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ABSTRACT
This project examines state environmental policy and its effect upon state
economic growth. State policymakers actively pursue policies intended to positively
impact state economic growth. A policy area surrounded by controversy regarding its
affect upon economic performance is that of environmental regulation. Prior research
indicates that policymakers believe state environmental regulations influence business
decisions to invest in certain areas. In this research I seek to determine whether states
which deliberately enact more lax environmental regulatory standards succeed in
increasing state economic growth. State economic growth is modeled as a function of
environmental policy variables and range of national economic and state demographic,
policy, financial, and institutional variables. Variables used to measure environmental
policy are critical to the results of the model estimations. When pollution abatement
compliance costs of business and industry are used as the measure of environmental
policy, state economies appear to suffer a detrimental impact as a result of more stringent
environmental policies. When state spending on environmental and natural resource
programs is used as the measure of environmental policies, state economies appear to
receive a positive impact as a result of more stringent regulations.
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CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION
What I am suggesting to you today is that federal land management and the
implementation of federal environmental laws in the West does not have to be a
contentious, win-lose, zero-sum game. This is not about sacrificing economic
benefits for environmental health -- it is about working together as a region to
have both.
--John Kitzhaber, Governor of Oregon, Federal Land Management Speech
Boise, Idaho, June 1, 2000.
State environmental regulatory policy and state economic development policy are
frequently viewed as policies with objectives that are in conflict with one another. Many
believe that in order to ensure a high level of environmental quality, sacrifices must be
made in the area of economic growth. In order in have a safe, clean environment,
industrial development must be kept to a minimum. By the same token, there are those
who believe that to grow a state economy, policymakers must be willing to lower
regulatory burdens in order to entice industry to remain or move into a state. These
individuals hold the view that some level of environmental degradation is acceptable in
order to attract industries that have the potential to affect a state economy in a positive
manner. Policy development is thus viewed as a competition between economic and
environmental goals. But the question remains as to whether these are in fact competing
policies. Must the environment be sacrificed in order to garner strong economic growth?
Do states that choose to enact strict environmental regulations pay a price in terms of
economic development? Do states that trade lax environmental policies for economic
development reap the rewards of strong economic performance? Broadly speaking, is
there a tradeoff between economic development and environmental quality? I seek to
answer these questions in this dissertation.
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State officials, along with those seeking state offices, frequently list economic
growth as their top priority. Elected officials often cite successful economic development
programs as reasons they deserve reelection. Candidates seeking state offices often run
on a pro-growth, pro-business platform. Finding ways to enhance economic development
through income and job growth are tasks toward which officials purport to work
endlessly. Indeed, various organizations and think tanks provide enumerable resources
for state leaders in their efforts to improve the economic growth of their home states (e.g.,
Council of State Governments, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Corporation for
Enterprise Development). Tax incentives for businesses, better public schools, low crime
rates, and healthy environmental conditions are just a few of the suggestions often
proposed to improve a state’s economic growth potential. Great attention is centered on
efforts to develop effective methods for improving state economic growth and
development.
However, questions remain as to whether these pursuits have any merit. Many
state officials offer businesses lucrative financial incentives to consider locating within
their borders. These incentives can take on many forms, including tax breaks, cash
assistance, loan forgiveness, and low regulatory burdens. In order to attract and/or retain
business and industry, many states are willing to forgo immediate economic rewards in
the hopes of attaining long-term economic growth and development. It is unclear,
though, whether states do indeed achieve the economic benefits that they hope for when
adopting these policies.

2

Economic Development
A quick perusal of any state or local newspaper makes it quite evident that,
whether or not economic development policies actually work, state leaders believe it is
important to their constituencies to pursue such policies. News stories are often filled
with promises of potential new businesses and the jobs they bring with them. Leaders
must be viewed as working aggressively to improve state economic conditions. To be
considered effective, state officials work to bring jobs and, thus, economic prosperity to
their states. State websites generally have direct links on their homepages listing
information on how to start, locate, or expand a business within their borders. Many
states follow the examples of California and Alabama and list the economic incentives
readily available to businesses relocating or expanding within their borders. Indeed the
state of New York proudly has a “NY Loves Business” link on which it declares itself a
“pro-business, pro-growth state” in order to attract businesses. Oregon asserts that it is a
“small business state” ranking top in the nation in electronic commerce. Even a
seemingly rural state, such as Wyoming declares itself “Open for Business” on its
business resources webpage. The campaign to lure new businesses and encourage
expansion by existing businesses is constant for state governmental officials. Economic
development is considered critical if a given elected official is to be viewed as a
successful leader.
“The objective of state economic development policy is to promote investment in
a particular location” (Saiz and Clarke, 1999, p. 475). State officials seek to convince
business leaders that their particular state offers the best climate within which to conduct
business. States are under increased pressure to compete with each other for these
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businesses (Brierly and Costello, 1999). Saiz and Clarke point out that state leaders have
very limited control of the movement of the objects of production through their borders.
Officials cannot mandate that businesses locate within their states. They do not have the
ability to direct the location decisions of businesses. Thus, state policymakers try to
entice investment through the offer of incentives for businesses.
Saiz and Clarke (1999) identify three types of economic development strategies
employed by the states: strategies for infrastructure, locational incentives, and
entrepreneurial strategies. Strategies for infrastructure focus state attention and resources
on the physical infrastructure of a state, such as roads and highways (p.481).
Entrepreneurial strategies focus on developing opportunities for growth and innovation
within a state, such as providing seed money for business formation or research (p.491).
Locational incentives focus on lowering the operating costs either for businesses newly
locating to a state or for existing businesses considering expansion. It is the locational
incentive type of economic development strategy that is the focus of this study.
Examples of states offering locational incentives or engaging in “smokestack
chasing” are plentiful (Saiz and Clarke, 1999; Mahtesian, 1994; Mahtesian, 1996;
Mahtesian, 1998). State leaders try to convince businesses that they will reap more
economic rewards by locating within their particular states. In 1993 the governor of
Illinois offered incentives to convince two companies to remain in the state. Tootsie Roll
industries was offered $20,000,000 in loans, $1,400,000 in tax exemptions, and $200,000
for job training. Nabisco was extended $30,000,000 in tax incentives and $700,000 for
job training. North Dakota held a special legislative session in 1994 for the sole purpose
of changing tax laws in order to be able to offer tax incentives to lure a corn processing
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plant to the state. Over a six year period, New York offered $176,000,000 worth of tax
breaks and concessions to NBS, CBS, and ABC television networks to prevent them from
leaving for another state (Mahtesian, 1994). Some Southern states have offered
enormous incentives to lure automobile manufacturers to their areas. In the 1980s
Tennessee offered incentives to Nissan amounting to $11,000 per job created and offered
Saturn incentives worth $26,000 per job created. In 1985 Kentucky leaders convinced
Toyota to locate a plant in their state with $150,000,000 worth of incentives. A
$300,000,000 incentive package won the state of Alabama a new Mercedes-Benz plant
(Mahtesian, 1994). In the past decade, much news has been made of the incentives
offered to sports franchises to locate (or remain) within a state. Maryland built a new
stadium to successfully lure a football team from Ohio, Missouri received a football
franchise after building a new $300,000,000 stadium, and many other states are willing to
offer new facilities, free rents, and other incentives to secure their own teams (Mahtesian,
1998). In the 1980s states and localities spent $750,000,000 to lure sports teams to their
areas, by the mid-1990s the amount dedicated to similar efforts reached $8,000,000,000
(Saiz and Clarke, 1999). It is clear that states are willing to invest significant amounts of
money to entice businesses to move to or stay within their jurisdictions. Economic
development policies designed to lower the costs of business operations or directly
provide aid to such operations are routinely employed by state leaders.
However, it is not always guaranteed that such economic development policies
will translate into economic growth within a state. States that engage in “bidding wars”
for businesses or sports franchises cannot be certain that winning the “bidding war” will
win them economic growth. Pennsylvania provided $71,000,000 worth of incentives to
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Volkswagen to open a new plant in the state in 1978. Within ten years, the plant closed
down. In the early 1990s Minnesota provided Northwest Airlines with a $270,000,000
loan; however, the airline postponed the planned expansion. Similarly, General Motors
shut down a plant in Michigan even though it was under an agreement to remain open in
order to receive tax breaks from the state and local governments (Mahtesian, 1994).
Hence, while state leaders may be eager to provide inducements to retain existing or
attract new businesses, there is no assurance that an economic benefit will be gained as a
result.
The Role of States in Environmental Regulation
In this research I investigate whether a particular locational incentive used to
attract businesses actually results in state economic growth. Governmental regulation of
business and industry affects the operational decisions that business leaders make. Just as
state leaders believe that offering tax breaks and other financial incentives will attract
businesses to their states, leaders believe that environmental regulations effect the site
location decisions of firms (Jaffe, Peterson, Portney, and Stavins, 1995). Because of the
intense economic development competition between states, officials may choose to lower
regulatory burdens in order to be more competitive in attracting business and industry.
Since a business can choose the state to which it will locate, it can choose which state
will regulate its interests (Williams, 1999). By lowering environmental regulatory
standards, state officials can offer businesses reduced operating costs. Lower standards
can allow businesses to spend less money on pollution control measures, and thus, lower
their operating costs. A decrease in operating costs allows businesses to make more
profits. Consequently, states that adopt less stringent environmental regulations increase
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the earning potential of businesses and may be more attractive to businesses than states
with more stringent environmental standards. Moreover, firms currently located in the
state may be less prone to being lured to move to another state.
Broad environmental regulation began with the federal government in the late
1960s and early 1970s: the Clean Air Act was passed in 1970, the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments in 1972, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act in
1976, and the Clean Air Act Amendments and the Clean Water Act Amendments in 1977
(Bartik, 1988; McConnell and Schwab, 1990; Ringquist, 1993). Until these major pieces
of legislation were passed, the states exercised dominance in environmental
policymaking, and there was much variation among the states. Indeed, this variation
caused some severe environmental problems, which prompted interests groups to push
for federal involvement in environmental regulation (Williams, 1999). Further, federal
policymakers were concerned about states using environmental regulation as a weapon in
their “bidding wars” with one another for businesses to locate within their borders. A
significant reason for the passage of this federal legislation in the 1960s and 1970s was to
eliminate state variation and have the same rules for all to follow. For instance,
according to one House report:
“The promulgation of Federal emission standards for new sources . . . will
preclude efforts on the part of States to compete with each other in trying to
attract new plants and facilities without assuming adequate control of large scale
emissions therefrom.”
(H. Report No. 91-1146 in Legislative History of the Clean Air Act [1979], Taken
from Bartik, 1998, p. 24).
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Many federal regulations were designed to prevent states from using environmental
regulatory factors as a tool in their endless competition to secure economic growth.
However, during the 1980s and the devolution movement of Ronald Reagan,
states began to exert more control over their own environmental policies and regulations.
Under our federal system of government, much power was restored to the states to
manage environmental activities within their borders. Supporters of devolution policies
maintain the appropriateness of this movement since states and localities are most
knowledgeable about environmental conditions in their areas and best able to respond to
changing circumstances. Detractors argue that states frequently do not possess the
financial capabilities to address significant environmental problems in an adequate
manner (Sabat, 2004). It may also be true that some states do not find an economic
advantage in certain environmental policies. Increased authority over environmental
policy allows these states some flexibility in their environmental programs. While states
cannot establish regulatory requirements below those set by the EPA, there is much room
for variation above the EPA “baseline.” Many states choose to go further with their
regulatory burdens. These states enact environmental policies more stringent than the
EPA. Other states choose to keep their regulations at the minimum level required by the
EPA. They maintain the federal requirements, but make no effort to enact environmental
policies that are more restrictive than those of the federal government (Sabatier, 1973).
Further, states can use procedural rules to help “loosen” environmental regulations.
According to Gray and Shadbegian, (1998) “state regulators have substantial discretion
when making plant level decisions, such as where to direct enforcement activity and how
strict (or slow) to make the permit application (p. 238)” Thus, states can maintain federal
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requirements but act on them in a manner designed to give industry more leeway in
fulfilling their environmental obligations.
Some observers contend that this environmental regulatory competition among
states is waning. State officials have come to develop a cooperative view of
environmental and economic goals, rather than a conflicting view (Fiorina, 2001;
Graham, 1998). State and industrial leaders have speculated about the economic benefits
of preventing pollution on the front-end rather than controlling it later in the game.
While it is certainly true that some states consider a “green” strategy as part of their
overall incentive package to attract new industry, it is not clear that all states have
embraced this philosophy. The conflicts of “jobs vs. environment” and “growth vs.
regulation” are arguments that are still waged. Many state leaders believe that the costs
of environmental regulation weigh into location decisions made by business and industry.
This is especially true for states that have economies that are highly dependent upon
polluting industries (Williams, 1999). Leaders in these states believe that lower
environmental standards will assist the industries that are so vital to their economies.
Thus, they provide locational incentives in the form of lower regulatory costs to convince
existing industries to remain within their borders and to attract new industries to locate to
their jurisdictions.
Organization of Research
The purpose of this dissertation is to ascertain whether state officials can effect
state economic growth through environmental regulatory policymaking. Different states
have taken various approaches to secure “better” economic performance. A controversial
incentive in many states is that of environmental regulations. Some states choose to have
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strict regulations in order to ensure higher environmental quality; this is expected to make
the state an attractive place to live and, hence, attract new businesses, though the strict
regulations that create an attractive place to live usually impose some costs on businesses.
Other states try a different approach. They offer looser environmental regulations in an
attempt to provide incentives for businesses to relocate within their borders or to remain
in their state. Of course, this approach reduces the cost of regulation but likely results in
the very lower levels of environmental quality that some believe will draw new
businesses to the state.
In this project, I attempt to identify the effects of environmental regulations upon
the economic performance of the states. Do states that adopt more relaxed environmental
regulations as an incentive to lure and keep businesses actually succeed in stimulating
economic performance? In order to answer this question, I explore the linkage between
environmental policy and state economic performance. The dependent variables are
various indicators of state economic performance, including economic growth and
unemployment. The primary independent variable of interest is environmental
regulation. A variety of control variables are included in the analysis. These control
variables include state business incentive policies, national economic conditions, state
fiscal conditions, state structural characteristics, and state demographic characteristics. I
utilize state data from 1977 to 2003 to determine if state economic performance is a
function of environmental regulation.
I review existing research and develop a model to estimate the effects of state
environmental policy on state economic performance. Chapter 2 consists of the review of
research surrounding the topics of state economic growth and development and state
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environmental policy. I begin with an examination of the literature surrounding the
determinants of state economic growth and the effects of state economic development
policies upon state economic growth. I then review the literature surrounding the
determinants of state environmental policy and the effects of environmental policy upon
state environmental conditions. I conclude the chapter with an examination of the
literature of the effects of environmental quality and policy upon productivity, site
location decisions, job growth, and economic growth. Chapter 3 provides a description
of the theory driving this research. I illustrate the reasoning that may lead policymakers
to believe that they have to choose between economic growth or environmental quality.
In Chapter 4 I address problems associated with available state environmental policy data
and provide a description of the data to be utilized in testing my model of state economic
performance. Because of the complexities surrounding the measurement of
environmental policy across states over time, various researchers have utilized different
tools as a measure of environmental policy. I examine these variables and determine
which tool best captures the variable I seek to isolate in this research. Chapter 5
describes the research design used. I describe all dependent and independent variables in
detail. Further, I present the full model used in the analysis. In Chapter 6 I present the
results of my empirical analysis. I present the full findings of the analysis, providing a
detailed examination of each of the models estimated. Finally, in the concluding Chapter
7 I summarize the findings of this research. I attempt to answer the key question driving
this research – does the level of environmental stringency adopted by the states have an
effect upon their economic growth?
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CHAPTER 2:
LITERATURE REVIEW
In general, the studies that attempt to analyze directly the effects of
environmental regulations on trade and competitiveness are limited in
number. If one casts a wide enough net, however, by defining
competitiveness rather broadly and by searching for indirect as well as direct
evidence, it is possible to identify more than one hundred studies potentially
capable of shedding some light on the relationship. It is nearly the case,
however, that no two of these studies ask the same questions or even examine
the same problem. (Jaffe, Peterson, Portney, and Stavins, 1995, p. 135)

Political scientists have devoted much attention to the issues surrounding state
economic growth and development policies. Literature on the subject ranges from
general explorations of determinants of state growth to the study of how states can
deliberately affect their economic development to examinations of the effect of specific
policies/regulations upon economic development. I review this body of research in turn
beginning with state economic growth and moving on to economic development. I then
shift the review to the topic of particular concern to this research – i.e., environmental
policy and economic performance. I first consider the literature discussing determinants
of state environmental policy and then proceed to review analyses of the effect of
environmental regulation upon productivity and state economic growth.
State Economic Growth and Development Policies
Researchers have expended much effort examining issues surrounding state
economic growth and economic development policies. However, research on the
determinants of state economic growth does not provide a definitive answer as to what
factors are most critical in influencing the growth of state economies. Further, research
on the effect of state economic development policies does not clearly indicate whether or
not states can influence their economies by pursuing specific development policies. The
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findings presented by various political scientists differ according to the variables used to
examine the particular questions examined.
Economic Growth
A critical question in the area of state economic growth is exactly what factors
exert the greatest influence upon state economies. Researchers try to determine whether
states even have the ability to effect their economic growth or whether factors outside the
control of state policymakers are more important determinants of state growth.
Moreover, different variables are used by researchers to measure state economic growth.
State variables used include change in per capita income, change in value added by
manufacturing, change in levels of nonagricultural employment, change in living
conditions, change in total personal income, real total personal income, capital levels,
labor resources, and technological resources. The conclusions reached by scholars differ
according to the variables used in their analyses.
Brace (1991) examines influences upon state economic growth. Working on the
theory that state ability to influence economic conditions may fluctuate over different
time periods examined, he seeks to determine whether states can have an impact on their
own economic development or whether national economic conditions dominate state
economies. Using change in per capita income as the measure of economic growth,
Brace (1991) finds that states’ abilities to affect their economic growth have changed
over time. From 1968 to 1979, states exhibit no effect on their economies with the
development policies pursued. However, Brace finds that this changes from 1980 to
1985. Changes in pressure placed upon the national economy from international markets
have enabled states to exert more influence upon their economies. This is particularly
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true in states possessing the institutional characteristics of strong gubernatorial capacity
and more professional legislatures. State economic development and taxation policies do
have an effect upon per capita income. Further, states with more professional legislatures
and more powerful governors were able to achieve greater effects. Brace cautions,
though, that during the 1980s the national economy was strained and this finding may not
hold for long-term economic growth. He notes that “while the role of states in shaping
their economic growth is on the rise, there may be many reasons to question the
sufficiency of state activity for sustaining long-term economic growth” (p.312).
Brace (1993) confirms these findings in a further development of his model. In
addition to change in per capita income, Brace examines whether states can have an
effect upon levels of nonagricultural employment and change in value added by
manufacturing. Again Brace finds that the ability of states to influence these factors of
economic growth was altered during different time periods examined. Changes in value
added by manufacturing exhibit a similar pattern to changes in per capita income.
National economic conditions display more of an influence than do state economic
development efforts until the 1980s. At this point states efforts begin to exert an
influence upon economic growth. Employment trends are a bit different, however. Brace
finds that state factors demonstrate more of an effect upon nonagricultural employment
than do national conditions. While Brace does note the dominant role of the states in
influencing employment and acknowledges the growing role of the state in influencing
economic growth during the 1980s, he holds that overall national conditions exert greater
influence over state economic growth than do state efforts.
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In his exploration of the volatility of state economies, Crain (2003) questions the
theoretical argument that national economic conditions dominate state economies. Crain
examines national and state economic trends in the last half of the twentieth century. He
notes that while overall U.S. income growth declined from 3.8% in the 1940s to a rate of
1.3% in the 1990s, there was not a similar pattern of slowdown in income growth in the
states. Crain holds that over half of state economies did not follow the national trend,
“the economies of 28 American states departed from the “national” pattern and showed
no significant slowdown in the last half of the twentieth century” (p. 9). Indeed in
examining different aspects of state economies (e.g., growth, living standards, volatility),
Crain finds that there is much variation among the states’ economic performance. He
demonstrates that the individual states experienced very different economic trends from
one other and from the nation throughout the twentieth century, thus, calling into
question the idea that national economic conditions drive state economic growth.
Conversely, Hendrick and Garand (1991) find that national economic conditions
are becoming increasingly important to state economic growth. They examine state
economic data from 1945 to 1984. The variables used to capture state economic growth
are yearly changes in total personal income, real (deflated) total personal income, and per
capita income. By examining yearly means and standard deviations of state economic
growth, they determine that immediately after World War II, deviations from the mean
were high, but this has been decreasing since the 1960s. This increased centering around
the mean leads the authors to hypothesize that state economies are becoming more
influenced by forces outside their control. Indeed, when the authors then examine
variation in growth, they find that, while conditions within states still account for much of
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the variation, this trend has been steadily declining since the 1960s, as well. Hence,
Hendrick and Garand determine that national factors are becoming increasingly important
to state economic growth and should be considered in future research.
The findings of Brierly and Costello (1999) appear to support the theory that state
economic growth is due largely to factors outside the control of state governments. The
authors examine the influence of state economic conditions upon gross state product from
1963 to 1991. They determine that state level capital (measured as the value of bank
assets), state labor resources (measured as the total number of civilian employees), and
technological resources (determined through use of an error correction mechanism) are
critical elements for state economic growth and development. This finding is supported
by the research of Brierly and Feiock (1993) who examine the effects of state economic
conditions and interest group organization upon state economic growth. This study notes
the significance of capital and labor as determinants of economic growth, “economic
resources, rather than organization, appear to matter more in determining income growth
rates” (p. 667). Brierly and Costello (1999) posit that states actually have very little
control over levels of state capital, labor, and technology. The consolidation of the
banking industry to the detriment of local banks leads to forces outside of the states
determining the capital flow into the states. The type of significant change in a state
labor market that could effect economic growth is not likely to occur through state efforts
alone. This requires long-term commitments from political leaders that are unlikely to
pay off within their tenures, and thus, are unlikely to occur. Technological changes are
not confined within state borders. Innovations occur throughout the economy and are not
likely to produce immediate economic improvement in particular states. Thus, the
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authors determine that while the state economic conditions of state level capital, labor,
and technological resources are crucial components to state economic growth, they argue
that these are exogenous variables outside the control of state policymakers.
The literature on the dominant influences upon state economic growth does not
provide clear answers as to which factors are most important for state economic growth.
Much of the literature does point to outside forces, such as national economic conditions,
as playing a significant role in state economic growth. When change in specific state
economic indicators and state level resources are used to measure state economic growth,
variables outside of state control appear to exert greater influence over state economic
growth than do state level variables. However, these results are not conclusive. When
analysis focuses upon rates of growth within the states over time, variability does exist.
Even during times when all states are subject to the same national economic conditions,
their individual rates of growth differ. This calls into question the notion that state
factors are less important in determining state economic growth than are national factors.
Further explanation is necessary to clarify the factors that drive state economic growth.
Economic Development Policy
Before specifically addressing the topic of economic growth and environmental
policies, I conduct a more general examination of the literature on economic
development. The effectiveness of economic development policy is well-worn ground
for political economy scholars. Researchers have examined issues surrounding the effect
of local economic development policies, state locational incentive policies, state and local
tax policies, state spending policies, and redistributional policies. They seek to
understand whether states and localities can have an impact upon their economic growth
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and their overall economic “health” through the use of specific economic development
policies. Tools used to measure economic growth in the various analyses include
unemployment rates, change in business indicators (e.g., number of firms), and changes
in personal and per capita income. These measures have allowed researchers to isolate
the effects of state and local economic development policies.
Feiock (1991) examines the effect of economic development policies upon local
economic growth during the 1970s and 1980s. He surveys city officials in 212 U.S. cities
to determine the use of various economic development policies (e.g., loan guarantees, tax
abatements, industrial development bonds). His measures of economic performance
focus on the manufacturing sector and include change in capital investment, change in the
number of firms, and change in employment. He finds that local policies do have an
effect upon capital investment, some effect upon the number of firms, but no apparent
effect upon employment. However, Feiock does not include state policies in his analysis
and as a result may be missing a large piece of the economic development puzzle by not
including state factors such as regulatory policy.
Ambrosius (1989), on the other hand, focuses specifically on state policies by
conducting a time-series analysis of eight state economic development/locational
incentive policies. She examines the effect of state revenue bond financing, state funds
for city/county development-related public works, accelerated depreciation of industrial
equipment, tax breaks on equipment or machinery, tax breaks on land or capital
improvements, state incentives for building in a high unemployment area, state supported
training of the chronically unemployed, and state incentives to industry to train the
chronically unemployed upon state economic health from 1969 to1985 (p. 285). She uses
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two measures of economic health: per capita manufacturing value added and percentage
unemployed. National measures of per capita manufacturing and unemployment are used
as control variables. Ambrosius finds that none of the state economic development
policies have a statistically significant effect upon state economic health. She finds no
support for the use of these measures to aid a state’s economic health. Consistent with
the findings of Brace (1991) and Hendrick and Garand (1991), Ambrosius finds that the
national economic control variables are significantly related to her measures of state
economic health.
Dye (1980) examines a different set of state policies. He measures economic
performance by examining growth in personal income, growth in employment, and
growth in value added by manufacturing from 1972 to 1976. Dye focuses on three types
of policies that he hypothesizes might effect state economic growth: taxes, spending
(specifically, spending on education, highways, welfare and health and hospitals), and
redistributional programs. Controlling for other state characteristics, Dye does not find
that tax policies or redistributional policies have an effect upon any of his measures of
economic growth. Only one of the spending policies examined exhibits an independent
effect upon each of the measures of economic growth. State highway expenditures
provide the strongest relationship with state economic growth. He speculates that
infrastructure investment is the most effective policy that states can pursue in their efforts
to improve economic growth.
Jones (1990) also examines how state spending affects economic growth. The
dependent variables he uses to measure state economic growth from 1964 to 1984 are
changes in employment, net business establishments created or lost, changes in personal
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income, and changes in per capita income. The spending policies examined are
education, highways, welfare, police/fire services, and health/hospitals. He finds that
spending on welfare and health/hospitals is negatively related to economic growth.
Spending on education and highways produces mixed results during different time
periods studied, with a significantly positive relationship between these variables and
economic growth in evidence during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Surprisingly,
spending on police/fire services is positively related to growth. Jones speculates that the
support he finds for the effects of police/fire services spending might be because these are
generally locally-borne costs and these spending measures may be acting as a surrogate
for other spending measures such as water, sewerage, etc. If this is the case, this study
may lend support to Dye’s infrastructure investment theory.
Helms (1985) takes a different approach in his study of economic growth. He is
specifically interested in the effects of state and local tax policies on growth. Noting,
though, that tax policies should not be “studied in isolation,” he also examines state
expenditures and characteristics of the labor force. He examines data from 1970 to 1979,
with state personal income as the measure of economic growth. Consistent with research
focusing on the effect of tax policies upon economic growth at the national level (King
and Rebelo, 1990; Jorgenson and Yun, 1990), Helms finds that state tax policies do have
an effect upon economic growth. He finds that tax increases decrease economic growth.
He takes the analysis further, however, by examining how tax money collected is spent
by state governments. Like Jones (1990), Helms determines that tax measures designed
to increase spending on redistributional programs are negatively related to growth. On
the other hand, tax measures designed to increase spending on programs such as
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highways and education are positively related to growth. Helms speculates that the
negative effects of higher taxes may be lessened if the taxes are used to fund (nonredistributional) programs that will make a state a more attractive site for business
(re)location. He posits that such non-redistributional spending has a positive,
“stimulative effect” upon a state’s economy.
This body of research produces interesting results. Those studies that use some
measure of change in an economic indicator as the dependent variable are more likely to
find that economic development policies can have an impact upon economic growth.
Studies that do find support for the effectiveness of economic development policies seem
to indicate that infrastructure development policies are the types of policies which can
produce a positive affect on state economic growth. State policymakers who wish to
increase state economic growth are better served by implementing infrastructure
development policies rather than redistributional policies. Thus, this research suggests
that the type of dependent variable used is critical to understanding the impact of
economic development policies. If the effect of economic development policies is to be
understood, then dependent variables used to study these effects should be centered on
understanding the change that these policies can produce. Further, not all economic
development policies are equal. Some are more effective than others at producing the
economic benefits pursued by state policymakers.
State Environmental Policy/Regulation
I am interested primarily in studying the effects that state environmental
regulatory policy have on state economic growth. Researchers engage in various studies
of environmental policymaking. States employ different levels of environmental
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policymaking and researchers seek to understand the causes of these differences among
the states. One area of research focuses on the reasons that states adopt specific
environmental policies and the extent to which the states engage in environmental
policymaking. Another area of research centers on the effect that environmental
regulation has on business productivity. Still, other researchers specifically examine the
economic effects of environmental regulations. In this section I examine these
explorations surrounding the determinants of state environmental policy, the effects of
environmental policy upon business activity, and the effects of environmental policy
upon the economy.
Environmental Policy
Environmental policymaking varies considerably among the states. Efforts are
undertaken to understand what factors influence state policymakers in determining which
policies are enacted. Researchers explore broad environmental policies, specific
pollutant policies, and enforcement policies within the states. Various factors are
examined to ascertain which have the greatest influence upon policymakers when
choosing to adopt environmental policies. These factors include environmental
conditions, political influences, economic resources, ideology, federal activity, regional
activity, and institutional characteristics. Thus, a broad range of variables are
investigated to understand the extent to which states engage in environmental
policymaking.
Hays, Esler, and Hays (1996) examine state influences upon the state level of
commitment to environmental policies. They review six possible influences upon state
environmental policy: environmental conditions, economic resources, political pressure,
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elite ideology, institutional characteristics, and federal activity. They use the Green
Index (Hall and Kerr, 1991) to measure state environmental commitment. Hays et al.
determine that the strongest influences upon state environmental commitment are
political pressure (measured as state public opinion liberalism, state membership in
environmental groups, and percentage of employees in the manufacturing sector), elite
ideology, and legislative professionalism. Of particular interest to the purpose of this
research is the effect of political pressure. State membership in environmental groups
and percentage of employees in the manufacturing sector both show a positive
relationship to environmental policy. Hays et al. hypothesize that large businesses may
have a competitive reason for supporting stricter environmental policies; stricter
regulations may add to operational costs and keep smaller firms from entering the market.
Thus, more stringent environmental regulations may add to the competitive advantage of
large firms.
Another area of interest for researchers is that of the determinants of hazardous
waste policy in the states (Lester, Franke, Bowman, and Kramer, 1983; Daley and
Garand, 2002). Lester et al. (1983) examine factors such as technological pressure
(problem severity), state economic resources, political demands, bureaucratic structure,
and legislative professionalism. Using a 1979 survey of state toxic substances programs
as a measure of state hazardous waste policy, the authors find that technological pressure,
administrative authority, bureaucratic structure, and legislative professionalism are the
strongest determinants of state hazardous waste policies. States respond to technical
pressure, i.e., problem severity. These variables appear to interact with one another,
though. In states where the hazardous waste levels are high, the legislature takes the
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initiative in hazardous waste policymaking. In low hazardous waste states, the
bureaucracy takes the initiative in policymaking. Similarly, Daley and Garand (2002)
investigate the effects of problem severity and economic resources on state hazardous
waste policy. They also test the effects of political influences, interest group influence,
and regional influences upon hazardous waste policy. Daley and Garand find that
problem severity, prior pro-environmental policy activity of a state, economic resources,
and regional influences have an effect upon state hazardous waste policy.
The effect of regional influences upon state environmental policy is further
explored by researchers (Pashigian, 1985; Fredriksson and Millimet, 2002). In his
examination of the policy of prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) – a policy that
mandates that areas that exceed the minimum air quality standards cannot allow
significant deterioration of their air quality – Pashigian (1985) finds that regions’ support
of the policy reflect competitive self-interests. Regions that have “dirtier” air are much
more supportive of the PSD, thereby, ensuring that other “cleaner” regions can not
engage in the economic development policies that cause their “dirtier” air. Thus, the
“clean” regions are not able to entice polluting industries to move from the “dirty”
regions to the “clean” ones. Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) examine whether states
respond to the environmental policies of their neighbors – whether evidence can be found
for a “race to the bottom” (or top) among neighboring states. They determine that the
neighbor effect moves in one direction – up. States are moved to adopt more stringent
regulations if their neighbors enacted such policies, frequently surpassing the stringency
of their neighbors. However, states do not follow their neighbors in adopting less
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stringent environmental regulations. An environmental “race to the bottom” does not
occur among less stringent states.
List and Gerking (2000) question whether the stringency of states’ environmental
regulations declined during the Reagan years when much authority over environmental
regulation was passed back to the states. Again, evidence does not support a “race to the
bottom.” List and Gerking do not find that states relaxed their environmental standards
when given greater control over environmental regulations. They note that “indicators of
environmental quality on the state level either continued to improve or at least did not
deteriorate” (p.454). Additionally they find weak support for a positive relationship
between economic growth and environmental regulation. As income increases, there is
an increase in environmental regulatory stringency. The authors suggest that as income
increases, people are more willing to pay the costs associated with pollution abatement
policies. However, there may something else at work here. It is possible that the
variables are endogenous. Rather than income increases producing a willingness among
people to pay for pollution costs, it may be that strong environmental regulations produce
a business climate conducive to economic growth. Thus, the causal flow may not be in
the direction presumed by the authors.
Crotty (1987) examines the issue of state primacy (authorization) under the Clean
Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, and the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act. The EPA allows states to apply for primacy in
environmental enforcement. Once approved, the state becomes the primary enforcement
agency regulating national (and state) environmental standards. Crotty outlines reasons
why the federal government encourages state assumption of primacy: the federal
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government wants the states to be the primary enforcement entity, the federal government
wants to reduce the amount of money provided to states for pollution control, and the
federal government hopes that states will enact even stricter environmental standards than
those delineated by the EPA. Crotty determines that states quickly began to assume
primacy once the option was made available by the EPA. Crotty further investigates the
reasons state officials decide to assume primacy for the enforcement of environmental
regulations within their states, finding that states with past histories of strong
environmental regulation are quickest to apply for primacy. One aberrant finding,
though, occurs in Southern states, which seek primacy but do not have strong histories of
environmental protection. This is also consistent with the findings of Lester, et al. (1983)
that Southern states are active in hazardous waste policy. Crotty (1987: 65) hypothesizes
that Southern states’ assumption of primacy has less to do with environmental protection
and more to do with an interest in controlling the procedures of environmental regulation
in an attempt to offer advantages to businesses within their states or entice new
businesses to locate within their borders.
Sigman (2005) also examines primacy or authorization within the states. Her
study focuses on whether states that are authorized under the Clean Water Act engage in
free riding behavior to the detriment of neighbors who share a common water stream.
Sigman examines whether states that are downstream of an authorized state experience
lower water quality than the authorized upstream state, suggesting that an authorized state
is not vigilant in its enforcement/monitoring responsibilities. She finds that “the
coefficient on being downstream from an authorized state is negative and statistically
significant, which is consistent with free riding [and] suggests a 4% reduction in the
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water quality index” (p. 92). Thus, the downstream state bears the costs of environmental
damage and cleanup that should have been managed by the authorized, upstream state.
Hence, Sigman determines that authorization does allow free riding to occur.
Helland (1998) studies influences upon enforcement efforts in thirty states in
1990. Enacting a policy is only part of the environmental puzzle; implementation of
enforcement is a necessary part of ensuring environmental compliance. A state may
enact strict policies, but if these policies are not enforced, there is no need for industry to
abide by pollution abatement requirements. Using EPA data on state enforcement of the
Clean Water Act of the pulp and paper industry, Helland determines that both budgetary
and political factors influence enforcement efforts of the states. States with smaller
budgets conduct fewer inspections, but the inspections that are conducted are more
comprehensive. States that pay their environmental regulators larger salaries are likely to
conduct fewer comprehensive inspections. Local economic factors are taken into account
when determining whether or not to conduct a rigorous inspection. In economically
depressed areas, if a plant is likely to shut down due to violations, a comprehensive
inspection is less likely to occur (p. 244). Overall, the enforcement decisions made by
state regulatory agencies will take into account both budgetary and political-economic
factors. It is interesting to note that Helland finds that a plant that has recently undergone
a comprehensive inspection has lower pollution levels than other plants that have not
been recently inspected. Related to this finding is that of Shimshack and Ward (2005).
These authors determine that when a state regulatory agency imposes a fine on a firm for
an environmental violation, both the fined plant and other plants under the authority of
the agency will have reductions in violations. Thus, firms react to the enforcement
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decisions made by regulators, whether or not they are the firm directly affected by the
enforcement action.
An examination of the determinants of state environmental policy indicates that a
variety of factors influence state environmental policymaking. Critical factors include
political pressure, elite ideology, institutional capacity, environmental conditions (i.e.,
problem severity), regional influences, prior history of environmental policymaking, and
economic resources. State policymakers respond to both internal state pressures and
external influences. While internal pressures can result in policymakers going in either a
more or less stringent direction in environmental policymaking, it appears that external
regional pressures influence states to adopt more stringent environmental policies. Also
important to note is that states can only act when they have the ability to act. Institutional
capacity (e.g., legislative professionalism and bureaucratic authority) and economic
resources are important determinants in state environmental policymakers. Thus, state
officials respond to a diverse set of factors when adopting environmental policy.
Environmental Policy and Productivity
More closely related to the issue of environmental regulation and the impact that
state policies have on businesses are studies conducted on the effect that such regulations
have on business productivity. Researchers in this area examine the regulatory impact on
specific industries. They seek to uncover the effect that various environmental and
workplace regulations have had on the industries examined. This body of research
focuses on whether businesses have experienced a decline in productivity and
competitiveness as a result of regulations imposed by government.
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Noting the decline in productivity in the U.S. from the mid-1960s and throughout
the 1970s, researchers have sought to determine the effect of environmental regulations
upon this decline. Christainsen and Haveman (1981) conduct a time-series regression of
the manufacturing sector from 1958 to 1977. They determine that between 12% and 21%
of the decline in productivity in the U.S. after 1973 was due to the introduction of stricter
environmental regulations. Gollop and Roberts (1983) examine the specific effect of
regulations of sulfur dioxide emissions upon the electric power industry each year from
1973 to 1979. They determine that environmental regulations had a negative effect upon
the productivity rate of the electric power industry. They note that the initial effects of
regulation result in larger negative effects on productivity, with the largest effect felt in
1976 – the year EPA standards went into full effect – but negative effects are persistent
even after the initial shock of the implementation of the more stringent regulations. The
authors find that “the annual average productivity growth for these firms would have
been 44% higher had it not been for sulfur dioxide regulations” (p. 672).
Similarly, Gray (1987) studies the effects of OSHA and EPA regulations on the
manufacturing sector (450 different industries within the sector) from 1958 to 1978. He
estimates that 30% of the decline in productivity slowdown occurred as a result of
increased regulations. Indeed, the most highly regulated industries in the sector
experienced the greatest slowdowns in productivity. However, he does find that OSHA,
rather than EPA, regulations have the greatest effect upon the slowdown in
manufacturing productivity. Gray and Shadbegian (1998) explore a different
productivity question. They examine the effect that a firm’s investment in pollution
abatement technology has upon the firm’s investment in productive investment. They
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find a negative relationship between these types of investments by firms, “a dollar of
pollution abatement investment reduces productive investment by $1.88 at that plant” (p.
254). Thus, adhering to more stringent environmental regulations may cause firms to
invest less in improving production technologies.
However, Barbera and McConnell (1986) have different findings when analyzing
different sectors of the economy. Using a factor demand analysis, they examine
productivity in four sectors: paper, chemicals, stone, and primary metals. The authors
analyze the effect of environmental regulations upon these industries’ demand for capital.
They find a greater impact of the regulations upon productivity slowdown from 1960 to
1973 than from 1973 to 1980. They suggest that sometime after the implementation of
harsher regulations “the marginal effect of an additional dollar of abatement capital on
productivity fell, either because of technological changes in abatement techniques or the
gradual adjustment to pollution regulation” (p. 167-168). Hence, Barbera and McConnell
determine that since industries can adapt to regulations, for a productivity decline to
result due to these environmental regulations the most heavily regulated industries must
be faced with severe productivity changes.
Jaffe, Peterson, Portney, and Stavins (1995) center their inquiry on the effect of
environmental regulation on competitiveness and productivity of firms. They review the
costs associated with environmental compliance and conduct a review of the existing
literature on the subject. Jaffe et al. argue that little evidence has been produced to link
industry slowdowns in competitiveness to increased environmental regulations. They
state that (1) stringency of regulations is hard to measure, (2) costs associated with
compliance are generally small in comparison to total expenditures of firms, (3) evidence
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has not shown that industries have migrated out of the country in large numbers to avoid
regulation, and (4) when firms do locate out of the country they tend to build plants in
line with U.S. standards. Further, they also argue that regulations have actually increased
the competitiveness of some firms. The authors note that data in this area are poor and
many researchers have failed to control for regulatory climate. Hence, the efforts to find
a link are constrained. They conclude with the notion that the truth of the relationship
may be somewhere in the middle of the two arguments. Some competitiveness/
productivity may be lost as a result of environmental regulation, but some may be gained
as well.
Other researchers examine the potential benefit of more stringent environmental
regulations upon productivity. Hart (2004) argues that strict regulations may lead firms
to engage in new areas of production research designed to maximize profits. He posits
that when industries are forced to engage in cleaner production methods, industrial
research efforts will focus toward techniques that will both benefit the environment and
improve productivity, “hence measures penalizing dirty technologies may not only raise
social utility, but also boost the growth rate of production” (p. 1097). Porter and van der
Linde (1995) contend that more stringent, “properly designed” regulations can lead to
“innovation offsets” in industrial processes that improve productivity and lead to more
cost effective methods of business operations. They provide case studies to support their
theory of a production benefit of strict environmental regulation, “[1] Ciba-Geigy’s . . .
two changes in production process . . . boosted yield by 40 percent . . . annual cost
savings of $740,000, [2] allowed 3M to reduce hazardous wastes by 10 tons per year at
almost no cost, yielding an annual savings of more than $200,000, [3] Dow redesigned its

31

production process . . . change cost $250,000 . . . savings of $2.4 million per year” (pgs.
102-103). Thus, the authors make a case that environmental regulation can push
industries toward innovations that will not only benefit the environment, but that also
result in greater productivity and cost savings.
The literature examining the effects of environmental regulations upon business
productivity produces mixed results. Studies that focus on individual industries during
the 1960s and 1970s (a period marked by increased federal regulation) find that
regulations do costs businesses in terms of lost of productivity. Increased regulations
caused a decline in productivity. However, studies that examine multiple industries after
the initial increase in regulations in the 1960s and 1970s find a less severe impact of
regulation on business productivity. Indeed, some authors theorize that increased
regulations actually force businesses to be more creative in research development and this
may result in productivity increases for business and industry. Research results in this
area are dependent upon the number of industries included in the study and the time
period examined.
Economic Effects of Environmental Policy
Environmental policy can effect economic growth in a number of ways.
Researchers attempt to identify the specific impacts that regulations have on business and
industry and how these impacts affect the overall economy. Regulations can have an
effect on employment levels. If businesses must assume greater costs as a result of
increased regulations, they may lay off employees in order to offset these expenses.
Regulations may also influence business decisions to either expand an existing facility or
to locate in a new area. Costs associated with regulations may be critical in making such
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business choices. These employment and site location decisions will ultimately affect the
local economies in which these businesses operate. Economic growth or economic
decline can result from businesses deciding to hire or fire employees and whether
business decide to remain in or leave a locality. Research examines effects upon
employment, plant location decisions, and overall economic performance.
Predictive Models of Economic Growth
Bovenberg and Smulders (1996) directly examine the link between environmental
policy and economic growth. However, they take a unique approach. They consider the
environment as a public good with two potential uses: consumption or production input.
The authors consider factors of production such as technology, preferences, income,
savings, knowledge, and man-made production factors in developing their endogenous
growth model. Ultimately, they determine that (in the long run) if the environment is a
consumption good, then economic growth will decline as regulations prevent its use.
Conversely, if the environment is a production input, then economic growth will increase
as regulations enhance the quality of this input.
Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990) model U.S. economic growth both with
environmental regulations and without them. They take into account historical
exogenous variables, and based on past performance, project their future value. They
assume inelastic capital. They use as a base case the economy with pollution regulations
and simulate an economy without these regulations. By focusing on three costs
associated with environmental regulation – operating costs associated with pollution
abatement, costs of investments to meet environmental standards, and cost of emissions
controls – they determine that U.S. economic growth would have been 0.034% points

33

higher from 1973 to 1985 without environmental regulations. Further, GNP would have
been 0.074% points higher. Jorgenson and Wilcoxen, thus, conclude that environmental
regulations “lowered the long-run capital stock, reduced long-term consumption . . . [and]
reduced the rate of capital accumulation” (p. 338).
Effects upon Employment Levels
In contrast to these predictive models, Goodstein (1999) examines the effect of
environmental regulation on job loss. He finds that environmental regulation has not
hindered employment, pointing out that in the 1990s, when spending for environmental
clean-up/regulation was at its all time high, unemployment was at its lowest since the
1960s. He finds that lay-offs directly attributed to increased environmental regulations
account for less than one tenth of one percent per year. Further, he does not find support
for mass relocation of plants into weak regulated areas, so-called “pollution havens.”
Finally, while he does find some support for environmentally created jobs, he discounts
this other side of the environment-jobs debate by pointing out that, while environmental
regulation does not cause drastic unemployment, it does not cure it either.
Wagner (2005) proposes a theory that under different sets of conditions
environmental regulation will have differing effects upon the employment sector. In a
setting in which environmental control efforts do not add significant costs to firms, there
is no financial incentive for firms to move toward abatement efforts. Thus, jobs will be
kept at the expense of the environment. In a setting that does place significant regulatory
costs upon polluting firms, an abatement industry will develop to assist in pollution
control. Jobs will be created in this new abatement industry. Thus, jobs that may be lost
in the polluting industry as a result of increased pollution abatement costs may be created
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in the new abatement industry, “aggregate employment and environmental quality are
complementary goals” (p. 154). In Wagner’s view, employment and environment are not
in conflict, but instead will find a balance within the regulatory path chosen by
policymakers.
Effect upon Site Location Decisions
Other research examines how business location decisions may be affected by
environmental regulations. Bartik (1988) investigates location decisions of Fortune 500
companies from 1972 to 1978. State spending devoted to environmental efforts are used
to measure environmental stringency. Specifically, Bartik uses spending on air and water
pollution control efforts divided by state manufacturing employment (p. 28). Using these
measures, he does not find a statistically significant relationship between environmental
regulations and site location decisions of new firms. Bartik hypothesizes that pollution
control costs are only a small part of the total operating costs for businesses, therefore,
these costs only account for a small portion of the location decision calculus. Thus,
evidence does not support the theory that environmental regulations will negatively effect
business location decisions because business leaders do not consider these costs to be
large enough to have a strong impact upon their decision.
McConnell and Schwab (1990) focus specifically on location decisions within the
motor vehicle sector in their analysis of the effects of environmental regulations upon site
selection. The authors examine environmental regulations at the county level. They use
measures of environmental conditions and industry pollution abatement costs to
determine stringency of environmental regulations. They do not find evidence to support
the theory that strict regulations deter plants from locating in an area. Further, they find
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weak support for firms choosing not to locate in an area with poor environmental
conditions. Levinson (1995) reviews studies examining international and domestic
business location decisions. His examination supports the finding of McConnell and
Schwab. He notes that “the literature as a whole presents fairly compelling evidence
across a broad range of industries, time periods, and economic specifications, that
regulations do not matter to site choice” (p. 23).
Conversely, List and Co (2000) do find a negative effect of state environmental
regulations upon location decisions by foreign firms. These authors use state spending on
environmental programs, industry pollution abatement spending, and an index of state
policies to measure the stringency of environmental regulations. They examine site
location decisions of foreign firms from 1986 to 1993. They determine that a “one
percentage increase or decrease in the independent variable changes the predicted
probability of a foreign firm choosing the most affected, median affected, and least
affected state” (p. 10). Interestingly, they find this effect for both pollution intensive and
non-pollution intensive firms. Thus, at least with regards to foreign direct investment,
state environmental policy does matter in the business location decisions of firms.
Becker and Henderson (2000) find similar results in their examination of air quality
regulations at the county level. The authors focus on plant location decision in four
industries: industrial organic chemicals, metal containers, plastics, and wood furniture.
Using environmental conditions as a measure of environmental policy, the authors
determine that industries in these sectors will move to “less polluted areas to avoid
stricter regulations in more polluted areas” (p. 380). More highly regulated areas have a
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35% - 45% less probability of having new firms locate within their borders. Hence, strict
environmental regulation deters the entry of new businesses.
Effect upon Economic Growth
Grossman and Krueger (1995) explore the economic growth/environmental
quality question from a different angle. They investigate whether countries that
experience higher levels of economic growth experience deterioration in environmental
conditions from 1977 to 1990. Using four measures of environmental conditions (i.e.,
urban air pollution, oxygen regime in river basins, fecal contamination of river basins,
and heavy metal contamination of river basins), the authors do not find that countries
with higher levels of economic growth suffer greater levels of environmental pollution.
Rather, “as nations or regions experience greater prosperity, their citizens demand that
more attention be paid to the noneconomic aspects of their living conditions” (p. 372).
Templet (1995) presents the question from the perspective of the effect of
environmental conditions upon economic growth. Rather than focusing on regulation in
his examination of the environment-economy debate, Templet analyzes environmental
risks and economic conditions. He finds that states which possess greater
environmentally risky conditions (e.g., chemical plants with high emissions) exhibit
poorer economic conditions. Templet argues that “an impacted or diminished
environmental base . . . reduces the long-term economic welfare because it can contribute
to less service to the economy . . . environmental abuse will also result in lowered public
welfare” (p. 38). Specifically, environmentally poor states have lower personal income,
greater income disparity, greater poverty, greater unemployment, poorer economic
“health scores,” lower retail sales growth, and greater numbers of business failures.
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Hence, Templet does not find that states with lower environmental standards are gaining
an economic benefit. Rather, these less environmentally healthy states become less
attractive to potential businesses and economic growth does not occur as a result of
business investment.
Similar results are found by Goetz, Ready, and Stone (1996). Using the Renew
America policy index of 1987 to 1989 and the Green Index ranking of environmental
quality, these authors examine the effect of environmental policies and conditions upon
economic growth in U.S. states from 1982 to 1991. They determine that better
environmental conditions had a positive effect upon per capita personal income growth.
They do not find a significant negative effect of environmental regulations upon growth,
“the coefficient estimate for environmental policies was positive but not statistically
significant, suggesting that any impact of stricter policies on economic growth was
negligible” (p. 104). The analysis seems to suggest that stricter environmental
regulations lead to better environmental conditions that, in turn, lead to higher economic
growth.
Meyer (1992) examines the effect of state environmental regulations upon four
different economic indicators: annual gross state product, state annual non-farm
employment growth, state annual manufacturing employment growth, and state annual
business failures. He creates a state environmental policy score based upon two policy
indexes from 1982 and 1990. He conducts the analysis for two time periods: 1982 to
1989 and 1990 to 1992. For the 1982 to 1989 time period, Meyer does not find a
statistically negative relationship between environmental stringency among any of his
economic indicators. Thus, he finds that the evidence does not support the contention
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that strict environmental regulations depress economic growth. In fact, while not
statistically significant, his results hint at a weak positive relationship between
environmental regulations and economic growth. However, when examining the
recessionary period of 1990 to 1992, Meyer finds that the coefficients do indicate a
negative relationship between environmental regulations and growth. However, once
again the coefficients are not statistically significant and no conclusions should be drawn
based on this finding alone. This leads Meyer to conclude that the evidence does not
support the contention that more stringent policies result in economic decline.
Feiock and Stream (2001) specifically examine the relationship between state
environmental policy and economic development from 1983 to 1994. Using new state
capital investment as the dependent variable, the authors develop measures for state
environmental policy using state spending on environmental programs, the cost of state
regulations upon polluters, tax incentives for pollution control, and the stability of
environmental policymaking institutions/decisions. They determine that different
policies have different effects upon economic development. Regulatory policies that
increase compliance costs for business have a negative impact upon new investment;
higher pollution control costs have a negative effect upon private sector growth rates (p.
318). However, increased state spending on environmental programs and state efforts to
establish clear administrative authority over and guidelines for environmental regulation
appear to have a positive impact upon economic development. When the uncertainty
surrounding potential environmental regulations is removed, businesses are more likely
to increase investments.
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The literature provides mixed results regarding the effect that environmental
regulations have upon state economic growth. Depending upon the time period studied
and the variables used to measure levels of environmental stringency, research studies
produce conflicting results. While there does not appear to be a link between
environmental regulations and unemployment, there is also no evidence to support the
idea that environmental regulations create employment. Research conducted in the early
1990s exploring the relationship between environmental regulations and business site
location decisions does not find that environmental regulations have an impact on site
location. However, more recent research finds support for the theory that environmental
regulations can have an impact upon site location decisions. Most of the research
exploring the relationship between environmental regulations and economic growth does
not find support for the theory that environmental regulation lowers economic growth.
Typically measures of state spending, environmental conditions, policy indexes, and
costs to business are used to measure environmental regulatory stringency. When
environmental policies are studied in isolation from one another, though, support is found
for the idea that regulations that increase pollution costs can lower growth rates.
However, environmental policies that increase state spending and clarify regulations are
found to have a positive impact upon economic growth.
Conclusion
The existing literature does not provide a conclusive understanding of the
relationship between environmental policy and economic growth. I have reviewed
research that explores questions surrounding state economic growth in general, the ability
of policymakers to affect growth through economic development policies, the
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determinants of state environmental policy, and the impact that environmental regulation
can have both on business productivity and economic growth. Quite often, researchers
focus their inquiries into specific sectors of the economy and caution must be used in
making generalizations from these results. When examining the relationship between
regulation and the economy, researchers are hampered in their efforts by the poor
measurement tools available. Measures that are specifically policy measures are crosssectional and do not allow the authors to examine variance in policies over time.
Alternative measures that are not policy-specific, but are longitudinal, serve as proxies
for policy variables in these longitudinal studies.
Missing from the literature is a longitudinal study that takes state characteristics,
national economic conditions, state fiscal conditions, business policies, environmental
conditions, and environmental stringency into account. In order to understand how one
variable affects another, all other possible variables that can affect the relationship must
be considered. To understand fully the potential effects that environmental regulations
can have upon state economic growth, other variables with the potential to effect
economic growth must be included in the study. In order to develop a comprehensive
model, the theory driving the environment versus economy debate must be examined in
detail. In Chapter 3, I explore the theory guiding this research project.
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CHAPTER 3:
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
We have . . . taken the position that the need for . . . stimulation to our
economy justified . . . serious tradeoffs, where the environment became either
totally or partially damaged. None of us . . . in positions of authority in the
state apologize for that. We did what we thought was best for the people and
the economy of Louisiana. We accommodated industry where we thought
we could in order to get the jobs and the developments, and in some instances
we knowingly and advisedly accepted environmental tradeoffs.
--Edwin Edwards, Governor of Louisiana, 1979 (Levinson,
1995, p. 17)
This quote by former Louisiana Governor Edwin Edwards is a perfect statement
of the rationale behind enacting less stringent environmental regulations with the hopes
of enhancing state economic growth. Strong economic performance is viewed by
government officials as necessary to ensure the prosperity of their states. State
governmental officials frequently make decisions designed to lure high income
individuals and businesses to their states in order to stimulate economic growth. These
officials are rational actors participating in a competitive struggle with other states – in
today’s global economy, even with other nations – to attract industries which will be
boons to their state economies. State officials actively seek corporate and individual
citizens who will add to their tax base in order to augment the services government can
provide. The wealthier the tax base, the more resources government has, and the more it
can provide to its citizens. A wealthy tax base also provides another benefit to
government. With a populace consisting of more persons at the higher end of the
socioeconomic scale, fewer government resources are needed to fund social welfare
programs. Wealthier citizens are less expensive to government than are poorer citizens.
They do not need to ask as much of government. Thus, strong economic growth reduces
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the need for government services. In pursuing individual and corporate citizens who will
enhance state economies, state policymakers attempt to add to state coffers and reduce
the need for government funded social welfare programs.
Referring again to the state of Louisiana, Williams (1999) illustrates how this
state pursued the chemical industry and successfully stole it from states such as New
Jersey. But while states like Louisiana, which generally rank at the bottom in
environmental conditions and environmental policy stringency, have succeeded in
attracting these businesses, have they succeeded in achieving the economic growth for
which they hoped? A quick perusal of the Green Index (Hall and Kerr, 1991) reveals that
Alabama, Louisiana, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Texas rank last in environmental
conditions/policies. Another quick look - this time at the 2006 Statistical Abstract shows that with the exception of Texas, the states with less stringent environmental
regulatory venues ranked in the bottom eleven states on economic performance, as
measured by per capita personal income. As of yet, it appears that these state have failed
to achieve the improved economic performance desired.
Of course, it may be that these states have experienced growth but have much
further to go to achieve the same level of economic performance of other states. Indeed,
according to Crain (2003), the very states mentioned above all ranked in the top 25 states
for real income per capita growth from 1969 to 1999. Further, they all rank in the top 20
states for real income per worker growth in the same time period. However, even with
high rankings in these two economic growth indicators, these states still lag behind other
states in overall economic performance. Policymakers have not yet realized the
economic benefits they hope to attain by enacting specific policies. While strong
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economic growth is the desired outcome of the decisions made by these state leaders,
there are limitations to their ability to act effectively. State economic performance is a
function of a variety of influences, including national conditions, institutional capacity,
state fiscal conditions, demographic characteristics of the states, and state policy choices.
The Ability of State Policymakers to Influence Economic Growth
State policymakers are constrained in the options available to them to enhance
state economic growth. They make decisions in an imperfect world with imperfect
choices. In the environmental policy setting, it may seem illogical to think that any state
policymaker would be willing to subject his or her state and its citizens to potential
environmental hazards as a result of a less stringent regulatory setting. However, given
other factors that play into the decision calculus of state officials, it may be entirely
logical to weigh the potential for environmental hazards against the potential for steady
economic decline and decide that a healthy economy is worth the risk. Policymakers
arrive at such decisions based on their own preconceived notions about what is the best
course of action and by evaluating outside forces that influence their internal state
economies.
When policymakers engage in such a decision making calculus as this they are
operating within the notion of bounded rationality. They are limited from making
perfectly rational decisions by their own cognitive limitations and their perceptions of the
actions of others. Arthur (1994) describes two reasons for perfect rational decision
making to break down: “[1] beyond a certain level of complexity human logical capacity
ceases to cope . . . [2] in interactive situations of complication, agents cannot rely on
other agents . . . to be under perfect rationality” (p. 406). Thus, policymakers are bound
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in their decision making by both their own limitations and by the assumptions they make
about the decision making of other policymakers.
National Economic Effect
Prior research (Brace, 1993; Hendrick and Garand, 1991) indicates that national
economic conditions exert great influence upon state economic performance. Growth in
national economic performance determines, in large measure, growth in state economies.
As the nation’s economy grows, so do most state economies. Conditions that serve to
stimulate national economic growth can also serve to stimulate state growth. Indeed,
because state economies make up the national economy this alignment in economic
performance levels makes sense intuitively. Similarly, as slowdowns in national
economic growth occur, state economic growth will slow as well. Brace (1991) finds an
exception to this trend. States with greater energy resources are less dependent upon
national economic conditions. These economies are not as responsive to the national
economic environment. States not reliant on the energy sector, though, do tend to follow
national trends. Thus, scholars suspect that states will follow similar economic
performance patterns to that of the nation’s economic performance.
State Institutional Capacity
States are also limited in their ability to effect economic performance, both by
their capacity to act and by the resources within their states. Good intentions will only
get policymakers so far. Officials must have the ability to affect change. Without the
institutional capability to effectively institute the reforms needed to spur economic
growth, governors and state legislatures are hindered from having an affect upon their
economies (Brace, 1991). For instance, if a governor wishes to grant incentive packages
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to businesses in order to entice them to move into his or her state, the governor must be
sure that these types of incentives can be authorized by the executive branch. Without
such authority, the governor would lack the institutional capacity to lure the business into
the state. In order to affect positive changes in economic performance, policymakers
must be able to institute change. Institutional processes or administrative rules that block
policymakers from either proactively providing incentives to attract industrial
development or prevent them from responding to changing external factors will limit the
role of policymakers in pursuing economic growth. Thus, the institutions of state
government must possess the capacity to act in a manner able to influence economic
performance.
State Demographic and Economic Capacity
State policymakers are also affected by their available resources in their ability to
affect economic growth. Demographic characteristics such as educational attainment of
the citizenry, the urban-rural make-up of the state, and infrastructure capabilities all have
the ability either to limit or expand the economic growth potential of a state. A welleducated workforce has a better capacity to grow and adjust to new and emerging
industries and technologies. Industries looking for new location sites or existing
industries trying to determine if a change of location might be more cost effective may be
more interested in states with an educated workforce since fewer industry resources will
be needed to devote to training and development. States with better educated populaces
may be perceived as having lower training costs, and hence, lower business costs.
Further, states that do not depend highly upon the agricultural sector may give the
appearance of being more open to greater industrial growth. While certain agriculture-
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related industries (e.g., insecticide producers, heavy equipment manufacturers, etc.) may
be present in states with a large agricultural sector, the opportunity for large scale
industrial growth may be greater in states that do not rely heavily upon the agricultural
sector for the make-up of their economies. These states may be perceived as being more
“pro-business” since they are not as dependent upon the agricultural sector for their
prosperity. States with a historical tradition of dedication to agricultural endeavors may
be perceived as more reluctant to make the changes necessary to encourage industrial
growth (e.g., transforming farm land into sites for urban development). Thus, businesses
and industries looking for new location sites may be attracted to states that have a proven
record of industrial development.
Along these lines, states with strong infrastructures may be more appealing to
potential new industries. States and localities that have already dedicated funding and
resources to strong infrastructure improvements may be perceived as committed to
industrial development. Further, businesses and industries will have lower costs if a
strong infrastructure is already in place to supplement their activities. Thus, the better
resources that states possess to aid industrial development, the greater the likelihood of
strong economic growth.
Policymaking Capacity
Of more interest to the purpose of this research is the ability of policymakers to
have an effect on economic performance through the enactment of specific policies
(Brace, 1991; Brace, 1993; Goetz, Ready, and Stone, 1996). Many policies have the
potential to influence economic performance. Business, education, environmental, law
enforcement, and transportation development policies are just a few of the areas in which
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governmental leaders can enact changes with the hope of attaining better economic
performance. However, there is no guarantee that such policy enactments will produce
the desired economic growth. Outside forces can often have a greater impact upon a
state’s economy than the internal efforts of policymakers. While state officials may
attempt to aid economic growth through policymaking, such efforts may produce limited
results. Officials develop policies hoping to make their states attractive to potential
newcomers. They want to provide an environment that is viewed as economically
healthy. These state leaders seek policy changes that result in economic growth in order
to improve overall economic performance. Though, it is unclear whether state
policymakers have the capacity to exert the influence over economic conditions that they
are seeking.
The State as Marketplace, The Citizen as Consumer
Researchers have attempted to describe how the choices made by policymakers
influence residency decisions of citizens (Tiebout, 1956; Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren,
1961; Schneider, 1989; Percy and Hawkins, 1992; Teske, Schneider, Mintrom, and Best,
1993; Lowery, Lyons, and DeHoog, 1995; Teske, Schneider, Mintrom, and Best, 1995;
Percy, Hawkins, and Maier, 1995; Lowery, 1998; Preuhs, 1999). At the forefront of this
literature Tiebout (1956) describes the mechanisms by which local governments attempt
to provide their citizens with the optimum level of public services in order to gain and
maintain the optimum population level. Citizens are consumers of public services and
will move to the location that provides their preferred level of services. If leaders of a
locality find that that the population is below an optimum level, they will attempt to
provide services that will attract more residents. For example, if leaders are hoping to
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attract more young families to their area, they may devote more government resources
toward funding the public school system. By putting more money into schools, local
leaders hope to have better schools than neighboring localities and entice young families
into moving into their area with the promise of a better education for children. Thus, the
local jurisdiction is the market and the family is the consumer. As a consumer, the family
seeks to live in an area that provides its preferred services. The family’s top priority may
be the educational quality available for their children. Thus, they may well move to a
municipality that devotes a significant amount of its budget to funding public schools,
hoping that the benefit of the greater level of educational spending will result in better
schools. However, the family may weigh the quality of the education against the taxation
level required to pay for the education. If the tax level becomes too burdensome, the
family may prefer a locality that provides a “decent” school system in addition to a low
tax burden. Hence, citizen-consumers “vote with their feet” and move to the locality that
provides their preferred level of government services and tax burden.
This theory extends to the present discussion of state environmental policy. In the
same way that individual citizens “vote with their feet” and choose to move to a
particular locality based on preferred policies, corporate/industrial citizen-consumers can
make similar calculations by which they choose the states within which to locate their
firms. States are the markets in which these corporate citizen-consumers “shop” for
preferred environmental regulatory policies. In efforts to spur economic growth, states
will enact policies that will attract these corporate citizens. State policymakers will
attempt to provide the preferred regulatory climate of potential corporate/industrial
citizen-consumers. Borrowing heavily from Tiebout (1956), it is assumed that the
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corporate citizen-consumer is “fully mobile.” Corporate/industrial citizens will move to
the state that offers the most preferred set of environmental regulations. These corporateconsumers have full knowledge of the environmental regulatory climate of all states.
States will seek to attract new corporate/industrial citizens and retain existing corporate
citizens in order to achieve the optimum level of economic performance. States will
provide the preferred environmental regulatory policies for corporate citizen-consumers
so that these consumers will “vote with their feet” by either moving to or remaining
within the state borders.
Both state policymakers and corporate/industrial decisions makers are rational
actors within this theoretical framework. State officials attempt to improve economic
conditions within their states by appealing to corporate interests. Policymakers hope to
entice new industry to move into their states, retain existing industries, and spur the
creation of new industries by adopting environmental regulatory policies which are
perceived by corporate decision makers as business-friendly, and thus, are the preferred
policies of businesses. By appealing to industrial interests, state policymakers make a
rational calculus designed to attract the corporate citizen that will be a boon to overall
state economic growth. By the same token, corporate/industrial decision makers (i.e.,
consumers) are rational actors calculating the costs and benefits of operating a firm
within a particular state. Part of the decision making calculus is the regulatory costs
associated with environmental regulations. The corporate decision makers/consumers
weigh the policy options provided by a particular state when deciding whether to locate
within a new state, retain a facility within a state, or create a new firm within a particular
state. Any number of policy options could affect the corporate consumer’s decision
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calculus: tax laws, financial incentives, environmental regulations, infrastructure, etc.
The corporate consumer will make a rational choice to locate to or remain within the state
that offers the set of policies closest to the corporation’s optimum preferences.
An Environmental “Race to the Bottom”?
If state policymakers are rational actors responding to citizen-consumers that
“vote with their feet,” these policymakers will engage in active competition with their
neighbors to win the optimum number of citizen-consumers. Much research has been
conducted around the notion that states will enact policies intended to attract individual
and corporate citizens who will enhance the potential for economic growth within their
borders rather than retain or attract those who will be a drag on economic performance.
States compete with one another for citizens who will be an asset to economic growth.
Part of this competition may include policy options that lower benefits for the poorer
producing segments of the economy. Welfare reform is a prime example of a policy area
in which state officials make decisions designed to enhance economic growth. A great
deal of literature focuses around the notion that in such a competitive environment states
will “race to the bottom” in welfare policy development in order to achieve the end result
of higher economic performance (Peterson and Rom, 1989; Piven, 1998; Rom, Peterson,
and Scheve, 1998; Brueckner, 2000; Lurie, 1998; Schram, 1998; Schram and Soss, 1998;
Beer, 1998; Piven, 2001; Allard and Danziger, 2000; Volden, 2002; Bailey, 2005). The
“race to the bottom” in the context of welfare policy involves the state lowering benefits
to those who receive welfare payments in order to dissuade welfare recipients from
residing within the state.
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The policy of enacting lower welfare benefits may produce a variety of outcomes
that could increase state economic growth. First, lower benefits may discourage wouldbe welfare recipients from moving into a state with low benefits. Thus, there is limited
possibility of those who would receive welfare moving into the state and draining state
resources. Second, lowering benefits may encourage the migration of recipients to other
states with higher benefits. In this scenario, those welfare beneficiaries who had
previously been a recipient of state resources move to higher welfare benefit states and no
longer consume the resources of their original state of residence. The burden of
supporting the welfare beneficiaries transfers to the state with the higher level of benefits.
Finally, if lower benefits are in place then overall state taxes may be lower since the
government need for revenue to fund welfare would not be as great. Hence, those with
higher incomes may be enticed to move to a state with lower tax rates. Thus, the “race to
the bottom” in welfare policy produces a population with the resources to enhance a state
economy.
States also compete to have corporate citizens locate within their borders. A
recent example of this competition is provided by the states of Louisiana, Alabama, and
Arkansas (Baton Rouge Daily Report, October 24, 2006). State economic development
teams from all three states traveled to Germany to convince corporate leaders to locate a
three billion dollar steel mill within their state. No doubt all three states will offer
incentives and government services to attract this new industry to their states. Indeed a
quick perusal of the economic development websites of all three states results in listings
of the incentives and services that each state offers to businesses that locate within their
jurisdictions. States can go beyond services and incentives, though. They may well
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choose to promote a regulatory environment that will be attractive to new and existing
industries.
Thus, the “race to the bottom” theory can be applied to state environmental policy
as well. State officials may seek to attract industry by lowering regulatory costs. While
his discussion focuses on welfare policy, Piven (1998) depicts the conditions under which
businesses can “pit one locality against another as they search for the most advantageous
package of services and taxes” (p. 40). In their efforts to improve economic conditions
within their states, officials will try to provide business environments that will convince
industries to move (or remain) within their jurisdictions. As noted by Piven, state
policymakers “depend for their electoral success on economic prosperity, which means
they depend on investors . . . depend on revenues gained by taxing those who have assets
. . . when those who have economic resources are mobile, they can bargain hard with
political leaders over the terms on which they will agree to invest or to be taxed” (p. 39).
Thus, state officials may perceive that in order to attract industries with the resources to
positively affect state economies, they must lower the cost of doing business within their
borders. One method of decreasing economic burdens/regulatory costs on businesses is
to lower the cost of pollution abatement by enacting less stringent environmental
regulations.
In making site location decisions, businesses (as most people) are always in favor
of a ‘helping hand’ to get them started. As noted by Jaffe et al. (1995), there exists “a
widespread belief that environmental regulations have a significant effect on the siting of
new plants in the United States . . . Public comments and private actions of legislators
and lobbyists, for example, certainly indicate that they believe that environmental
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regulations affect plant location decision” (p. 148). One method chosen by some state
leaders to achieve better economic performance has been to attract industry with the lure
of quicker industrial growth due to less stringent environmental regulations. These state
officials believe that by enacting less stringent environmental policies, they will
accomplish two goals necessary for strong growth: prevent existing firms from leaving
their states and induce new businesses to locate within their states. Conversely, by
enacting strict environmental policies, states increase business costs within their borders,
resulting in a slow down in business growth and development and, hence, decrease state
economic growth and long-term benefits. Thus, state officials may believe that the
enactment of less stringent state environmental policies will make their states more
appealing as a place to do business.
In addition to having an impact on site selection decisions, environmental policies
also play a role in the productivity of existing businesses (Christiansen and Haveman,
1981; Gray, 1987; Barbera and McConnell, 1986; Jaffe, Peterson, Portney, and Stevens,
1995; Jorgenson and Wilcoxen, 1990). State policymakers who advocate less stringent
environmental regulations believe that they are enacting policies that will allow
businesses within their states to maintain higher levels of productivity. According to
Jaffe et al. (1995) “environmental regulations affect a firm’s cost of production, both
directly through its own expenditures on pollution reduction and indirectly through the
higher prices it must pay for certain factors of production that are affected by regulation”
(p.138). Jaffe et al. specify five effects more stringent environmental regulations may
have on a firm’s productivity levels:
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“[1] measured productivity of the affected industry will fall because measured
inputs of capital, labor, and energy are being diverted to the production of an
additional output – environmental quality . . . [2] when and if firms undertake
process or management changes in response to environmental regulations, the
new practices may be less efficient than the old ones . . . [3] environmental
investments could conceivably crowd out other investments by firms . . . [4] many
environmental regulations exempt older plants from requirements, in effect
mandating higher standards for new plants . . . discouraging investments in new,
more efficient facilities . . . [5] requirements that firms use the ‘best available
control technology’ for pollution abatement may increase the adoption of these
new technologies at the time regulation go into effect, but subsequently blunt
firms’ incentives to develop new pollution control or prevention approaches over
time” (pgs. 150-151).
Thus, although less stringent regulations do not guarantee high productivity, they do not
add additional costs to business operations. Businesses are not forced to divert resources
toward satisfying more stringent regulatory requirements and are able to maintain high
levels of production without increasing their costs. By ensuring that regulatory cost do
not dramatically increase, state officials attempt both to protect the productivity levels of
existing industries within their borders and to attract new industries with the opportunity
of higher productivity levels, as compared to operating in states with stricter
environmental regulations. Hence, policymakers try to ensure economic growth by
keeping the “cost of doing business” at a minimum.
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Or a “Race to the Top”?
A contradictory theory regarding state environmental policy is offered by other
scholars. Rather than attract businesses with lax regulations, others propose that stricter
environmental policies will benefit businesses (Porter, 1990; Meyer, 1992; Porter and van
der Linde, 1995; Goetz, Ready, and Stone, 1996). Again Jaffe et al. (1995) provide a
good summary of this theory from the perspective of the firms affected:
“Some sectors of private industry, in particular, environmental, will benefit
directly from more stringent environmental regulations on their customers . . .
some regulated firms will benefit competitively at the expense of other regulated
firms . . . can provide some firms with ‘early mover’ advantages by pushing them
to produce products that will in the future be in demand in the market place . . .
can increase domestic efficiency, either by wringing inefficiencies out of the
production process as firms struggle to meet new constraints or by spurring
innovation in the long term through ‘outside-the-box thinking’ . . . [and] by
forcing exceptionally inefficient plants to close” (pgs. 154-155).
Thus, the benefits of stricter environmental regulatory policies are examined entirely in
light of the operating effect on firms. More strict regulations provide the opportunity for
a new area of industrial growth. Once stricter regulations are enacted, many existing
firms need guidance in following the regulations. Environmental service firms provide
such expertise. Further, the costs of complying with regulations differ among individual
firms. Larger firms may more easily absorb the additional costs than smaller firms.
These firms that can more easily adjust to pollution abatement costs will benefit
competitively against those that cannot. Firms that can anticipate future abatement needs
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and provide products to meet these needs will profit from the regulations that establish
the need for these new products. Finally, more strict regulations may cause the shutdown
of firms that were operating inefficiently. The additional costs for improving pollution
control can force inefficient firms to recognize that their processes are too unproductive
to keep up with innovations. Thus, from a purely operations perspective, stricter
environmental regulations can have a positive affect upon the marketplace.
Scholars focus their research around the notion that stricter environmental
regulations produce environmental conditions within states that actually attract business
and industry to the states that enforce such policies. Goetz et al. (1996) argue that while
states that choose stricter environmental regulations may suffer a temporary economic
slowdown, in the long run the benefits of a “greener” environment will be beneficial to
states; specifically, “a region that imposes stricter environmental regulations may (at least
initially) experience slower economic growth. However, if regulations result in higher
levels of environmental quality over time, growth rates may subsequently increase” (p.
100). States that have more stringent environmental regulations and enforcement policies
should reap an environmental reward for such policies. It is assumed that states that are
more proactive with their environmental regulatory powers will have cleaner air to breath
and cleaner water to drink than states that choose to be more lax with their environmental
regulatory authority. Businesses and industries looking for a new location site may be
attracted to a state that offers a more environmentally safe place to live. States with
healthier environments offer the employees of businesses a better quality of life than do
states that become “pollution havens” in their efforts to attract industry. Thus, by
choosing to locate in states with more stringent environmental regulations, industrial
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employers provide a better home for their employees. This could actually serve as a
benefit to businesses in recruiting higher quality employees. As noted by Tannenwald
(1997) and Gray (1997) some employees may even be willing to work for less pay if the
location that they live in has a higher quality of life. Just as states may be willing to
sacrifice short-term economic benefits in favor of long-term environmental benefits, so
may individuals. Thus, employers may find that locating in a “greener” state will aid in
attracting high quality employees. Since businesses often claim that employees are their
most valuable asset, providing a pleasant and safe place to live for these employees may
be a critical factor in the site location decision making process.
In addition to offering a quality of life benefit on the front end, states with more
stringent environmental policies may also offer a long-term economic incentive to
businesses and industries as well. With all else being equal, states with more stringent
environmental regulations should have better environments than states with less stringent
regulations. A better environment may not only result in more satisfied employees, but it
also may translate into healthier employees. If a business locates in a state with a good
environmental backdrop, it may expect that their employees will be at a lower risk for
certain environmental-related illnesses. With lower risk factors come lower insurance
and healthcare costs for the employer. Thus, while businesses may pay higher pollution
abatement costs as a result of more stringent environmental regulations, these businesses
may save on personnel costs associated with insurance and healthcare as a result of
choosing to locate within a state with overall better environmental conditions. As noted
by Graham (1998), “environmental measures that contribute to critical infrastructure,
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attract skilled workers, or satisfy the needs of particular businesses are rightly seen as
having economic value” (p. 4).
Further, by choosing to locate in “greener” states, businesses and industries may
actually lower some of their production costs. Jaffe et al. (1995) point out that
“environmental regulations can reduce costs for some firms or industries, by lowering
input prices or by increasing the productivity of their inputs” (p. 138). Thus, if a business
locates in a state with stricter environmental regulations, the resources they utilize for
production (e.g., water) will be less likely to be polluted. These unpolluted resources will
lower the cost of production since the business will not need to spend additional
resources cleaning the inputs of production. Hence, while some state policymakers may
argue for the economic benefits of less stringent environmental regulations, other state
policymakers may make the same economic benefits argument in favor of more stringent
environmental regulations.
A Model of Economic Growth
Goetz et al. (1996) illustrate how environmental regulations and conditions may
effect economic growth in Figure 3.1. In the first section of the figure, the authors
indicate that better environmental conditions will influence four areas that can have an
impact upon economic growth. First, better conditions may serve to attract firms to an
area. These firms are drawn to an area that offers its workers a better quality of life
and/or provides cleaner inputs of production. Better environmental conditions may also
attract a more skilled labor force. Individuals may choose to locate and find employment
in an area that offers a “cleaner” setting. Similarly, wealthy retires may be drawn to
settle in areas perceived as more healthy to live. These better environmental conditions
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affect more than people and the decisions they make. Conditions also have an impact
upon productivity. If the inputs into productions are clean, time and money is not wasted
on making these inputs ready for use. Better environmental conditions can reduce costs
to businesses leading to higher productivity. These potential benefits of more firms,
more skilled workers, more wealthy retirees adding to the tax base, and increased
productivity can all contribute to increased economic growth.
The second part of Figure 3.1 illustrates how environmental policy can have a
negative impact on economic growth. Stricter regulation can increase business costs.
Firms may be forced to purchase specific equipment pollution abatement equipment that
can drive up their costs. They may be forced to hire additional technical staff to ensure
compliance with complicated regulations. Further, regulations may force them to change
processes toward more abatement-related activities, forcing businesses to spend more
money. Such a diversion of resources away from production and toward pollution
abatement processes can increase the cost of production. This type of diversion of
resources can also lower output. When time and money are spent in areas other than
production, output declines. Thus, while spending more on pollution control activities,
businesses may end up producing less. Such a scenario of increased costs and lowered
output could result in a negative impact upon economic growth.
Of course, the theories of environmental regulation and economic development
discussed above are not necessarily in competition, but instead may be applicable under
different sets of state circumstances. There may be intervening variables that have effects
that cause states both to choose a specific set of policies and to see a different set of
results from those policies. State socioeconomic conditions matter in efforts to
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Figure 3.1. Relationship between Environmental Conditions and Policies and Economic
Growth. Taken from Goetz et al. (1996, p. 99).

encourage economic growth. States with demographic advantages, such as a more highly
educated workforce, may not feel compelled to lower regulatory costs in order to make
their areas more appealing to potential corporate residents. These states may believe that
they have a great deal to offer industry without needing to add the enticement of lower
regulatory costs.
On the other hand, officials in states with fewer demographic advantages may feel
compelled to lower the regulatory burden on businesses in order to compete with other
states that may appear more attractive at first glance. Since these states may not have the
advantages of skilled workers, for example, they will use policy to create an attractive
regulatory environment. Williams (1999) points out that “states with lower per capita
income and less educated workforces have pursued an economic development strategy
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that depends on attracting industrial facilities with more severe environmental impacts
that are attracted by less stringent environmental oversight . . . among these states,
devolution of responsibility leads to a “race for the bottom” in environmental
protections” (451-453).
However, competition does not drive all states to lower regulatory costs. State
policymakers who operate in states with more resources (e.g., better educated workforce,
lower poverty levels) may perceive that better demographic and economic conditions
enhance their position, i.e. enhance their competitive edge, and therefore, enact more
stringent environmental policies. With state socioeconomic conditions working for them
in attracting new businesses and industries, there is less pressure to lower regulatory
standards in order to appeal to industry. Conversely, policymakers that are faced with
fewer advantages as compared to other states, thus, choose to have less stringent
regulations in order to compete for business and industry. By lowering the cost of doing
business within their states, they are able at least to “level the playing field” when it
comes to competing against better educated and more wealthy states. One could argue
that a “race for the bottom” occurs between those states that already find themselves at
the bottom.
Thus the model provided by Goetz et al. (1996) can be refined to include a
calculus that leads state policymakers to either enact less stringent or more stringent
environmental policies. When choosing which type of environmental policies to enact,
state policymakers will be influenced by their internal resources and by policies being
offered by their neighboring states. Figure 3.2 illustrates the effect that these factors will
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have on the environmental policies chosen and in turn how these policies will effect
economic growth, measured as income per capita.
As illustrated in the lower left-hand portion of Figure 3.2, when states do not
possess demographic characteristics that can be used to either retain or attract industry
(e.g., highly educated workforce, strong infrastructure), they will feel compelled to lower
regulatory burdens upon industries in order to compete with other states to have
industries locate within their borders. The consequences of less appealing demographic
characteristics may be less stringent environmental regulations. Conversely, states that
posses better characteristics will not feel pressured to lower costs to compete and will
enact more stringent environmental regulations.
As the “race to the bottom” theory suggests, a further factor for states to consider
is the environmental policies enacted by their neighbors. Since states are indeed in
competition with one another, they will be aware of what types of environmental policies
that other states are enacting. Figure 3.2 shows this element factored into the policy
decision making calculus. Critical to a state’s environmental policy decision will be the
policies enacted by neighboring states. If a neighboring state enacts less stringent
regulations, then a state will not want to enact environmental policies that are more
stringent, and thus more costly to businesses. After all, why should a business locate in
state A when state B, located right next door, has a lower regulatory burden in effect? A
state that does enact more stringent environmental policies than its neighbor risks its
ability to compete for industry by adding costs to both existing industries and potential
new industries to locate within the state.
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Figure 3.2. Factors Affecting the Enactment of Environmental Policies and the Subsequent
Relationship Between Environmental Policies and Environmental Conditions upon
Economic Growth.

By the same token, when a neighboring state has stricter environmental policies in
effect, a state will not feel pressured to lower environmental standards in order to
compete. State policymakers are free to choose to enact stricter environmental policies
without worry of losing their ability to compete with their neighbors. In fact, if the first
part of this model is correct and better environmental conditions do result in a net
attraction of firms, then states with neighbors that have stricter environmental policies
may feel compelled to be just as strict with their environmental regulations. In such a
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case, a state does not want to be viewed as having a less pristine environment than its
neighbors, thus, losing its ability to compete with its neighbors over quality of life issues.
Hence, instead of a “race to the bottom,” these states may engage in a “race to the top”
when enacting environmental policies.
Conclusion
Still, Brace (1993) finds that states are limited in their ability to effect economic
performance within their borders. States do not operate in a vacuum. In addition to the
competition they face from neighboring states, state economies often fluctuate according
to national economic conditions. This fluctuation is determined by how dependent a
state’s economy is upon the national economy. Brace finds that the ability of states to
influence economic development seems to be limited to their influence over per capita
personal income. He indicates that this may come at the expense of employment, though,
since income and job growth are inversely related. He concludes by reiterating that states
are limited by national constraints in their ability to effect economic changes.
Thus, while state officials may enact weak environmental laws with the best
possible motive -- to ensure economic growth -- states may only possess limited ability to
effect such changes. States exist in a much broader world than the one drawn by their
boundary lines. State capacity to act effectively towards greater economic growth is
hampered by national economic conditions. This study attempts to discover whether
there is a significant relationship between state environmental policies and state
economic growth. Are policymakers making reasonable decisions in enacting specific
environmental regulations/policies with the hope of having an effect upon state economic
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growth? Do states which enact strict environmental policies sacrifice economic growth
while states which enact less stringent environmental policies reap an economic reward?
I develop a model for analysis to discover the relationship between environmental
regulation and economic growth. Factors that can constrain policymakers’ abilities to
influence growth are included in the model. In addition to environmental policy
variables, I include variables to capture the effects of business policies, national
economic conditions, state fiscal conditions, and state demographic factors. The full
model is described in Chapter 5. Before discussing this model, it is necessary to review
issues concerning environmental policy variables. The selection of a measure for
environmental policy is problematic. Concerns related to this variable are discussed in
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4:
EXAMINATION OF STATE ENVIRONMENTAL DATA
[S]tudies struggle with the issue of how to measure regulatory stringency. This is
perhaps the most difficult problem encountered. Measures of regulatory
stringency often are not comparable across states, are highly industry-specific, or
partially reflect state-specific characteristics that have nothing to do with
stringency. (Tannenwald, 1997, p. 86)
A review of the literature of environmental policy reveals that researchers
continually struggle to develop an adequate measure for state policy stringency. Some
researchers focus on state environmental spending as a measure of state policy (Bartik,
1988). Others use various policy indices as their measure (Goetz, Ready and Stone,
1996; Meyer, 1992). State environmental conditions is the measure selected by some
researchers (Templet, 1995; Grossman and Krueger, 1995). Other studies utilize the
Census Bureau’s Pollution Abatement Control Expenditure survey (Gray and
Shadbegian, 1998; Levinson, 1999). Specific industry costs are used in other studies
(Gray, 1987; Gollop and Roberts, 1983). Still other studies use some combination of
these measures (Feiock and Stream, 2001; List and Co, 2000; Barbera and McConnell,
1986; Daley and Garand, 2002; McConnell and Schwab, 1990; Bacot and Dawes, 1997).
There is no “ideal” measure available to study state environmental policy
stringency. In a data “perfect” world, a longitudinal measure tracking the multiple
dimensions of environmental policy in all fifty states would exist. This measure would
consistently examine state environmental policy and provide a value of regulatory
stringency for state policies. While cross-sectional measures do provide a measure of
stringency for a single point in time, no such measure exists over time. Thus, researchers
use rather imperfect tools to arrive at an adequate measure of state environmental
stringency.
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Each of the measures noted has advantages and disadvantages. Spending
measures provide a level of the commitment that states have toward environmental
programs, but it is an imperfect proxy for policy goals. The use of a policy index is a
good cross-sectional tool but does not allow for the study of states over time.
Environmental conditions illustrate the need for policy, but do not address whether states
are addressing the need. The Pollution Abatement Expenditure (PACE) survey describes
industry costs but does not control for state specific industry characteristics. Specific
industry costs studies only provide results in the particular area studied. Whether the
results of these studies can be considered reliable in other sectors is subject to some
debate.
In this chapter, I consider a variety of measurement tools. However, a refinement
of the PACE survey created by Levinson (1999) is the primary tool I use to measure
environmental stringency. This Levinson Index best captures the main variable of
interest in my study. The measures to be used in the model are discussed in turn.
State Environmental Spending
State policymakers can enact any number of policies, but commitment to
particular polices is reflected by the amount of resources they dedicate to the policies
with budgetary measures. Bacot and Dawes (1997) note that environmental programs are
“only as effective as their funding levels allow them to be” (p.366). Hence, budget
information can reveal the level of a state’s commitment to environmental regulation.
The Environmental Council of the States (ECOS) and the Council of State Governments
(CSG) have collected state environmental and natural resource spending data in the years
1986, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1996, 2000, and 2003. Initial collections of state budget data
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were conducted by the Council of State Government, but these have been conducted by
the Environmental Council of the States since 1998.
To be included in the ECOS budget survey, funds must be directly included in the
state budget bills to operate state and federal environmental and natural resource
programs (Brown and Keifer, 2003). Budget categories included in the spending survey
include water, land management, fish and wildlife, waste management, and air quality.
Budget allocations in the water category consist of state spending for water quality, water
resources, drinking water, and marine and coastal issues. Allocations in the land
management category include state spending on forestry, soil conservation, mining
reclamation, land management for state-owned resources, pesticide control, and
geological surveys. The fish and wildlife category includes state spending for all efforts
to protect state fish and gaming resources and to enforce state fish and gaming laws. The
waste management category encompasses state spending on hazardous, solid, and nuclear
wastes management programs. The air quality category includes all state spending to
administer the Clean Air Act.
The drawback in relying on spending levels as a measure of environmental
stringency is that certain states may have characteristics that spending measures will not
capture. For example, a state may have a history of not encouraging industrial growth,
instead choosing to preserve lands and the environment. Such a state would not have the
need to spend a great deal on pollution control efforts since its pollution levels would be
lower than states with large industrial sectors. Alternatively, a state with a large
industrial sector may be forced to spend greater levels on pollution control. However,
this spending could be a result, not of state policymakers’ preferences, but of federal
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mandates. Until federal environmental legislation was passed in the 1970s and 1980s,
some states did not choose to allocate significant funds toward environmental policies.
Increased environmental spending in these states occurred as a response to federal action,
and not as a result of state initiative.
Further, state spending levels may be a function of the overall state economy.
Some states may spend more on environmental programs because they have more money
to spend. Other states, with fewer financial resources, may spend less on environmental
programs, not due to a lack of will, but due to a lack of funds. Compounding this
problem for some states is the fact that, if they do experience budget shortfalls that
require a reduction in environmental budgets, they may become ineligible for federal
monies due to a lack of matching state funds. Such states may spend less on
environmental efforts because they have less to spend generally. Thus, the use of budget
allocations as a measure of environmental stringency may be complicated by specific
state characteristics.
However, the study of state budget allocations for environmental and natural
resource spending can demonstrate state dedication to these programs. Funding provides
state agencies the ability to implement policy programs. If state policymakers are truly
interested in carrying out effective environmental programs, they must provide the
monies necessary to run these programs. Without adequate funding, no action can be
taken by agencies charged with executing environmental programs. Budget allocations
are indicators of the importance policymakers give to the programs they develop.
Through the dedication of state funds to environmental programs, state regulations are
put into practice. Thus, budget data can reveal intent to implement environmental policy.
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State Environmental Conditions
As explained by Bacot and Dawes (1997), “states with less environmental
legislation, and consequently fewer programs to assure environmental protection
regularly, likely will experience higher levels of pollution production in their state”(p.
362). Higher levels of pollution can be indicative that state policymakers are not
enacting strict environmental standards. More lax environmental policies would create a
setting in which industries prone to heavy pollution levels could more comfortably
operate. This could lead to poorer environmental conditions within a state. States with
more stringent environmental standards should have mechanisms (policies) in place to
ensure lower pollution levels. Thus, a state’s environmental conditions can provide a
clue as to the environmental regulatory venue.
The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act passed in 1986
provided the EPA with the authority to collect information regarding potential hazards in
communities. Under this act, businesses and industries are required to report the type and
amount of chemicals stored at their facilities. They are also required to report any toxic
transfers or releases into the environment. This information is collected annually by the
EPA in the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) which was developed in 1987. In 1990 The
Pollution Prevention Act added the requirement that waste management and source
reduction activities also be reported in the TRI. Currently, the TRI provides information
on the release of approximately 650 chemicals into the environment by industrial
facilities. This industrial pollution information provides data on what chemicals are
released into the environment so the public can understand the environmental risk factors
evident in their areas. Thus, it is a comprehensive listing of industrial polluting activities.
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There are limitations to the use of TRI reports as a measure of environmental
conditions. The TRI report only tracks industrial emissions/releases. Other releases, e.g.,
vehicle emissions, are not included. As a result, overall state pollution levels are not
completely captured by the TRI data. Only pollution as a result of industrial activity is
reported. Also, as noted by the EPA, the TRI does not provide an estimation of exposure
risks to the public. The focus is on releases, not potential harm as a result of the releases.
Nor does the TRI differentiate between most and least harmful chemicals (Bacot and
Dawes, 1997). For the purposes of this study, though, release information is useful in
determining state environmental conditions. It is not necessary to know the immediate
risks of a particular release to have an understanding of broad environmental conditions
within a state. Finally, some express concerns that the TRI relies on industry self-reports
for the data collected (Bacot and Dawes, 1997). Industry is expected to fully disclose all
releases that occur within a year. Thus, while the TRI does provide a thorough data
source for industrial pollution, there are limitations to the information available.
However, the TRI is strictly monitored by the EPA in its regulatory efforts
regarding the states. The report clearly tracks industrial pollutants in communities.
These releases are valuable in order to understand environmental hazards that exist in a
given community. Therefore, it will be utilized as a measure of environmental
conditions. Concerns that the TRI is limited because it provides pollutant information
solely on industrial activities are not a worry of this study. I am particularly interested in
industrial activities and how these activities are affected by state environmental policy.
Information of industrial releases can be an indicator of how strictly these industries are
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regulated. The TRI provides insight into how proactive a state may be in ensuring
“good” environmental conditions.
State Environmental Policy Data
Longitudinal measures of state environmental policy are not available. However,
researchers have developed a few good cross-sectional measures of state environmental
policies. The years for which such measures are available are 1983, 1987, and 1991.
Three different indices are constructed looking at various environmental policies at these
different points in time. The first index was created by the Conservation Foundation.
The second index was created by the Fund for Renewable Energy and the Environment.
The third index is the Green Index created by Bob Hall and May Lee Kerr at the Institute
of Southern Studies. All three serve to capture the “greenness” of the fifty states at the
time period they study. Each study takes into account policies and conditions at the time
of observation. As these three indices are frequently used in studies of state
environmental policy, I discuss them in detail here.
The Conservation Foundation Index
In 1983 the Conservation Foundation created a ranking to determine the level of
effort each state puts towards ensuring a quality environment (Duerksen, 1983). The
focus of the study is to rank the intensity with which states approached their
environmental programs. Two main indicators are used in developing the index:
environmental and land-use. Table 4.1 provides a listing of the indicators used to
compile this state ranking.
Under this index created by the Conservation Foundation, states can earn up to 63
points. At the time of the study, no state achieved a score this high. Minnesota earned
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Table 4.1. Environmental Indicators used to Compile Conservation Foundation Ranking,
Including Score Ranges for each Indicator
Environmental Indicators
Congressional Voting Record on Environmental Issues
Existence of a State Environmental Impact Statement Process
State Legislature’s Commitment to Environmental Protection
Tax-Check Off for Wildlife & Fisheries Funds
Per Capita Spending on Air, Water, & Land Pollution Programs
RCRA Authorization
Single Oversight Agency for Monitoring Air, Water, Hazardous
Waste, & Noise Pollution
Tax Breaks for Solar Energy
Protected Rivers for Wildlife, Scenic, of Recreation Purposes
Per Capita Spending on Noise Control Programs
Land Use Indicators
Legislation Protecting Wetlands or Endangered Species Habitats
Power Plant Siting Law
Environmental Protection as Specific Land Use Goal
Required Comprehensive Land Use Plans
Surface-Mine Reclamation Program
State Floodplain Laws and Development Rules
Extent of State Involvement in Land Use Decision Making
Adoption of Aesthetic Rationale for Eminent Domain
Per Capita Spending on Natural Resources, Parks, Sewerage/
Sanitation, & Housing and Urban Renewal
Approved Solid Waste Plan under RCRA

Score Range
0–4
0, 2, 4
0–4
0, 1
0–6
0–2
0, 1
0–2
0–2
0–2

0–2
0–3
0–2
0–4
0–3
0–2
0–6
0–2
0–2
0–2

the highest ranking in the index with a score of 47. Alabama ranked last with a score of
10. Only five states achieved a score of over 40. A majority of states failed to earn a
score greater than 31. The study provides a breakdown of the range of scores. Five
states scored 40 or higher. Six states scored within the range of 35-39. Nine states
scored in the 30-34 range. Eleven states scored in the range of 25-29. Thirteen states
earned between 30-24. Six states scored a 19 or lower. Thus, at the time of the first
comprehensive ranking of state environmental effort, states appear to have limited
commitment to widespread environmental programs. Each state’s rank in the
Conservation Index is found in Table 4.4. This index uses a variety of indicators to
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measure state environmental effort. These include environmental related expenditures,
enactment of specific policies, conservation-related tax breaks, political support for
environmental policies, and authorization for specific environmental programs.
The FREE Index
In 1987 the Fund for Renewable Energy and the Environment (FREE) compiled
an index of environmental program strength within the states. The FREE index considers
issues surrounding air pollution, soil conservation, solid waste, groundwater protection,
hazardous waste, and energy conservation. A score of 0-10 for each of these six
indicators is possible. This index takes into consideration states’ existing environmental
conditions and subsequent responses to these conditions in assessing environmental
program strength. A matrix for each environmental area is developed. The states are
ranked within each matrix. This study is another attempt at a comprehensive review of
state programs to address environmental concerns.
Table 4.2 presents the indicators used in the development of each matrix. Using
these six matrices, each state is awarded a score from 0-60 on the FREE index. The
higher a state scores on the index, the “greener” the state programs. The state of
Wisconsin ranked highest on the index with a score of 49. Mississippi ranked last with a
score of 14. Ten states earned a score of 40 or higher. Fourteen states scored within the
range of 30-39. Sixteen states scored within the 20-29 range. Ten states scored below
19. FREE Index rankings of the states are found in Table 4.4. The Conservation
Foundation and FREE Index use different indicators to create their rankings, and thus,
cannot be compared directly. However, it interesting to note that in the Conservation
Foundation index a majority of states (31) failed to reach a score of half of the index
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total. In the FREE Index, calculated four years later just under half of the states (24)
achieved a score greater than half of the index total. As a whole, the states appear to have
improved their environmental scores on the FREE Index. Again, the two indices measure
different polices so caution is taken when making assumptions based on the scores.
However, while not directly comparable, the states’ performances on these two different
indices appear to indicate that state environmental programs are growing stronger.
Table 4.2. Environmental Indicators used to create FREE Index Matrices
Air Pollution Matrix: Indicators
Number of Counties with State Implementation Plans (SIP) Deficiencies
Criteria Pollutants Exceeding Primary Standards One or More Areas
Total Number of Monitors for Criteria Pollutants
Total Enforcement Action
EPA Sanctions Imposes as Consequence for SIP Deficiencies
Toxic Pollutant Control Program in Place
Acid Deposition Control Program in Place
Research on Acid Rain
1982 Total Air Program Budget
1985 Total Air Program Budget
Soil Conservation Matrix: Indicators
Statewide Conservation Program
Erosion and Sediment Control Laws
Established Soil Loss Limits
Approved Plan Required before Soil can be Disturbed
Provisions for Enforcement and Penalties
Cost-Sharing for Soil Conservation
Average Tons Lost Per Acre on Total Cropland – 1982
Percentage of Cropland Needing Erosion Control
Percentage of Total Cultivated Tillage – 1982
Funds Appropriated by State & Local Government for Soil Conservation – 1985
Solid Waste & Recycling Matrix: Indicators
Solid Waste Management Plan
Regulations for Landfill Safety and Control
Recycling Program
Total Monitoring of Groundwater
Total Inspection
Frequency of Inspections
Number of Groundwater Violations
Number of Subtitle D Landfills
Number of Subtitle D Surface Impoundments
Estimated Solid Waste Tonnage
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Table 4.2 (continued).
Solid Waste & Recycling Matrix: Indicators
State Superfund Statutes
Small Quantity Generator Regulations
Underground Injection Restrictions
Pre-HSWA Final Authorization
Community Right to Know Laws
Incentives to Reduce/Recycle
Household Hazardous Waste Collection
Number of National Priority List (NPL) Sites
Number of ERRIS List Sites
Ranking by Hazardous Waste Generation
Groundwater Protection Matrix: Indicators
Legislative Authority to Implement Strategy Management Plan
Groundwater Strategy Management Plan in Place
Strategy Plan Includes Mapping
Leaking Underground Storage Tank Legislation
Non-Degradation or Limited Degradation as State Policy
Monitoring for Pesticides, Salt Water Intrusion, Hazardous Waste & Non-Hazardous Waste
State Policy for Controlled Land Use Areas
Percentage of Population Served by Groundwater
Groundwater Withdrawal Per Day
Energy Matrix: Indicators
Least Cost Provisions & Regulations
Income Tax Credits for Solar and Renewable Energy Systems
Tax Credit Expiration Date
Percentage of Available Solar Energy & Energy Conservation Bank 1982 – 1986
Building Code Provisions
Appliance Efficiency Standards
Construction Work in Progress Policy

The Green Index
Arguably the most comprehensive index of state environmental program ranking
is developed in 1991 with the Green Index (Hall and Kerr, 1991). This study takes into
account 256 indicators of state environmental health, including measures of
environmental conditions, spending on environmental programs, state congressional
leadership on environmental programs, and state environmental policy initiatives.
Specific environmental factors examined include air pollution, water pollution, energy
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use, automobile emissions, toxic and hazardous waste, workplace environment,
farmlands, forests, and wildlife. The Green Index covers much of the same ground as
previous studies, but goes into greater detail. When specific environmental conditions
are examined, many more indicators are used to rank a state’s health. The Green Index is
much more inclusive in the indicators examined. It is a more comprehensive ranking of
state environmental health. Table 4.3 provides a listing of the numerous indicators used
to create the Green Index.
The Green Index provides a detailed snapshot of the states’ environmental effort
in 1991. Table 4.4 shows the state ranking in the Green Index. It also provides the
ranking of states according to the two main categories of the Green Index: environmental
policies and environmental conditions. According to the overall composite index score,
Oregon ranks highest in environmental health. Alabama ranks last. The index ranks
states according to environmental conditions and policy initiatives. Some of the states
with poor environmental conditions responded to these conditions with aggressive policy
initiatives (p. 135). On the other hand, some states that rank high on policy initiatives
rank low on spending. These states do not provide the funding needed to follow through
with policy implementation. Thus, the Green Index presents a comprehensive picture of
state environmental conditions and state response to these conditions. The limitation of
the Green Index is that it only provides this picture at one point in time. While it serves
as an excellent tool for a cross-sectional study, it does not allow for studying states’
environmental effort over time.
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Table 4.3. Environmental Indicators used in the Green Index
Air Pollution
Population with Air Violating Standards for Ozone
Population with Air Violating Standards for Carbon Dioxide
State Per Capita Spending on Air Pollution
Density of Motor Vehicle Traffic & Pollution
Toxic Chemical Releases by Industry to Air
Toxic Emissions without End-of-Stack Controls
High Risk Cancer Facilities
Ozone-Depleting Emissions
Acid Rain
Air Emissions from U.S. Electric Utilities
Carbon Dioxide Emissions from all Fuels
Water Pollution
Total Chemical Underground Injections
Public Sewers in Non-Compliance
Investment for Sewer Needs to Year 2008
Miles of Rivers, Streams, Lakes, & Reservoirs
Percentage of Rivers, Streams, Lakes, & Reservoirs Unusable
Spending on Water Quality & Development
Water Pollution (continued)
People Served by Groundwater
Households Served by Own Wells
Households with Septic Tank Only
Pesticide Contaminated Groundwater
Surface & Groundwater Systems Failing SDWA
Percentage of Water Systems in Significant Non-Compliance
Population with SDWA Violations
Percentage of Water use for Drinking & Cooking
Congressional Leadership & Policy Initiatives
State Congressional Votes on Energy Bills
Contributions Received by Congressmen from Energy-Related Groups
Recycling Programs
Landfill Requirements
Toxic Waste Plans
Acid Rain Plans
Water Quality Monitoring
Agricultural Monitoring
Energy & Transportation Monitoring and Tests
Place & Pollution Management Plans
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Table 4.3 (continued).
Toxic Waste
Toxic Chemical Releases to the Land
Toxic Chemical Transfers Off Site
Cancer-Causing Chemicals Released to the Environment
Birth Defect Toxins Released to the Environment
Nerve Damaging Toxins Released to Environment
Total Toxic Chemicals Releases to Environment
Personal Income from Chemical Industry
Hazardous Waste Generated
Hazardous Waste Remaining in State
Hazardous Waste RCRA Generators
Hazardous Waste Management Facilities
Hazardous Materials Transport Accidents
Military Hazardous Sites
State Spending to Manage Solid & Hazardous Waste
Superfund NPL Sites
Cleanup of NPL Sites
Non-Superfund Waste Sites
Non-Hazardous Subtitle D Impoundments
Municipal Solid Waste Generated
Municipal Waste Recycles
Curbside Recycling Programs
Open Municipal Landfills
Municipal Incineration
Energy
Coal Production
Oil Production
Natural Gas Production
Gross State Product from Energy
Pipelines in Non-Compliance
Oil Spills in State Water
Oil & Gas Injections Wells
Growth of Carbon Emissions (1966 - 1986)
Carbon Emissions (Tons Per GSP)
Growth in Per Capita Energy Consumption
Energy Growth vs. Population Growth
Low-Income Homes Weatherized
Percentage of Electric Capacity in Nuclear Power
Citations at Nuclear Plants
Low-Level Radioactive Waste sent for Disposal
Total Radioactive Waste in State
Gasoline Use Per Capita
Miles Per Gallon Gas Consumed
Highway Deaths per Billon Miles Driven
Persons Per Motor Vehicle
Cars Per Transit Buses
Dependency on Vehicle & Related Industries
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Table 4.3 (continued).
Highway Spending as a Percentage of Vehicle-Related Revenue
Mass Transit Spending as a Percentage of Highway Spending
Mass Transit Used in Urban Areas
Renewables as a Percentage of All Energy
Renewables as a Percentage of All Electricity
Non-Hydro Renewables of Electricity
Energy from Municipal Waste
Solar Collection Systems
Community & Workplace Health
Cancer Cases & Deaths
Premature Deaths
Population in Underserved Areas
Population without Insurance
Public Health Spending
State Medicaid Program
Households without Plumbing
Infant Mortality
Workplace Deaths
Workers in High-Risk Jobs
Workers in most Toxic Industries
Workers in High-Injury Industries
Hazardous Waste Workers
Maximum Unemployment Benefits
Community & Workplace Health (continued)
Unemployment Rates
Population with Workplace Insurance
Union Membership
Laws for Workplace Safety
Farms, Forest, Fish, & Recreation
Number of Farms
Farms Gained or Lost
Farmland in State
Fertilizer Use Per Capita
Herbicides per Acre
Pesticide Use Per Capita
Pesticides Tainted Ground water
Unsafe Nitrates in Wells
Cropland Irrigated
Cropland Erosion
Conservation Tillage
Acres in Conservation & Reserve
Agriculture as a Percent of State Gross Product
Forest Products
Forest as a Percent of all Land
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Table 4.3 (continued).
Forests Owned by Timber Firms
Change in Forest
Private Tree Farms
Lumber as a Percentage of Gross State Product
Paper Mills
Wetlands Lost
Shellfish Fishing Water Limited
Commercial Fish Landings
Fishing Licenses
Adults who Hunt of Fish
Registered Motorboats
Recreational Waters
Total Land
Land Owned by Federal Government
Land Owned by Fish & Wildlife Services
Land in State Park Areas
Budget for State Parks
Natural Resources as a Percentage of State Gross Product
Population
Conservation Members

Environmental Stringency – The Levinson Index
After conducting a thorough examination of state environmental policy measures,
it becomes apparent that the effort to study the economic effects of environmental policy
across states over time is problematic. While there has been research specifically focused
upon state environmental policy, none of this research is longitudinal. The most cited
environmental policy measures are cross sectional, thus only provide a snapshot of
environmental policy in the states at single points in time. In order to select a measure
that accurately provides a representation of the variable that I am most interested in
isolating, it becomes necessary to revisit the theory driving this research.
Some states approach the development of environmental policy from an economic
perspective. These states hope that by enacting environmental regulations that are less
stringent than other states, they will entice businesses to locate new facilities or expand
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existing facilities within their borders. By providing a lower regulatory burden, states
hope to lower operational costs for businesses. Businesses are not forced to divert
resources to pollution abatement measures, and thus, have the potential to reap greater
profits by locating in states with weaker environmental policies. Less stringent
environmental regulations lower business costs and make the states more attractive as a
siting location. Thus, environmental stringency directly affects business cost.
Levinson (1999) develops a longitudinal measure that directly addresses the issue
of business costs in an environmental regulatory setting. Levinson begins with the
Census Bureau’s Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures (PACE) survey. This
survey was conducted from 1977 to 1994 (excluding 1987 when PACE data were not
collected) and again in 1999. Manufacturing industries are surveyed regarding their
pollution abatement operating and capital costs. Thus, the very factor that can influence
industry location decisions is specifically asked of industries in this survey. While some
researchers use the PACE data as a longitudinal measure of environmental stringency,
they fail to control for the fact that some states having higher numbers of polluting
industries. States with greater numbers of polluting industries will have greater amounts
spent on pollution abatement costs by those industries. This does not necessarily reflect
greater environmental stringency of the states, however. Greater levels of pollutions
abatement spending is a function of greater numbers of polluting industries. By the same
token states with a lower concentration of pollution intensive industries will have overall
lower industrial pollution abatement spending. These states are not necessarily less
stringent in their environmental policy, they just have fewer polluting industries within
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their jurisdictions. The industrial composition of the state is simply not considered. It is
a state characteristic that is not controlled for in the measure of the variable.
Levinson creates an “industry-adjusted index” in order to control for the industrial
composition of a state. According to Levinson (1999) “the index compares the actual
pollution abatement costs in each state, unadjusted for industrial composition, to the
predicted abatement costs in each state, where the predictions are based solely on
nationwide abatement expenditures by industry and each state’s industrial composition”
(p. 3). Levinson accounts for both the pollution abatement spending by industries within
a state and the industrial composition of the state. His index is a reflection of what
industries in each state are spending for pollution abatement purposes yearly, while
controlling for the overall industrial composition in each state. This index provides a
measure of pollution spending in the states without “punishing” states that contain large
numbers of polluting industries with poor scores on the index. Essentially this index
takes into account what similar businesses are spending in different states. Levinson does
not just tally up the cost of pollution abatement to businesses in each state. He
determines industrial pollution costs across the nation and then uses this to establish what
these same industries spend in each state on pollution abatement. By controlling for
industrial composition, the Levinson Index resolves which states are costing businesses
more for pollution abatement efforts. Thus, he provides a measure of the environmental
costs of conducting business within a particular state.
This measure allows for the comparison of industry environmental costs across
the states. If environmental costs are higher in some states than in others, there must be
reasons for this. Industries would all build the most cost effective plants with similar
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operating costs in every state in which they were located if their were not external factors
causing them to do otherwise. These external factors are state environmental policies.
More stringent policies can increase the environmental operating costs of industries.
Thus, states that have industries spending greater amounts on environmental/pollution
abatement expenses are likely to have more stringent environmental policies/regulations
in place. However, Levinson does caution that factors other than stringency may also be
affecting pollution control costs. Labor costs for environmental workers may vary across
states and have an effect upon pollution abatement costs. Further, age of facilities is not
taken into account. New facilities are often subject to higher environmental standards
than existing plants, adding to their pollution abatement costs. This measure does not
take these other factors into account. While these limitations are important, the Levinson
Index does provide a useful tool for evaluating industry environmental costs across the
states. These costs can be affected by state policy decisions.
Table 4.4 illustrates how the states rank in environmental effort/stringency
according to the most frequently used cross-sectional measures and Levinson’s industryadjusted index. The ranking of the Conservation Foundation Index, FREE Index, and the
Green Index are presented. The Green Index ranking is also divided into its component
parts of state environmental conditions ranking and state policy ranking. A quick glance
at Table 4.4 shows that while the three “conventional” indices have similar ranking
patterns, there are some large differences between these and the Levinson Index. For
example, California is ranked in the top four of the “conventional” indices, but ranks 29th
on the Levinson Index. Mississippi has rankings of 48, 28, and 47 on the “conventional”
indices, but ranks 7th on the Levinson Index. Levinson runs correlations on the indices
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Table 4.4. Rankings of State Environmental Effort/Stringency According to Various
Indices
Conservation
Foundation Index
Alabama
50
Alaska
33
Arizona
32
Arkansas
26
California
2
Colorado
27
Connecticut
14
Delaware
21
Florida
17
Georgia
29
Hawaii
12
Idaho
47
Illinois
23
Indiana
11
Iowa
21
Kansas
33
Kentucky
12
Louisiana
43
Maine
14
Maryland
7
Massachusetts
4
Michigan
18
Minnesota
1
Mississippi
48
Missouri
49
Montana
7
Nebraska
39
Nevada
39
New Hampshire
43
New Jersey
3
New Mexico
46
New York
7
North Carolina
29
North Dakota
39
Ohio
18
Oklahoma
45
Oregon
5
Pennsylvania
23
Rhode Island
27
South Carolina
29
South Dakota
18
Tennessee
33
Texas
39
Utah
33
Vermont
14
Virginia
23
Washington
6
West Virginia
33
Wisconsin
7
Wyoming
33

FREE
Index
26
25
19
25
2
21
4
21
7
20
24
25
7
10
8
17
18
21
10
12
7
5
9
28
15
22
31
22
14
3
22
5
6
26
12
17
11
14
16
15
22
17
20
26
18
13
17
27
1
26

Green
Index
50
34
35
48
4
16
11
24
18
39
12
19
31
43
20
42
41
49
2
13
6
17
5
47
30
21
29
22
15
14
28
8
23
25
37
40
1
26
7
36
27
45
46
33
3
32
9
44
10
38
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Green
Cond.
47
18
26
40
19
10
23
27
30
38
1
11
42
49
29
43
39
50
4
14
6
32
5
44
33
15
24
9
8
28
20
17
37
16
46
31
3
34
7
35
12
45
48
22
2
36
13
41
21
25

Green
Policy
49
47
39
50
1
26
4
25
13
29
24
36
17
27
16
28
33
34
5
15
9
11
7
46
23
31
30
43
20
3
38
8
18
37
19
42
2
21
10
32
48
40
35
41
12
22
14
45
6
44

Levinson
Index
14
9
15
29
20
44
11
13
28
1
26
17
24
38
22
5
4
16
43
19
46
7
35
6
31
47
39
34
2
36
33
37
32
48
12
27
41
21
42
18
8
25
45
23
6
3
30
40

and finds that the Conservation Foundation Index, FREE Index, and Green Index are
highly positively correlated. However, these indices are negatively correlated with his
index.
Levinson suggests reasons for a lack of correlation with the “conventional”
indices. The “conventional” indices all include state environmental conditions in their
measures. Levinson’s index is based on industry expenditures. These expenditures may
be higher in states with poor environmental conditions because they are mandated to
meet federal requirements. Thus, poor conditions which lead to a low ranking on the
“conventional” indices can cause increased industry spending which leads to a higher
ranking on the Levinson Index. Further, Levinson points out that the other indices
frequently include policies that have nothing to do with industry costs (e.g., curbside
recycling). Consequently, the indices are measuring different concepts. The
“conventional” indices focus on state environmental effort and policy. The Levinson
Index focuses on the costs of state policies upon the industries they regulate. As stated
by Levinson, the “index measures how much it costs to locate a manufacturing facility in
any one state, relative to others, in terms of pollution abatement costs” (p. 12).
Conclusion
Researchers have used many ways to measure environmental policy in the states.
State environmental spending levels, state environmental conditions, and state
environmental policy/effort indices are commonly used. In this study I seek to determine
if states can spur economic growth by getting new industries to locate within their
borders or by having existing industries expand their operations with the inducement of
lower environmental costs. In other words, can states reap an economic reward by
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enacting environmental regulations that will result in lower operating costs for business
and industry? The Levinson Index provides a measurement tool that specifically
examines the environmental/pollution abatement costs of industries in the states across
time. Since this is the variable I am most interested in isolating, it is used as the main
independent variable of interest in this study. The next chapter presents the model used
in this analysis. All dependent and independent variables are thoroughly examined.
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CHAPTER 5:
THE MODEL
Existing studies tend to focus on one or two regulatory measures, and a single
econometric specification. One worthwhile project would involve trying out a
variety of these differences to see which matter the most. (Gray, 1997, p. 103)
In this research I attempt to discover whether state environmental policy has an
impact upon state economic growth. Two conflicting theories are prevalent in the
environment versus economy debate. The first theory posits that stringent environmental
regulations increase the operating costs of businesses, thereby, decreasing the likelihood
that businesses will locate (or expand operations) in states with more strict regulations.
Without business expansions to stimulate growth, state economies will suffer. Moreover,
stringent environmental regulations lower the efficiency of state businesses by imposing
costs on their production activities. The second theory holds that states with more
stringent regulations have better environmental conditions that serve to attract both
businesses and high quality workers needed by these businesses. Thus, environmental
regulations improve state characteristics that are appealing to potential businesses. As a
result, businesses locate in these “greener” states, stimulating the state economies and
enhancing state economic growth.
In this study, I model state economic growth as a function of state environmental
policy stringency. Three variables are used as measures of state economic growth.
Because of limitations of the availability of the data used as measures of environmental
stringency, separate models are estimated for the time periods of 1977 to 1994 and 1986
to 2003. Data for this study are drawn mainly from the Statistical Abstract of the United
States, published by the U.S. Department of Commerce, although other sources were
used for specific variables. All fifty states are examined in the analysis. The data is
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analyzed to determine whether environmental policies enacted by states effect state
economic growth. The dependent and independent variables utilized in this study are
discussed in turn.
Dependent Variable: State Economic Performance and Growth
The dependent variable of interest is state economic performance, measured
primarily in terms of state economic growth. I seek to understand the impact of
environmental policy upon state economies. State policymakers who support more lax
regulations generally argue that a less stringent regulatory environment will encourage
business development and result in overall economic growth. Three different measures
are used in an attempt to capture the basic elements of the concept of state economic
performance. I estimate separate models for each of the three variables.
State economic growth can be measured in a number of ways. I focus on
measures related to state income and employment. The first measure of state economic
growth is change in state total personal income. I collect data on real (deflated) total
personal income by state for each year. To capture change in personal income, I lagged
this variable by one year and calculated the percentage change from year t-1 to year t.
This was done in order to reflect growth in income that might have come about as a result
of state policies enacted in the prior year. The use of a lagged dependent variable allows
for the capture of change in economic conditions (Brace, 1991). The second measure of
state economic growth is change in state per capita income. I collect data for real
(deflated) state per capita income and, as with the first measure, this variable is lagged by
one year in order to attain a measure of growth in per capita income. The final measure
of state economic performance is state unemployment rates. If state economies grow as a
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result of growth in new or existing businesses, more citizens should be able to find work
in these businesses. The measure is simply the unemployment levels in the states for
each year. This variable is the unemployment rate measured as the number of
unemployed persons in the state as a percentage of the civilian non-institutional
population over the age of 16 in each state for each year. These three variables provide
an illustration of different factors that encompass a state’s economic growth. Thus, these
three state economic indicators that focus on change in state income and unemployment
rates are used as measures of state economic growth.
Independent Variable: Environmental Policy
As discussed in the previous chapter, many different indicators are used by
researchers as measures of state environmental policy. In this study, I emphasize the
Levinson Index, since this measure focuses on the environmental regulatory costs for
businesses in the states. However, since this measure is only available from 1977 to
1994, two other commonly used (but less valid) measures are examined for the time
period from 1986 to 2003. State spending on environmental programs and state
environmental conditions will also be included in the analysis in separate models
accounting for a different time period. In the full analysis presented in Chapter 6, I also
present a brief model examining the effects of the Green Index and the Green Policy
Index, the cross-sectional policy indexes discussed fully in Chapter 4. Since these
indexes are described thoroughly in the preceding chapter and are discussed in the model
in Chapter 6, I do not repeat that discussion in this section. Instead, I focus on the critical
longitudinal independent variables of the Levinson Index, state environmental spending
per capita, and state environmental conditions.
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The Levinson Index
The Levinson Index is the main independent variable of interest in the analysis of
the years 1977 through 1994. As discussed in the preceding chapter, the Levinson Index
is created using data from the Census Bureau’s Pollution Abatement Costs and
Expenditures (PACE) survey that details the costs to business and industry of complying
with environmental regulations. As the Census Bureau did not conduct the PACE survey
in 1987, the Levinson Index does not contain data for this year. However, using the
available years of the index, data were imputed using linear interpolation to produce a
value for 1987 for each state.
The Levinson Index provides a yearly score for each state based on the PACE
assessment of business costs. This index is based on the amount that business and
industry in each state spend on pollution control measures while accounting for the
industrial composition of the state. Thus, states are not ranked high on the index simply
because they are home to larger numbers of polluting industries. The industrial
composition of the state is factored into the score assigned to each state. This is used as a
measure of environmental policy stringency because it is likely that business and industry
will be forced to pay higher pollution costs if a state has more stringent environmental
regulations. Further, for the purposes of this study, I am specifically interested in
whether the costs imposed on businesses to comply with environmental regulations are a
detriment to state economic growth. By using a variable that specifically measures such
costs, I am able to explore the key question of interest in this dissertation.
If the policymakers who argue that environmental regulatory stringency has a
negative effect on business growth that in turn has a negative impact upon a state’s
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economy are correct, I expect that there will be a negative relationship between the
Levinson Index and growth in state total personal income and state per capita income.
Further, there will be a positive relationship between the Levinson Index and state
unemployment rates. However, if those who argue that more stringent environmental
regulations produce positive environmental conditions that serve to attract business and
industry to a state are correct, I expect to find the opposite results. The Levinson Index
will be positively related to change in state total personal income and state per capita
income and negatively related to state unemployment rates.
State Environmental Spending
Data collected by the Council of State Governments (CGS) and by the
Environmental Council of the States (ECOS) on state environmental and natural resource
spending is used as a measure of environmental policy for the second time period
analyzed in this study. While this measure is not an ideal measure of environmental
policy and the stringency of environmental regulation, it does capture the general
willingness of each state to commit budgetary resources toward environmental goals.
While specific policies are not accounted for in this variable, it does serve as a global
measure of state commitment to environmental goals. This measure is used for the model
estimates for the years from 1986 through 2003. The CGS collected these state spending
data in 1986, 1988, 1991, 1994, and 1996, while ECOS collected these data for the more
recent years of 2000 and 2003.
This spending data are reported in two forms. The total amount spent in each
state on environmental and natural resources is available for all of the reporting years.
The amount spent per capita in each state is available for the years 1994, 1996, 2000, and
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2003. Population data from the Statistical Abstract and total environmental and natural
resource spending for each state are used to calculate state per capita environmental and
natural resource spending for the years of 1986, 1988, and 1991. The data are then
imputed to provide values for the years in which the actual data are not collected.
If policymakers who argue for stronger environmental policies in order to provide
“clean” conditions as an enticement to businesses to locate within their borders are
correct, I expect greater environmental and natural resources spending to be positively
related to change in state total personal income and state per capita income.
Unemployment rates will be negatively related to environmental and natural resource
spending. However, if those policymakers who worry that businesses will be deterred by
a stricter environmental regulatory policy setting are correct, greater state spending on
environmental and natural resources will be negatively related to growth in state total
personal income and state per capita income. Further, there will be a positive relationship
between state environmental and natural resource spending and state unemployment
rates.
State Environmental Conditions
Since one of the key purposes of environmental regulations is to control and/or
reduce pollution, those states with more stringent regulations should see a benefit from
those regulations in the existence of better (i.e., cleaner) environmental conditions. Data
regarding industrial chemical releases is collected annually by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) in the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI). This data is available
for every year since 1988. Two indicators from the TRI are used in this analysis to
measure environmental conditions: chemical air emissions and water releases. Data from
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the TRI is utilized for information contained on these air and water releases. It is
expected that states with stricter environmental regulations would have lower numbers
reported on their TRI.
If officials who believe that strict environmental regulations harm a state’s
business climate are correct, I expect environmental conditions as reflected in the TRI
will be positively related to change in state total personal income and state per capita
income (i.e., the higher the emissions, the greater the income growth). Under these
circumstances, environmental conditions will be negatively related to state
unemployment rates. Conversely, if those who believe that “greener” conditions create a
better climate for business development and subsequent economic growth are correct,
then emissions will be negatively related to state total personal income and per capita
income (i.e., the lower the emissions, the greater the income growth) and positively
related to state unemployment rates.
Additional Independent Variables
In order to understand the relationship between state environmental policy and
state economic growth, other variables that can have an impact upon state economic
growth must be considered in the analysis. A variety of factors can have an influence
upon state economies. These factors include business incentives offered by states to
encourage industrial growth, the national economic climate in which the states operate,
the internal fiscal conditions under which the states operate, state structural and
institutional characteristics that can affect the policymaking environment, and
demographic characteristics of the states that may make them more or less appealing as
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siting locations to business and industry. The variables used to measure each of these
elements in the analysis are discussed in turn.
State Business Policies
In an effort to support business and industrial development, many states actively
engage in the adoption of pro-business policies. Policymakers in these states believe that
by providing incentives to businesses, they can encourage expansion of existing
businesses and the location of new businesses within their borders. The ultimate hope is
that the expansion of the business sector will have a positive impact upon state economic
growth. Thus, businesses and industries are offered incentives by states so that the states
can grow their economies.
Each year Site Selection magazine (formally Site Selection and Industrial
Development Handbook) conducts a survey of state economic officials to assess the
legislative business climate within each state. The magazine survey indicates whether
each state possesses eighteen different policies to provide financial assistance for industry
(see Appendix A). An additive scale is created that provides a score of government
financial assistance for each state for each year. The higher the state score, the more
financial assistance policies a state has in place.
Data are not available for 1994. To create a value for this missing year, I estimate
1994 data based on an interpolation of data for policies in place in 1993 and 1995. If a
policy is (or is not) in place in both 1993 and 1995, I assume that the policy is (or is not)
in place in 1994. When a change does occur between 1993 and 1995, I assume that the
change occurred in 1995. Hence, in these cases the 1994 value is assigned the same
value as for 1993.
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Policymakers enact these financial assistance policies with the expectation that
such policies will encourage business expansions and/or entice new businesses to locate
within their states. Thus, the enactment of these policies is done so with the expectation
of spurring economic growth. I expect that this variable will be positively related to the
state income variables and negatively related to state unemployment rates.
Site Selection magazine also has information available on the types of tax
incentives states offer business and industry. Data on fifteen tax incentives are collected,
including corporate income tax exemptions, incentives for the creation of jobs, and excise
tax exemptions (see Appendix A). An additive scale is created for this variable as well,
with higher scores indicating more tax incentives offered by the state. Once again, 1994
data are missing for this variable. The data are treated in the same manner as described
for the state financial assistance variable to provide a value for the missing year.
Similar to the financial assistance variable, state policymakers enact these tax
incentives hoping to stimulate growth and encourage expansion within the business
sector. The ultimate goal of business tax incentive policies is to improve overall state
economic growth. Therefore, the relationship between the tax incentive variable and the
state income variables should be positive. The more tax incentives offered to businesses,
the greater the growth in state total income and state per capita income. I expect to find a
negative relationship between the unemployment variable and the tax incentive variables.
The more tax incentives offered, the lower the state unemployment rate.
National Economic Conditions
As discussed in Chapter 2, research indicates that national economic conditions
can have great influence upon state economic development. States exist and operate
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within the national economy, and it is likely that national economic trends will have an
impact upon state economic growth. While states may attempt to control the effect of
economic conditions through the enactment of economic policies, they cannot eliminate
the influence that the national economy will exert upon state economies.
The first national economic variable examined is change in national real Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. This variable reflects the change in national per
capita GDP from one year to the next. Data are collected from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis and Economic History Services websites. I expect changes in national per
capita GDP to be positively related to the state income variables and negatively related to
state unemployment. This is consistent with Brace’s (1993) findings that national
economic conditions often have greater effects than state policies on state economic
conditions.
The next national economic indicator examined is national unemployment. This
variable is a measure of the nation’s unemployment rate. Data are collected from the
Statistical Abstract. I expect this variable will be negatively related to the state income
variables and positively related to state unemployment.
While research does indicate that national economic conditions can exert a great
deal of influence upon state economies (Brace, 1991; Garand and Hendrick, 1991), this
effect is not necessarily consistent among all of the states. The effects of national
economic conditions will vary among the states. Some states are more likely to be
affected by national conditions than others. For example, Louisiana is a state that is
heavily reliant upon the oil industry for its economic performance. While high oil prices
may benefit Louisiana, the nation as a whole may see an economic downturn as a result
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of rising oil prices. Indeed, the economies of non-oil producing states can be harmed by
an increase in oil prices. An oil price increase can harm the national economy and states
within that economy, while at the same time benefiting the economies of oil-producing
states. Thus, some states may not be as influenced by national economic conditions as
others. Indeed, Brace (1991) points out that states with energy resources faired better
than the nation as a whole during the oil crises of the mid to late 1970s. These states
were not as susceptible to the unstable economic conditions that influenced the national
economy.
State Fiscal Conditions
The potential for state economic growth can be either limited or expanded by
existing state fiscal conditions. States that are heavily indebted will be forced to allocate
resources to paying off that debt. Instead of being able to invest dollars into areas that
could benefit the state economically, these states must use resources to satisfy old
obligations. Moreover, states with heavy debt will be constrained in their ability to make
new investments, and some proposed investments may be limited by the greater difficulty
that states with heavy debt may face when they attempt to borrow money. State
economies are also affected by the level of federal dollars they receive each year. Such
dollars can alleviate the needs for states to use their limited financial resources in areas
that the federal government provides assistance. With federal monies used to cover some
state costs, states can otherwise allocate some of their limited resources into areas
designed to spur economic growth. To account for such fiscal conditions, measures of
state debt and federal aid are included in this analysis.
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Data are collected on the total debt outstanding for each state for each year from
the Statistical Abstract for the years 1977 to 2003. A variable is then created that
measures total state debt as a proportion of total state personal income. I expect that state
economic growth will be lower in states that have greater debt as a proportion of total
state income. Therefore, this state debt variable is expected to be negatively related to
the state income variables and positively related to state unemployment rates.
The Statistical Abstract provides data on the total amount of federal aid received
by each state. These data are collected for each state for each year from 1977 to 2003. A
per capita measure of federal aid in each state is created for the analysis. I am unsure
how this variable will affect the dependent variables. It may be that the more federal aid
a state receives, the better it is able to increase its infrastructure and attract businesses
which will help to increase economic performance. If this is the case, then the federal aid
variable will be positively related to the state income variables and negatively related to
state unemployment. On the other hand, receipt of greater federal aid may be a result of
increased need due to poor state economic conditions. If greater federal aid is a response
to state economic need, I expect this variable to be negatively related to the state income
variables and positively related to state unemployment rates.
State Structural/Institutional Characteristics
Certain state structural or institutional characteristics have the potential to
influence state economic growth. State tax structure, gubernatorial power, and legislative
professionalism can contribute both to the amount of revenues that states can collect and
the capacity of government to make effective use of those revenues in order to stimulate
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economic growth. Thus, these factors must be considered in the analysis of influences
upon state economic growth.
Tax structure is a critical variable in the discussion of a state’s ability to affect its
economic growth. The manner in which a state chooses to tax its citizens has an effect
upon the revenue received and, hence, the state economy. As witnessed at the national
level throughout the 1990s, there is great debate on how a tax system should be
structured. Some argue the benefit of a progressive income tax system while others favor
flat tax structures. Winters (1999) calculates the regressivity of states’ tax systems by
measuring the “percentage of income extracted in taxes from the lowest 40 percent of
income earners as a percentage of the percent of income extracted from the top 5
percentage of income earners in each state” (p. 317). A higher number reflects a state
with a more regressive tax structure. This measure of tax regressivity can be used as a
measure of the state tax structure.
Regrettably, I must point out that this is a cross-sectional variable. Winters
created this measure using 1991 tax data; thus, the measure does not vary over time for
the states. While not an ideal measure for a longitudinal analysis, the variable does
provide some insight into the tax structure of the states, allowing for the understanding of
the role tax structure plays in state economic growth. Just how this variable will affect
the economic growth variables depends upon which side of the tax structure argument is
correct. If proponents of sales taxes are correct, then this number should positively effect
economic growth. But if proponents of progressive incomes taxes are correct, then
greater state tax regressivity should negatively effect state economic growth.
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Since the 1990s, gubernatorial candidates have frequently stressed their abilities
to positively enhance state economic growth in order to demonstrate their qualifications
for the highest office in their states. In order for a governor to influence state economic
conditions, he or she must possess the structural capacity to do so. Brace (1993) notes
that states with more powerful governors achieved greater effects on per capita income.
Greater institutional capability allows states to have a greater influence upon economic
growth. Governors with the capacity to more effectively institute policies aimed at
improving economic growth will be more successful than governors with weak
institutional capacities. Beyle (1999) has developed a measure of gubernatorial
institutional power by examining six factors: gubernatorial tenure, appointment power,
budgetary power, veto power, party control, and whether a state’s executive branch
officials are elected separately or together. Beyle’s score is used in this analysis. As with
the tax structure variable, this measure is also cross-sectional and does not vary over
time. However, it does provide some understanding of gubernatorial capacity for the
purposes of this analysis. According to this index the higher the score a state receives,
the greater the institutional power of the state’s governor. I expect this variable to be
positively related to the state income variables and negatively related to state
unemployment rates.
While governors might like to imagine that sole responsibility for state policy lies
in their hands, the legislature is a critical body in state policymaking. Much research has
focused on the increased professionalism of state legislatures and the notion that
increased professionalism enables a legislature to better affect state policy
(Mooney,1995; Moncrief, Thompson, and Kurtz, 1996; Rosenthal, 1998; Dilger, Krause,
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and Moffett,1995; King, 2000). King examines legislative professionalism over a thirty
year period, providing a legislative score for each decade. This measure is used in this
analysis. Since King calculates the score each decade, this variable does provide slight
variation in the states over time. The score for each state changes in 1983 and again in
1993. Higher scores indicate greater levels of legislative professionalism in the states.
Consistent with Brace’s (1993) finding that states with more professional legislatures are
able to affect per capita income due to greater institutional capability, I expect that
greater legislative professionalism will be positively related to state income variables and
negatively related to state unemployment rates. State legislatures that have the capacity
to enact policies designed to achieve increased state economic growth will use that
capacity to do so.
State Demographic Variables
In addition to the business policy, national economic conditions, state fiscal, and
state structural/institutional variables, other variables that reflect demographic
characteristics of the state have the potential to influence state economic growth. These
types of variables can be important factors for businesses in making site location
decisions. They can also be important to a state’s ability to grow its industrial sector.
Education, manufacturing employment, political culture, agricultural strength, region,
urbanization, and race are variables that are used frequently in state economic studies to
account for economic differences among the states. Thus, these demographic variables
are included in the analysis.
The educational attainment of a state’s citizenry can be critical is its efforts to
court new business and industries. Educational attainment is measured in two ways. The
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first variable is one that represents the percentage of a state’s population that has a high
school diploma. The second variable is the percentage of a state’s population that has at
least a college degree. These data are collected from the Statistical Abstract, the Current
Population Reports, and the American Community Survey. Some explanation of how
these variables are collected and created is necessary. Unfortunately, the Census Bureau
has not been consistent in either how it has asked questions regarding educational
attainment or how often it has asked these questions during the years covered in this
study. Prior to 1989, the Census Bureau asked respondents whether they had completed
four years or more of high school and whether they had completed four years or more of
college. In 1989 the questions were changed to specifically ask whether a high school
degree or its equivalent was attained and whether a college degree was earned.
Obviously these questions are not providing the same information, as it is possible that a
respondent before 1989 could have gone to either high school or college for more than
four years without actually having attained a degree. In addition the ages of respondents
examined changed during the period under examination. Prior to 1989, answers reported
in various years were reported for the population over the age of 14, the population over
the age of 15, the population over the age of 18, and the population over the age of 25.
Since 1989, though, results have been consistently reported for the population over the
age of 25. While these represent key differences in the data collected over the time
period, for the purposes of this analysis, the data are treated as equivalent.
A second problem with the educational attainment data arises concerning the
reporting years and reporting regions. The census occurs every ten years and the
Statistical Abstract provides data for the census years for each state. The census years
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covered in this analysis are 1980, 1990, and 2000. The Current Population Reports and
American Community Survey provide estimates of these educational attainment data
based on samples from the states for select years. Current Population Reports data
available for the time period covered in this analysis are for the years 1977, 1979, 1981,
1983, 1987, 1989, 1991, and 1993 to 1999. A further complication involves the years
1977 to 1987. The Current Population Reports did not report the data for each state.
Instead, regional educational attainment data is provided. The American Community
Survey provides the educational attainment data through the Census Bureau website for
the years 2001 to 2003. While complete data are available for each state from 1993 to
2003, reporting gaps exists from 1977 to 1992. The data are imputed to provide values
for the missing years of 1978, 1982, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1988, and 1992. In order to
prepare the data for imputation, I removed data for some states for some years that
exhibited extreme outliers in the level of educational attainment. Hence the time series
for these variables are slightly smoothed over time.
Business and industry looking for areas in which to develop often seek out
locations with educated workforces so that the costs of training employees will be lower.
States with better educated citizens should be more attractive for business developers. I
expect these states to have an advantage in their potential for economic growth. Further,
since educational attainment and income achievement are linked, I expect that states
whose citizenries possess higher levels of educational attainment will have higher levels
of economic performance. Thus, I expect the educational attainment variables will be
positively related to the state income variables. Educational attainment will be negatively
related to state unemployment.
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The amount of a state’s labor force that is employed in the manufacturing sector
can also have an impact upon state economic growth. Data are collected from the
Statistical Abstract on the number of employees in each state that are employed in the
manufacturing sector. These data are used to create a variable that represents
manufacturing employment as a proportion of the total state population. Just as business
and industry may want to develop in a state with a more highly educated workforce to
keep employee training costs lower, they may be attracted to an area with a large number
of employees who are already trained in the manufacturing area. Such employees may be
easier to train in industrial jobs. States with large proportions of their population already
employed in this sector may be more appealing to new business and industrial
developers. Thus, the manufacturing employment variable is expected to be positively
related to the state income variables and negatively related to state unemployment rates.
Political culture is another state characteristic that can have an influence upon
state economic growth. Johnson’s (1976) reformulation of Elazar’s classification of state
political culture using discriminant analysis is utilized to assign a political culture score
to each state. Traditional states are coded 0, individualistic states are coded 1, and
moralistic states are coded 2. Johnson’s categorization excluded Hawaii and Alaska.
Multinomial logit is used to create a model of predicted political culture from the
variables utilized in this model. The predicted political culture model had an R2 of .594.
Thus, the model was used to predict scores for the two missing states. Hawaii is
classified as a moralistic state. Alaska is classified as an individualistic state.
Categorization of political culture classifies moralistic states as more reliant upon
government solutions to problems. These moralistic states are expected to actively use
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government means to make their states more desirable areas to live (e.g., infrastructure
development). Such improvements can make states more attractive to business and
industrial development. Such development can lead to state economic growth.
Therefore, moralistic political culture should be positively related to the state income
variables and negatively related to the state unemployment rate variable.
The strength of the agricultural sector of a state can also have an impact upon
state economic growth. Data on the number of farms in each state is collected using both
the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Agricultural Statistics and the Statistical Abstract.
These data are used to create a measure of the number of farms per capita in each state
for each year. Data values are missing for 1981, so the available data are imputed to
create a value for that year for each state. Brace (1993) suggests that since the 1970s,
state economic development policy has “focus[ed] on the creation of new industries and
markets and the expansion of existing ones” (p. 28). Since so much state effort has been
put forth to develop business and industries, the presumption appears to be that these
sectors are most economically advantageous for the states while the agricultural sector is
not as ripe for economic growth. Since states with greater number of farms per capita are
likely more reliant upon the agricultural sector, policymakers in these states may be less
willing to adopt policies designed to increase industrial development. Hence this variable
is expected to be negatively related to the state income variables. On the other hand,
agriculture is a labor-intensive sector of the market, and an active agricultural sector may
be a heavy employer that takes advantage of slack labor markets. Even as a large
agricultural sector may generate less income than other economic sectors, it may reduce
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unemployment, albeit with lower-paying jobs. Hence, I hypothesize that farms per capita
will be negatively related to state unemployment.
Regional location is another factor that is important to the states. As Brace (1993)
notes, globalization has had a negative effect upon the economies of southern states. For
decades the southern region relied on low wages to attract industrial development.
Globalization has made other nations, with significantly lower wage rates, more attractive
for this purpose. Also, southern states have traditionally been more rural-based
economies. As such, it is expected that their economic growth would be lower than other
regions; though, this specific effect should be captured by the farms per capita variable.
It is worth noting that in more recent years southern states have experienced higher levels
of growth than in their past. Historically, though, growth in these states has been weaker
than in other states so southern states had more potential for growth. This “south”
variable is coded 1 for southern states and 0 for other states. While an argument can be
made for increased growth in the south, I expect the effects of globalization and the
strength of traditional agricultural sectors to outweigh the effects of more recent growth.
Thus, I expect this variable to be negatively related to the state income variables and
positively related to the state unemployment variable.
Urbanization levels can also have an important impact upon state economic
growth. Data from the Statistical Abstract are utilized to develop a measure of the lagged
urban population proportion of a state. More urban areas are expected to possess greater
numbers of businesses which should enhance state economic growth. Therefore, the
variable is expected to be positively related to the state income variables. The
relationship with state unemployment is less conclusive, however. While greater
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numbers of businesses should increase employment rates, stories are constantly told of
the need for redevelopment in cities and the high unemployment rates of inner city
residents. Fieock (1991) describes the fiscal crises in the mid-1970s and economic
downturns in the 1980s which drove cities to pursue economic development policies.
However, he does not find evidence that local economic development initiatives
enhanced employment rates. Hence, it is inconclusive as to what the relationship will be
between state urbanization levels and state unemployment.
A final state demographic characteristic examined in the analysis is that of racial
composition. This variable is a measure of the lagged black population proportion of
each state. Data are utilized from the Statistical Abstract to create this variable. Minority
areas are generally regarded as poorer areas lacking economic growth. Stories are
repeatedly told of the need for business development in minority neighborhoods in order
to revitalize these areas. Thus, this variable is expected to be negatively related to the
state income variables and positively related to unemployment.
Conclusion
The model described in this chapter explores the relationship between state
environmental regulatory policy and state economic growth while controlling for other
independent variables that can also have an impact upon state economic growth. The
purpose of this analysis is to determine whether state environmental policy does have an
effect on state economic growth. Specifically, I am trying to ascertain whether these
environment policies influence the business climate within the states in a manner that
directly effects state economic growth. To gain a full understanding of this relationship,
other factors that can have an impact upon state economic growth must be considered. A
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variety of factors can effect state economic growth. These include elements within the
states that can influence business decisions that have an impact upon state economies.
They can also include elements that are external to the states, but still influence the state
economies. State business policies, the national economic climate, state fiscal conditions,
state structural/institutional characteristics, and state demographic characteristics are
included in the model. These variables are necessary to capture the true effect that
environmental regulatory policy has upon economic growth. Without the inclusion of
these control variables in the model, the accuracy of the results would be questionable.
Reasons for including each of the control variables are discussed in detail
throughout this chapter. Table 5.1 provides an illustration of the expectations of the
relationships between the dependent state economic growth variables and all of the
independent variables. Two of the dependent variables are income variables and the third
is an unemployment variable. As is readily noticed from a quick glance at the table, these
variables work in opposite directions. When a positive relationship is expected with the
income variables, a negative relationship is expected with the unemployment variable.
Similarly, when a negative relationship is expected with the income variables, a positive
relationship is expected with the unemployment variables. Since growing income
suggests a growing economy with growing employment, this is not surprising. Income
and unemployment should work in different ways.
The expected relationship between the dependent variables and the state
environmental policy variables are illustrated as a function of the “pro-business, antiregulation” side of the argument. For the purposes of this table, I assume that those who
argue against strict environmental regulations in order to stimulate business and industrial
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development are correct in their assertions that such regulations depress business growth,
and hence, depress state economic growth. As discussed earlier in the chapter, if the
proponents of more stringent regulations are correct in their assertions that “greener”
environments actually attract business and stimulate economic growth, then the
relationships would run in the opposite direction from that depicted in Table 5.1. The
state income dependent variables would be positively related to the Levinson Index and
state environmental spending and negatively related to the environmental conditions
variables. The state unemployment variable would be negatively related to the Levinson
Index and state environmental spending variables and positively related to environmental
conditions.
The relationships between the dependent variables and independent variables are
explored in the remaining chapters. Now that the model is prepared with the variables
fully described, the analysis can occur. Regressions establish the nature of the
relationship between state economic growth and the independent variables described in
this chapter. The model is ready for scrutiny.
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Table 5.1. Expectations of Relationships between Dependent and Independent Variables.
____________________________________________________________________________
Change in State
Change in State
State
Total Personal
Per Capita
Unemployment
Income
Income
Rate
--------------------------------------------------------------____________________________________________________________________________
Environmental Policy Variables *
Levinson Index
State Environmental Spending
State Environmental Conditions
Air Emissions
Water Emissions

-

-

+
+

+
+

+
+

-

Business Policy Variables
Financial Assistance
Tax Incentives

+
+

+
+

-

National Economic Variables
Change in Per Capita GDP
National Unemployment

+
-

+
-

+

State Fiscal Variables
State Debt
Federal Aid **

?

?

+
?

Structural/Institutional Variables
Tax Structure **
Gubernatorial Power
Legislative Professionalism

?
+
+

?
+
+

?
-

State Demographic Variables
Educational Attainment
High School Degree
College Degree
Manufacturing Employment
Political Culture (Moralistic)
Farms
South
Urbanization **
Black

+
+
+
+
+
-

+
+
+
+
+
-

+
+
?
+

________________________________________________________________________
* For the purposes of this table, expectations of relationships between environmental policy and economic
growth are based upon the theory that strict environmental regulations harm economic growth.
** The expectation of the impact of this variable upon state economic growth is uncertain.
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CHAPTER 6:
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this chapter, I present the empirical results of my analysis of the relationship
between state environmental regulatory policy and state economic growth. The
dependent variable examined is state economic performance and three indicators are used
to measure this variable. These dependent variables are change in state total personal
income, change in state per capita income, and state unemployment rates. The main
independent variable of interest is state environmental policy. I seek to discover the
degree to which states with more stringent environmental regulations realize an economic
penalty for such regulations. Do states that enact tougher environmental regulations
suffer a loss in economic growth? By the same token, do state that enact more lax
environmental regulations experience greater economic growth?
The variables used as measures of environmental policy are the Levinson Index,
state per capita environmental spending, and state environmental conditions. I review
these variables briefly in the discussion of the analysis. I include a wide range of control
variables in the model to ensure that the results present an accurate reflection of the
relationship between state environmental policy and state economic growth. These
control variables include state business policies, national economic conditions, state fiscal
conditions, state structural and institutional characteristics, and state demographic
characteristics. In the presentation of the model, I also include a discussion of the effect
of these control variables on state economic performance, though the focus of my
discussion is on the effects of state environmental policies.
The models used in this analysis are estimated using observations from all fifty
states for subsets of years from the time period from 1977 to 2003. Because I use data
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for state-year observations over time, my models are estimated using pooled crosssectional time-series (or panel) data. In order to avoid violations of ordinary least squares
(OLS) concerning the assumptions of homoskedasticity and uncorrelated error terms, my
models are estimated using feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) regressions (Powell
and Garand, 2006). A model using FGLS regression corrects for OLS violations of
homoskedasticity and uncorrelated error terms by assuming “a heteroskedastic error
structure across panels with no cross-sectional correlation and is estimated using panelspecific estimates of first-order autocorrelation” (p. 14). The result is a set of regression
coefficients and test of statistical significance that are uncontaminated by the potential
violations of these OLS assumptions.
The Green Index Model
Before presenting the results of my analysis using the Levinson Index and state
environmental spending and environmental conditions variables, I first present a
preliminary model using the Green Index as a predictor of state economic performance.
As discussed in Chapter 4, the Green Index is a cross-sectional measure of the
“greenness” of each state in 1991. In developing the Green Index, Hall and Kerr (1991)
include 256 indicators of state environmental health. These indicators include measures
of environmental conditions, state environmental spending, state congressional leadership
on environmental programs, and state environmental policy initiatives. The Green Index
is a comprehensive examination of each state’s environmental health for the year the
study is conducted, providing the most thorough analysis of the environmental setting of
all fifty states. Indeed, if this variable were available for multiple years, it would be the
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ideal independent variable to use in my analysis. Unfortunately, this widely used
variable is available only as a cross-sectional variable.
In addition to providing a score of environmental health, the Green Index also
provides each state with a Green Policies score. Both the Green Index and the Green
Policies score are examined in this section. I estimate two separate models, with the
Green Index and Green Policies variables serving as independent variables in these
models, respectively. I consider the effects of each of these variables for two reasons.
First, the overall Green Index composite score is the measure used by other researchers
who rely on this variable as a policy measure. I follow their example to set my analysis
into the context of previous studies. However, since policy is the variable I am most
interested in examining, I estimate the model using the Green Policies score. This allows
me to determine whether the inclusion of non-policy related environmental measures
have a differing affect on state economic performance. This provides a good test for the
validity of the policy measures utilized later in the analysis.
The Green Index scoring is such that a higher score represents a state with poorer
environmental health. For example, the state of Alabama is ranked last on the Green
Index and has an index score of 8,658. The state of Oregon achieves the best
environmental health and receives an index score of 4,583. Thus, if those who advocate
in favor of less stringent environmental regulation in order to stimulate economic growth
are correct, I expect the Green Index and the Green Policies Index to be positively related
to the state income variables and negatively related to state unemployment. If those who
argue that more stringent environmental policies enhance economic growth, I expect the
Green Index and Green Policies Index to be negatively related to the state income
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variables and positively related to unemployment. I estimate two models. The first uses
the composite Green Index score as the main independent variable of interest, while the
second model uses Green Policies score as the main independent variable of interest. The
results of these two models are presented for changes in state personal income, changes
in state per capita income, and state unemployment rates in Tables 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3,
respectively.
Models for Change in Total State Personal Income
Table 6.1 displays the FGLS estimates1 for the model of change in total state
personal income, depicted as a function of the Green Index (Model 1) and Green Policies
(Model 2) and the independent variables described in the model in the previous chapters.
In Model (1) of Table 6.1, I find that the coefficient for the Green Index is negative and
highly significant (b = -0.005, t = -6.03). This finding suggests that a “greener” a state
experiences higher growth in overall state total personal income. As states enact more
stringent environmental policies and attain “better” environmental conditions, they will
experience positive growth in total personal income. While the coefficient for this
variable appears to be small, it achieves significance at the stricter .01 level. This
significance level lends greater confidence to the indication that a low Green Index score
will help states attain growth in total state income.
Several control variables are found to have a significant effect on growth of state
total personal income. Indeed, four of the variables achieve significance at the .01 level.
As expected, the national economic variables exhibit a strong effect on state total
personal income growth, and the relationships are in the expected direction. Change in
national per capita GDP (b= 0.565, t = 23.23) is positively related to state total personal
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Table 6.1. FGLS estimate for Green Index and Change in Total State Personal Income
(1)
(2)
----------------------------------------------b
t
b
t
Intercept

0.091

7.13***

Environmental Policy Variable
The Green Index [1]
Green Policies Index [1]

-0.005

-6.03***

0.077

5.80***

-0.003

-2.07**

Business Policy Variables
Financial Assistance [1]
Tax Incentives

-0.006
-0.007

-0.03
-2.06**

0.052
0.27
-0.758 [1] -2.03**

National Economic Variables
Change in Per Capita GDP
National Unemployment

0.565
-0.003

23.23***
-7.20***

0.561
-0.003

22.81***
-7.01***

State Fiscal Variables
State Debt
Federal Aid [1]

-0.019
-0.010

-1.08
-3.60***

-0.009
-0.011

-0.53
-3.97***

Structural/Institutional Variables
Tax Structure [1]
Gubernatorial Power
Legislative Professionalism

0.026
-0.003
-0.280

2.31**
-1.73*
-4.59***

0.016
-0.006
-0.024

1.40
-3.01***
-3.58***

State Demographic Variables
Educational Attainment
High School Degree [1]
College Degree [1]
Manufacturing Employment
Political Culture (Moralistic)
Farms
South
Urbanization [1]
Black [1]
N
Pseudo R2
Wald chi-square
Prob chi-square
***prob < .01
** prob < .05
* prob < .10

0.141
-0.370
0.002
-0.001
-0.160
0.005
0.136
0.107

0.86
-1.41
0.08
-0.77
-2.13**
1.79*
1.91*
0.90
1350
0.2872
954.87
0.0000

[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation
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0.038
-0.080
-0.001
0.002
-0.191
0.007
0.111
-0.119

0.23
-0.29
-0.02
1.29
-2.47**
2.38**
1.49
-0.94
1350
0.2745
888.10
0.0000

income; this suggests that state economies typically move hand-in-hand with the national
economy. Moreover, the national unemployment rate (b = -0.003, t = -7.20) is negatively
related to growth in state total personal income. Two other independent variables also
achieved significance at the .01 level. Federal aid (b = -0.010, t = -3.60) exhibits a
negative relationship to total growth in total state personal income. This indicates that
the more federal dollars states receive, the lower their growth in total personal income.
This is surprising, since the influx of federal funds might be expected to increase state
economic performance, with all else being equal. Legislative professionalism also
attained the .01 level of significance. However, the results are a bit curious, as a negative
relationship emerges (b = -0.281, t = -4.59). This indicates that the more professional a
state legislature, the lower the growth in total personal income. Hence, this relationship
is not the expected direction. I hypothesize that more professional legislatures have the
capacity to adopt and ensure the implementation of policies to stimulate state economic
growth. These results do not lend much support to this hypothesis.
Other control variables also exhibit a significant relationship to state total
personal income growth, though at lower levels of statistical significance. Variables
achieving significance at the standard .05 level are farms per capita, tax structure, state
tax incentive policies, and gubernatorial institutional power. As expected, a negative
relationship exists between farms per capita and growth in total state personal income (b=
-0.160, t = -2.13). The model suggests that the more farms in a state, the lower the
growth in state total personal income. The coefficient for the tax structure variable (b =
0.260, t = 2.31) is positive, indicating that the more regressive a state’s code, the greater
the growth in total personal income. More curious results are the negative coefficients
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displayed by the tax incentive variable (b = -0.007, t = -2.06) and the gubernatorial power
variable (b = -0.003, t = -1.73), both of which are in the unexpected direction. The
results indicate that offering more tax incentives to businesses and having a governor
with greater institutional capacity leads to lower state total personal income growth.
Two other variables achieve significance at the more relaxed .10 level of
significance. States with higher levels of urbanization experienced greater growth in
state total personal income. The southern region variable produced results contrary to
expectations. Southern states experienced a positive relationship to state total personal
income. This finding could indicate that while many southern states have lagged behind
the rest of the nation in overall economic indicators, these states have managed to
experience higher levels of growth than other areas. This growth has not yet allowed
states in the south to reflect more robust economies because these states have had much
more “catching up” to do as compared to the economic performance of other states.
In Model (2) of table 6.1, I find that the Green Policies Index results share some
of the same results as the Green Index. In this second model, I find the Green Policies
Index (b = -0.003, t = -2.07) is negatively related to state total personal income. Thus,
states with better environmental policy scores on the index exhibit greater growth in total
personal income, indicating higher growth rates for states with more stringent
environmental policies. Coefficients for the controls variables in Model (2) are of similar
magnitude and significance as in the first model. Only two variables that achieved
significance in the first model failed to do so in the second model. The coefficients for
the tax structure and urbanization variables are not statistically significant in the second
model. All other control variables exhibit similar results to those of Model (1). Further,
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those variables that maintained their significance in both models had their coefficients in
the same direction in both models – even when theses results were in an unexpected
direction.
Models for Change in State Per Capita Income
The models are estimated for the second dependent variable representing state
economic growth, change in state per capita income. The results of this estimation are
presented in Table 6.2. Model (1) presents results using the Green Index as the main
independent variable of interest. The Green Index (b = -0.002, t = -3.21) achieves the
more rigorous .01 level of significance in this model. The variable is negatively related
to change in state per capita income, indicating that states with greater environmental
health over the course of the time period under study achieve higher growth rates in per
capita income.
In Table 6.2 Model (1), other independent variables are found to have significant
relationships to growth in state per capita income. National economic indicators achieve
highly significant relationships (.01 level) to this dependent variable. The coefficients for
these variables are in the expected direction. National per capita income growth (b =
0.591, t = 27.30) is positively related to state per capita income growth, and national
unemployment (b = -0.003, t =-7.71) is negatively related to state per capita income
growth. Clearly the national economy shapes economic performance, at least in most of
the American states.
Four variables achieve the standard .05 significance level. The federal aid
variable (b = -0.006, t = -2.96) is negatively related to state per capita income. Higher
levels of federal aid result in lower levels of growth in state per capita income. The
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Table 6.2. FGLS estimate for Green Index and Change in State Per Capita Income
(1)
(2)
----------------------------------------------b
t
b
t
Intercept

0.059

6.00***

Environmental Policy Variable
The Green Index [1]
Green Policies Index [1]

-0.002

-3.21***

0.052

5.34***

-0.011

-0.99

Business Policy Variables
Financial Assistance [1]
Tax Incentives [1]

0.026
-0.133

1.82*
-0.48

0.292
-0.177

2.03**
-0.63

National Economic Variables
Change in Per Capita GDP
National Unemployment

0.591
-0.003

27.30***
-7.71***

0.591
-0.003

27.27***
-7.66***

State Fiscal Variables
State Debt
Federal Aid [1]

-0.022
-0.006

-1.68*
-2.96**

-0.019
-0.007

-1.46
-3.38***

Structural/Institutional Variables
Tax Structure [1]
Gubernatorial Power [1]
Legislative Professionalism

0.007
-0.333
-0.012

0.91
0.26
-2.50**

0.003
-0.790
-0.009

0.45
-0.61
-1.85*

0.126
-0.162
0.048
-0.176
-0.143
0.001
-0.090
0.046

-1.00
-0.80
2.37**
-0.17
0.25
0.54
-1.74*
0.53
1350
0.3053
1173.83
0.0000

State Demographic Variables
Educational Attainment
High School Degree [1]
College Degree [1]
Manufacturing Employment
Political Culture (Moralistic) [1]
Farms
South
Urbanization [1]
Black [1]
N
Pseudo R2
Wald chi-square
Prob chi-square
***prob < .01
** prob < .05
* prob < .10

[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation
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-0.151
-1.20
-0.032
-0.16
0.048
2.19**
0.966
0.98
0.003
0.05
0.002
0.96
-0.106
-2.02**
-0.051
-0.58
1350
0.3005
1165.01
0.0000

proportion of a state’s population that is employed in the manufacturing sector (b =
0.048, t = 2.37) is positively related to growth in per capita income, indicating that the
more manufacturing employees in a state the higher the per capita income growth rate.
States that offer more financial assistance programs (b = 0.026, t = 1.82) for businesses,
achieve higher growth in per capita income. The coefficient for legislative
professionalism (b = -0.012, t = -2.50) is in an unexpected direction. States that have
more professional legislatures experience lower growth in per capita income. The
coefficient of the urbanization variable achieves significance at the more relaxed .10
level. Contrary to the result for the dependent variable of change in total state personal
income, urbanization (b = -0.090, t = -1.74) is negatively related to growth in state per
capita income.
Table 6.2 Model (2) presents the results of the estimation when the Green Policies
Index is used as the main independent variable of interest. Green policies do not have a
significant effect on growth in state per capita income in this model. Hence, there is
insufficient evidence to support the contention that state environmental policies have an
impact upon state per capita income growth. The coefficients of the remaining
independent variables in Model (2) are of a similar magnitude and significance as are
found in the first model. The only variable that is not significant in both models is state
debt. The coefficient for this variable loses significance in the second model. When
Green Policies is the main independent variable of interest, state debt is not found to be a
significant influence upon change in state per capita income. On the other hand, the
coefficient for the urbanization variable (b = -0.106, t = -2.02) achieves the standard .05
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level of significance in Model (2). Thus, the performance of this variable is stronger in
the second model.
Models for State Unemployment Rate
In Table 6.3 I present the FGLS estimates for the two models with state
unemployment rate as the dependent variable. Model (1) contains the Green Index as the
main independent variable of interest. The Green Index (b = 0.313, t = 2.99) is found to
be positively related to state unemployment rates. This finding suggests that states with
better environmental health experience lower levels of unemployment over the course of
the time period under study than states with weaker environmental conditions.
Other control variables are also significant in Table 7.3 Model (1). Consistent
with expectations, national unemployment (b = 0.905, t = 38.61) is positively related to
state unemployment. As national unemployment rates increase, state unemployment
rates will also increase. State debt (b = 3.286, t = 3.19) also has the expected positive
relationship with state unemployment. States with greater proportions of total state
income that is absorbed by state debt will experience higher unemployment rates. As
expected, the manufacturing sector variable (b = 10.202, t =3.56) has a negative
relationship with state unemployment. States with more employees in the manufacturing
sector have lower levels of unemployment. Further, as expected, the farms per capita
variable (b = -34.809, t = -5.52) is negatively related to state unemployment. State
unemployment decreases as the number of farms increase. Once again, the coefficient
for legislative professionalism (b = 2.496, t =4.40) confounds expectations and is
positively related to unemployment suggesting that states with more professional
legislatures have higher unemployment rates.
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Table 6.3. FGLS estimate for Green Index and State Unemployment Rate
(1)
(2)
----------------------------------------------b
t
b
t
Intercept

2.203658

7.13*

Environmental Policy Variable
The Green Index [1]
Green Policies Index [1]

0.313

2.99**

3.126921

2.36**

0.047

0.28

Business Policy Variables
Financial Assistance
Tax Incentives

0.003
0.015

0.19
0.66

-0.002
0.008

-0.14
0.35

National Economic Variables
Change in Per Capita GDP
National Unemployment

-0.614
0.905

-0.69
38.61***

-0.734
0.899

-0.83
38.36***

State Fiscal Variables
State Debt
Federal Aid [1]

3.286
-0.195

3.19***
-1.09

3.408
-0.203

3.23***
-1.12

Structural/Institutional Variables
Tax Structure
Gubernatorial Power
Legislative Professionalism

-0.001
-0.304
2.496

-1.03
-1.32
4.40***

-0.402 [1] -0.32
0.018
0.07
1.820
2.85***

State Demographic Variables
Educational Attainment
High School Degree
College Degree
Manufacturing Employment
Political Culture (Moralistic)
Farms
South
Urbanization
Black
N
Pseudo R2
Wald chi-square
Prob chi-square
***prob < .01
** prob < .05
* prob < .10

-0.022
0.003
-10.202
-0.017
-34.809
-0.353
-0.162
0.009

-1.71*
0.12
-3.56***
-0.09
-5.52***
-1.08
-2.03**
0.66
1350

0.5532
2191.18
0.0000

[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation
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-0.019
-0.003
-12.054
-0.300
-28.978
-0.600
-0.012
0.034

-1.49
-0.12
-3.73***
-1.74*
-4.58***
-1.70*
-1.45
2.30**
1350
0.5202
2158.50
0.0000

Two other demographic variables are important in this model. Urbanization (b =
-0.162, t = -2.03) is negatively related to state unemployment, suggesting that state-year
cases with higher levels of urbanization experience lower levels of unemployment. High
school educational attainment (b = -0.022, t =-1.71) is negatively related to state. The
larger the percentage of a state population with a high school degree, the lower the
unemployment rate in that state.
In Model (2) in Table 6.3 I present estimates for the model with the Green
Policies Index utilized as the main independent variable of interest. The Green Policies
variable fails to achieve significance in this model. It appears that environmental policy
is not related to state unemployment rates. Other independent variables perform very
much as in the first model, achieving similar magnitudes and significance levels.
Though, two other variables achieve statistical significance in the second model as well.
The coefficient for the black variable (b = 0.034, t = 2.30) has a positive relationship to
state unemployment. As the proportion of the state population that is black increases,
state unemployment rates increase. This result is significant at the .05 level. Finally, as
expected, states with a moralistic political culture (b = -0.300, t = -1.74) experience lower
levels of unemployment.
The Green Index is significant to the economic growth measures in all three
models. Further, the coefficient for all three sets of results suggests that states which are
more environmentally healthy experience greater economic growth. This supports the
argument of those who advocate for more stringent environmental policies in order to
enhance economic growth. However, when the Green Index is stripped of all non-policy
related indicators, the results are less conclusive. The Green Policies Index only achieves
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significance in one model (Table 6.1, Model (2)). The results of this model do support
the results of the Green Index estimations since the .05 level of significance is achieved.
It is interesting, though, that there is no indication that environmental policy has an effect
upon change in state per capita income and change in state unemployment. Other results
of particular note are that the national economic variables consistently show a strong
relationship to the state economic variables. National economic conditions appear to
have a great effect upon state economies. Another consistent, and surprising, result is
that of the institutional variables. In particular, legislative professionalism continuously
exhibits a negative relationship with economic growth. These preliminary models
suggest that more professional legislatures do nothing to enhance state economic growth.
Summary
In this section I begin my analysis by exploring the effects of environmental
quality and environmental policies on state economic performance. I estimate separate
models for change in state personal income, change in state per capita income, and state
unemployment rates, with environmental quality the key independent variable in one set
of models and environmental policy the key independent variable in a second set of
models. Overall, the results suggest that environmental quality has a consistent effect on
state economic performance, controlling for the effects of other independent variables.
The effect of environmental policy on economic performance is somewhat less consistent
across models.
I estimate these models in order to make explicit comparisons with the findings of
previous research that uses the Green Index and Green Policies Index to predict state
economic performance. However, it is important to note that the empirical results from

126

these models are somewhat limited, since the Green Index and Green Policies Index are
measured for only one year. Hence the coefficients for these two variables indicate the
mean state economic performance levels across the time frame under study for different
levels of environmental quality and policy, controlling for the effects of other
independent variables.
What is necessary is to measure state environmental policy and quality for each
state over time. Having such a measure would permit me to estimate directly the effect
of these independent variables on state economic performance, with state environmental
quality and policy in one year linked explicitly to state economic performance in a given
year. Without having such data, the preceding analyses are not definitive but rather are
suggestive.
The Levinson Index Model
As explained in Chapter 5, the Levinson Index is used as a measure of
environmental stringency. This is a measure of the cost to industry of compliance with
pollution abatement regulations for each state-year case during the time period from 1977
to 1994. The industrial composition of the state is factored into the score assigned to
each state so that states are not ranked high on the index simply because they are home to
larger numbers of polluting industries. This measure is particularly appealing as a
measure of environmental stringency because it gets to the core of the theory driving this
study. The Levinson Index is a measure of how much compliance with environmental
regulations costs industries in each state over time. Thus, the analysis reveals whether
states that put a higher price tag on pollution abatement suffer an economic loss as a
result of policies that put these regulatory costs into place. The model is estimated
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separately for each of the three dependent variables representing state economic
performance.
Model of Change in Total State Personal Income
Table 6.4 presents the results of the model using change in total state personal
income as the dependent variable, depicted as a function of the Levinson Index. The
index coefficient (b = -0.005, t = -1.99) is in the expected negative direction and is
significant at the .05 level. Hence, it appears that environmental stringency is negatively
and significantly related to change in total personal income. A higher score on the
Levinson Index results in a decrease in total state personal income growth. States with
regulations that impose the highest costs on businesses to comply with pollution
abatement measures exhibit a decline in total personal income growth. This finding
supports the position of those who contend that stricter environmental policy will harm
the efficiency and performance of states’ economies. The finding suggests that when
environmental regulatory costs increase, states will see a decline in economic growth.
The business incentives policy variables produce interesting results in this model.
Included in this estimation is a variable for pollution control incentives2 offered by states
to businesses. This variable is taken from an annual survey from Site Selection magazine.
An additive index is created based on nine pollution control incentives. The survey was
discontinued in 1994, so this measure is only available from the years 1977 to 1993. The
pollution control incentives variable (b = -0.001, t = -2.57) is highly significant, reaching
the .01 level of significance. A negative relationship is found between pollution control
incentives and total state personal income growth. States that offer more incentives for
pollution control measures experience a decrease in total personal income growth. This
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Table 6.4. FGLS estimate for Levinson Index and Change in Total State Personal Income
b

t

Intercept

0.088

Environmental Policy Variable
The Levinson Index

-0.005

-1.99**

Business Policy Variables
Financial Assistance [1]
Tax Incentives [1]
Pollution Control Incentive

-0.066
-0.236
-0.001

-0.27
-0.51
-2.57***

National Economic Variables
Change in Per Capita GDP
National Unemployment

0.573
-0.002

21.77***
-3.23***

State Fiscal Variables
State Debt
Federal Aid [1]

-0.034
0.001

-1.20
1.54

Structural/Institutional Variables
Tax Structure [1]
Gubernatorial Power
Legislative Professionalism

-0.044
-0.006
-0.022

-0.32
-2.50**
-2.81***

-0.168
-0.001
-0.018
0.001
-0.459
0.011
0.222
-0.340

-0.62
-1.52
-0.44
0.60
-4.24***
2.53**
2.10**
-2.27**

State Demographic Variables
Educational Attainment
High School Degree [1]
College Degree
Manufacturing Employment
Political Culture (Moralistic)
Farms
South
Urbanization [1]
Black [1]
N
768
0.3260
Pseudo R2
Wald chi-square
717.64
Prob chi-square
0.0000
***prob < .01
** prob < .05
* prob < .10

5.11***

[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation
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result seems counterintuitive. These pollution control incentives are not required
regulations of the states. It is a policy which is dependent upon voluntary compliance. In
return for voluntary compliance, the states reward businesses for their good
environmental behavior. Even if the argument that environmental policies create costs
that harm economic growth is correct, I do not expect a negative relationship between
this variable and economic growth. Compliance is voluntary. If businesses choose to
accept the costs through voluntary compliance, it seems odd that they would then move
out of a state because of those increased costs. Thus, the results for this variable are a bit
curious. While the coefficient for the pollution control variable produces surprising
results, the other two business policy variables fail to achieve significance in this model.
Thus, there is no evidence that financial assistance programs and tax incentives have an
impact upon change in total state personal income.
The coefficients for national economic indicators are extremely significant in this
and in the expected direction. Growth in the national GDP (b = 0.573, t = 21.77) is
positively related to total state personal income. As national GDP increases, state
personal income will also increase. National unemployment rates (b = -0.002, t = -3.23)
are negatively related to total state personal income growth. If national unemployment
increases, then growth in total state personal income will decrease. National conditions
assert a great deal of influence over total state personal income growth. There is no
evidence, though, that state fiscal variables effect change in total state personal income.
These variables fail to achieve significance in this model.
Once again, the structural/institutional characteristics are highly significant, with
coefficients performing in the opposite directions than expected. The coefficient for the
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legislative professionalism variable (b = -0.022, t = -2.81) attains significance at the more
rigorous .01 level. This variable is negatively related to total state personal income
growth. This suggests that states with more professional legislatures experience declines
in total personal income growth. Further, the coefficient for the gubernatorial power
variable (b = -0.006, t = -2.50) is significant at the standard .05 level. States that have
governors with greater executive powers have decreased growth in total state personal
income.
Some of the demographic characteristics of the states influence total personal
income growth. The number of farms per capita variable (b = -0.459, t = -4.24) is highly
significant and in the expected direction. States with more farms per capita have
decreased growth in total personal income. The coefficients for the level of state
urbanization (b = 0.222, t = 2.10) and the lagged proportion of the population that is
black (b = -0.340, t = -2.27) are significant at the .05 level and perform in the expected
direction. The urbanization variable is positively related to total state personal income
growth, indicating that greater urbanization leads to greater growth. The black
population percentage variable is negatively related to total personal income growth,
indicating that as black population increases, total personal income growth decreases.
The variable for the southern region (b = 0.011, t = 2.53) also reaches the .05 level of
significance, but the coefficient is in an unexpected direction. There is a positive
relationship between location in the south and growth in total state personal income.
Southern states attain greater growths rates for this dependent variable than do nonsouthern states.
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Model of Change in State Per Capita Income

Estimates of the effects of the independent variables on growth in state per capita
income are presented in Table 6.5. The Levinson Index (b = -0.003, t = -1.52) does not
have a statistically significant effect upon change in state per capita income. While the
coefficient is in the expected negative direction, no conclusions can be drawn about the
relationship between these two variables since the coefficient fails to achieve
conventional levels of statistical significance.
National economic conditions are highly significant and in the expected direction.
Change in per capita GDP (b = 0.604, t = 26.80) has a positive relationship with state per
capita income growth. As national GDP increases, state per capita income also increases.
National unemployment (b = -0.002, t = -3.71) performs in the expected negative
direction. When national unemployment levels increase, states will experience declines
in per capita income growth.
The demographic variables produce interesting results in this model. The
coefficient for the farms per capita variable (b = -.0134, t = -1.71) reaches the .05 level of
significance. As expected the greater the farms per capita in a state, the lower the growth
in per capita income. The coefficient for college attainment (b = -0.789, t = -2.39) also
achieves significance at the .05 level in this model. However, the coefficient is in an
unexpected direction. The proportion of the state population that attains a college degree
is negatively related to change in per capita income. Contrary to expectations, this
finding indicates that states with more highly educated citizens experience decreases in
per capita income growth. Also performing in an unexpected direction is the coefficient
for legislative professionalism (b = -.010, t = -1.88). Though the significance reached
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Table 6.5. FGLS estimate for Levinson Index and Change in State Per Capita Income
b

t

Intercept

0.047

Environmental Policy Variable
The Levinson Index

-0.003

-1.52

Business Policy Variables
Financial Assistance [1]
Tax Incentives [1]
Pollution Control Incentive [1]

0.193
0.205
-0.503

1.09
0.61
-1.47

National Economic Variables
Change in Per Capita GDP
National Unemployment

0.604
-0.002

26.80***
-3.71***

State Fiscal Variables
State Debt
Federal Aid [1]

-0.020
0.006

-1.01
1.05

Structural/Institutional Variables
Tax Structure [1]
Gubernatorial Power [1]
Legislative Professionalism

-0.004
-0.442
-0.010

-0.39
-0.29
-1.88*

-0.117
-0.789
0.029
0.148
-0.134
0.005
-0.017
-0.143

-0.59
-2.39**
1.06
0.11
-1.71*
1.72*
-0.25
-1.41

State Demographic Variables
Educational Attainment
High School Degree [1]
College Degree [1]
Manufacturing Employment
Political Culture (Moralistic) [1]
Farms
South
Urbanization [1]
Black [1]
N
768
0.3436
Pseudo R2
Wald chi-square
969.89
Prob chi-square
0.0000
***prob < .01
** prob < .05
* prob < .10

3.78***

[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation
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is at the more relaxed .10 level, these results indicate that when a state has a more
professional legislature, it will have lower growth in per capita income. The southern
states coefficient (b = 0.005, t = 1.72) also performs in the opposite direction than
expected, but at the more relaxed .10 level of significance. Southern states are more
likely to have an increase in per capita income growth.
Model for State Unemployment Rate
In Table 6.6 I present the results of the model with state unemployment utilized as
the dependent variable for economic growth. The coefficient for Levinson Index (b =
0.634, t = 4343) is both positive and highly significant in this model, reaching the .01
level. Clearly there is a positive relationship between the Levinson Index and state
unemployment. As states score higher on the Levinson Index, state unemployment rates
increase. Similar to the findings presented in Table 6.4, these results suggest that
environmental regulations can have a negative impact upon state economies. The results
of Table 6.6 indicate that when business costs for pollution abatement activities increase
in a state, that state will notice an increase in unemployment rates. Thus, increased
environmental regulatory stringency imposes costs on a given state economy. This
finding lends support to those who argue in favor of the enactment of less stringent
environmental policies in order to stimulate economic growth.
Other independent variables exert significant influence upon state unemployment
rates. As expected, national unemployment (b = 0.933, t = 31.02) is positively related to
state unemployment. When national unemployment rates increase, state unemployment
rates also increase. This relationship is significant at the .01 level. Reaching a similar
level of significance are the state fiscal variables. As expected, the coefficient for state
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Table 6.6. FGLS estimate for Levinson Index and State Unemployment
b

t

Intercept

2.440

1.50

Environmental Policy Variable
The Levinson Index

0.634

4.43***

Business Policy Variables
Financial Assistance [1]
Tax Incentives
Pollution Control Incentives

0.128
0.449
0.166

0.01
0.15
0.42

National Economic Variables
Change in Per Capita GDP
National Unemployment

-0.555
0.933

-.049
31.02***

State Fiscal Variables
State Debt
Federal Aid

8.890
-0.002

4.35***
-3.18***

Structural/Institutional Variables
Tax Structure [1]
Gubernatorial Power
Legislative Professionalism

-0.847
-0.404
2.254

-0.61
-1.36
2.72***

0.002
0.012
-12.628
-0.147
-22.929
-0.879
-0.192
0.497

0.11
0.31
-3.33***
-0.86
-2.95***
-1.83*
-1.75*
2.54**

State Demographic Variables
Educational Attainment
High School Degree
College Degree
Manufacturing Employment
Political Culture (Moralistic)
Farms
South
Urbanization
Black
N
768
0.4334
Pseudo R2
Wald chi-square
1361.15
Prob chi-square
0.0000
***prob < .01
** prob < .05
* prob < .10

[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation
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debt (b = 8.890, t = 4.35) is positively related to state unemployment, indicating that
states that have larger proportions of total state personal income absorbed by debt have
greater unemployment rates. Federal aid (b = -0.002, t = -3.18) is negatively related to
state unemployment. States that receive a greater per capita amount of federal aid
experience lower unemployment rates. Once again, the coefficient for the legislative
professionalism variable (b = 2.254, t = 2.72) performs in an unexpected direction. A
positive relationship is present indicating that states with more professional legislatures
have higher unemployment rates.
State demographic variables also display evidence of significant relationships to
state unemployment rates. The coefficients for the manufacturing employment (b =
-12.628, t = -3.33) and farms per capita (b = -22.929, t = -2.95) variables are both
negative and significant at the .01 level of significance. Hence, both variables exhibit a
negative relationship to state unemployment. As expected, states with greater numbers of
people employed in the manufacturing sector have lower levels of unemployment. Also
as expected, the coefficient for farms per capita is negative. States with higher numbers
of farms have lower unemployment rates. Achieving significance at the .05 level, the
black population variable (b = 0.497, t = 2.54) is positively related to state
unemployment. States with greater proportions of the population that are black have
higher unemployment rates. Two other variables achieve significance at the more
relaxed .10 level. States in the south (b = -0.879, t = -1.83) and states with more
urbanization (b = -0.192, t = -1.75) exhibit a negative relationship to unemployment. The
model indicates that southern states have lower unemployment rates. This may indicate
that southern states are experiencing “catch-up” growth and as a result have larger
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numbers of citizens in their states employed. States that have greater proportions of the
population in urban areas also exhibit lower unemployment rates. Thus, cities appear to
have greater opportunities for employment than more rural areas.
Summary
Results from the models estimated using the Levinson Index as the measure of
environmental policy point to different effects of environmental policy than the results of
the Green Index models. In two of the models, the Levinson Index produced results
indicating that states that increase the pollution abatement regulatory burden on
businesses experience a negative impact on economic growth. States with higher scores
on the Levinson Index have systematically decreased total state personal income growth
and higher rates of unemployment. These results lend support to the argument of those
who hold that the enactment of strict environmental regulations is a detriment state to
economic performance. Other findings of note include the strength of the national
economic conditions variables. These variables consistently exert a strong effect upon
state economic conditions. It appears that state economies are heavily influenced by
national conditions. Another variable continues to produce confounding results. State
legislative professionalism appears to be a deterrent to state economic growth. While the
significance varies in the models, the legislative professionalism variable continues to
produce coefficients in the direction opposite to expectations. However, caution is
necessary in the interpretation of the results of this variable. The variable is somewhat
cross-sectional, only changing at three points in time for the time period I examine.
Thus, the observations do not change each year and the results may not be an accurate
reflection of the true effect of legislative professionalism. Overall, the Levinson Index
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models indicate that state environmental policies that add to the pollution abatement costs
of businesses may lead to a decline in the economic performance of the states.
Environmental Spending Models
The careful reader will note that I have estimated the models of state economic
performance during a limited time frame. Even though data on state economic growth
and unemployment are available until the present, it is perhaps surprising that I am
unable to estimate a model of environmental effects for the entire time period for which
economic data are available. The Census Bureau discontinued the survey used to create
the Levinson Index, so this variable is only available for the years 1977 to 1994.
Conclusions based on results that are focused on these years alone should be met with
caution. The 1970s was a time of extreme environmental regulation. The federal
government and the states became very active regulators for pollution control efforts.
Prior to this high regulatory period, business and industry were not mandated to spend
large amounts for environmental regulations. Thus, when regulations did change, one
can speculate that the initial costs to business and industry were high. Since
environmental compliance costs are not inexpensive to business and industry, the effects
of these initial costs may have lasted for an extended period.
It is necessary to extend the analysis further than the 17 years covered by the
Levinson Index. At the initiation of the environmental regulatory movement, businesses
may have let regulations become a large part of their site location decision making
calculus. However, once business and industry adjusted to the “start-up” costs of
environmental regulation and these costs became routine, the effects of regulatory costs
to businesses may have changed. It is quite conceivable that such an adjustment reduced
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the importance of environmental regulation to business costs. Thus, focusing on the first
years of heavy regulation may produce results that are skewed by the initial shocks felt to
business and industry. It is necessary to extend the years of analysis in order to
determine if the effects found in the Levinson Index models are constant over time.
Since the Levinson Index is only available through 1994, I use two other measures of
environmental policy to continue the analysis. Separate models are estimated using state
environmental spending and state environmental conditions as measures of state
environmental policy. Clearly, the results of this analysis are not directly comparable to
those based on the Levinson Index, but they may be suggestive about the effects of
environmental stringency beyond the time period for which the Levinson Index is
available.
The importance that government places on a policy area can often be determined
by the resources it is willing to allocate toward that initiative. Without the proper funds
to implement a policy, the goals of a given program are unlikely to be realized. The
amount of money that states spend on environmental programs indicates the level of
commitment the states have towards addressing environmental issues. States that devote
significant budgetary resources toward environmental programs have placed a priority on
environmental goals relative to other possible targets of those funds. Thus, state
spending on environmental programs is used as a proxy measure of environmental policy
stringency. As described in detail in Chapter 4, data on state environmental and natural
resource spending are available for the years from 1986 to 2003. I estimate separate
models for each of the three dependent variables of economic growth for these years
using environmental spending as the main independent variable of interest.
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Two models are estimated for each dependent variable. The first model includes
all the years for which the spending data are available. The second model includes all of
the same independent variables as the first model, but I also include the variable for the
index on the state business policy offering pollution control incentives to business. Data
on this business policy is collected until 1993, but these data are not available after that
date. Given this, the first model includes the years from 1986 to 2003 and the second
model includes the years from 1986 to 1993.
Models for Change in Total State Personal Income
In Table 6.7 I present the results for the first model of state economic
performance, using state environmental spending as the measure of state environmental
policy. Change in total state personal income growth is the dependent variable. For
Model (1), the coefficient for state environmental spending (b = 0.425, t = 1.71) is
statistically significant at the .05 level in a one-tailed test. The relationship between
environmental spending and change in total personal income growth is positive,
indicating that as state environmental spending increases growth in total personal income
increases. This model lends limited support to those who argue that strong environmental
regulations enhance economic growth, though caution should be used in drawing this
conclusion since this represent a very different measure of state environmental
stringency.
As expected, national economic variables have a highly significant effect on the
dependent variable in this model. The coefficients for both variables attain significance
at the .01 level. Change in national per capita GDP (b = 0.781, t = 18.57) is positively
related to change in total state personal income growth, indicating that as national per
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Table 6.7. FGLS estimate for State Environmental Spending and Change in Total State
Personal Income
(1)
(2)
----------------------------------------------b
t
b
t
Intercept

0.462

2.67***

-0.007

-0.28

Environmental Policy Variable
Environmental Spending [1]

0.425

1.71**

0.131

3.16***

Business Policy Variables
Financial Assistance [1]

0.163

0.68

0.348

1.22

-0.498

-1.05

0.081
-0.001

0.13
-2.15**

National Economic Variables
Change in Per Capita GDP
National Unemployment

0.781
-0.026

18.57***
-3.68***

0.872
0.002

18.19***
2.35**

State Fiscal Variables
State Debt
Federal Aid [1]

-0.046
-0.011

-2.25**
-3.83***

-0.108
-0.002

-4.03***
-0.27

Structural/Institutional Variables
Tax Structure [1]
Gubernatorial Power
Legislative Professionalism

0.009
-0.005
-0.018

0.68
-2.22**
-2.63***

-0.013
-0.005
-0.029

-0.68
-1.77*
-3.12**

0.068
0.163
0.076
0.003
-0.213
0.007
-0.001
-0.130

0.30
0.56
2.10**
1.90*
-2.30**
1.89*
-0.01
-1.0

0.443
1.21
-0.471
-0.90
0.172
2.96***
-0.104 [1] -0.04
-0.598
-4.07***
0.011
2.13**
0.121
0.88
-0.297
-1.56
400
0.2377
490.85
0.0000

Tax Incentives [1]
Pollution Control Incentive

State Demographic Variables
Educational Attainment
High School Degree [1]
College Degree [1]
Manufacturing Employment
Political Culture (Moralistic)
Farms
South
Urbanization [1]
Black [1]
N
Pseudo R2
Wald chi-square
Prob chi-square
***prob < .01
** prob < .05
* prob < .10

900
0.2857
562.06
0.0000

[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation
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capita GDP increases growth in total state personal income also increases. National

unemployment (b = -0.026, t = -3.68) has a negative relationship with total state personal
income. As national unemployment rises, growth in total state personal income declines.
Based on these results, it is clear that most state economies march in lockstep with the
national economy.
The state fiscal and institutional/structural variables also exhibit an impact upon
total personal income growth, though; the relationships are not always in the expected
direction. The coefficient for state debt (b = -0.046, t = -2.25) has a negative relationship
with dependent variable; as state debt becomes a larger proportion of total state personal
income, the growth in total state income is lower. The coefficient for the federal aid
variable (b = -0.011, t = -3.83) attains the .01 level of significance and has a negative
relationship to growth in total state personal income. States that receive larger amounts
of federal aid have lower growth in total personal income. Contrary to expectations, but
consistent with earlier models described in this chapter, state institutional variables are
negatively related to total state personal income growth. States with greater gubernatorial
power (b = -0.005, t = -2.22) and greater legislative professionalism (b = -0.018, t =
-2.63) exhibit lower growth in total state personal income. Though, because of the crosssectional nature of these last two variables, I am cautious in my interpretation of these
results.
Some of the coefficients for state demographic characteristics were also
significant. The coefficients for manufacturing employment (b = 0.076, t = 2.10) and
farms per capita (b = -0.213, t = -2.30) are both in the expected direction and achieve
conventional levels of statistical significance. As state employment in the manufacturing

142

sector increases, growth in total state personal income increases. The more farms a state
has per capita, the lower the growth in total personal income. The coefficients for state
political culture and southern location are both statistically significant. The model
provides limited evidence that moralistic (b = 0.003, t = 1.90) states and southern states
(b = 0.007, t = 1.89) having higher growth in total state personal income.
The results in Table 6.7 Model (2) are quite similar to those from Model (1).
There are a few differences worthy of discussion, however. The coefficient for state
spending on environmental and natural resources (b = 0.131, t = 3.16) becomes highly
significant when the pollution abatement policy index is included in the analysis, though
the magnitude of the coefficient is much smaller that in Model (1). Model (2) provides
greater confidence of the effect that environmental spending has upon growth in total
state per capita income, though the magnitude of the effect is considerably smaller. The
results indicate that as state environmental spending increases growth in total state per
capita also increases, supporting the contentions of those who argue that stringent
environmental policies stimulate economic growth. Here again, one must urge caution
because of the differences in measures for state environmental stringency.
The state pollution control incentives index coefficient (b = -0.001, t = -2.15)
performs in the opposite direction as expected and is significant at the .05 level. These
results indicate that states offering more incentives to business to engage in pollution
abatement measures have lower total state personal income growth. The national
economic variables remain highly significant reinforcing the results of earlier models.
While the coefficient for the state debt variable (b = -0.108, t = -4.03) achieves a greater
level of significance in Model (2), the federal aid variable (b = -0.002, t = -.027) loses its
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significance in this model. Once again the coefficients of the state institutional variables
perform in the opposite direction from expectations, though; both variables lose some of
their significance in this model. With the exception of political culture, all other
demographic variables that were significant in the first model remain so in the second
model.
Models for Change in State Per Capita Income
Table 6.8 presents the estimates for the model using change in state per capita
income as the dependent variable. In Model (1) the coefficient for state environmental
spending (b = 0.034, t = 1.89) is positive and significant at the more conventional levels.
As state environmental spending increases, change in growth in state per capita income
increases as well. This model provides support for the argument that strict environmental
policies result in improved economic growth.
As is the case for my other models, national economic conditions are strongly
related to state economic performance. State per capita income growth increases as
national per capita growth (b = 0.761, t = 21.17) increases, while increases in national
unemployment rates (b = -0.004, t = -7.30) generate declines in state per capita income
growth. Also significant in the model are the coefficients for the state fiscal variables.
The coefficients for state debt (b = -0.037, t = -2.51) and federal aid to states (b = -0.008,
t = -3.57) both exhibit negative relationships with state per capita income. Growth in
state per capita income decreases as both state debt and federal aid increase. The
financial assistance index (b = 0.373, t = 2.26) achieves the .05 level of significance and
has a positive relationship to state per capita income, as expected. The more financial
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Table 6.8 FGLS estimate for State Environmental Spending and Change in State Per
Capita Income
(1)
(2)
----------------------------------------------b
t
b
t
Intercept

0.648

5.38***

0.362

2.22**

Environmental Policy Variable
Environmental Spending [1]

0.034

1.89*

0.181

2.95***

0.373
-0.097

2.26**
-0.30

0.487
-0.135
0.089

2.44**
-0.35
0.24

National Economic Variables
Change in Per Capita GDP
National Unemployment

0.761
-0.004

21.17***
-7.30***

0.832
0.057

21.21***
0.08

State Fiscal Variables
State Debt
Federal Aid [1]

-0.037
-0.008

-2.51**
-3.57***

-0.068
-0.004

-3.27***
-0.61

Structural/Institutional Variables
Tax Structure [1]
Gubernatorial Power
Legislative Professionalism

0.013
-0.001
-0.006

1.49
-0.93
-1.22

0.023
-0.002
-0.195

1.97**
-1.08
-3.64***

-0.374
0.207
0.694
0.003
0.042
-0.869
-0.201
0.006

-2.41**
1.03
2.77***
2.26**
0.66
-0.38
-3.16***
0.07

-0.337
-0.242
0.110
0.003
-0.100
0.373
-0.129
0.068

-1.39
-0.72
2.91***
1.73*
-0.96
0.11
-1.38
0.55

Business Policy Variables
Financial Assistance [1]
Tax Incentives [1]
Pollution Control Incentive [1]

State Demographic Variables
Educational Attainment
High School Degree [1]
College Degree [1]
Manufacturing Employment
Political Culture (Moralistic)
Farms
South [1]
Urbanization [1]
Black [1]
N
Pseudo R2
Wald chi-square
Prob chi-square
***prob < .01
** prob < .05
* prob < .10

900
0.3274
897.77
0.0000

[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation
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400
0.3154
762.84
0.0000

assistance programs states offer to business, the greater the level of growth in state per
capita income.
Four state demographic variables have significant effects on the dependent
variable in Model (1). Manufacturing employment (b = 0.694, t = 2.77) and political
culture (b = 0.003, t = 2.26) have coefficients that are both significant and in the expected
direction. As manufacturing employment increases in a state, growth in state per capita
income also increases, while states with a moralistic political culture have higher growth
in per capita income. Variables with coefficients performing contrary to expectations are
the variables for high school educational attainment (b = -0.374, t = -2.41) and level of
urbanization (b = -0.201, t = -3.16). These results suggest that as more citizens of a state
receive a high school degree, state per capita income growth decreases. This finding is
troublesome. Conventional wisdom holds that states with better educated citizenries have
better economies. This result suggests just the opposite. The urbanization variable also
produces unexpected results, suggesting that states with higher levels of urbanization
have lower levels of economic growth.
Table 6.8 Model (2) provides the results of the analysis with the inclusion of the
pollution control incentives index variable. In this second model, the coefficient for the
environmental spending variable (b = 0.181, t = 2.95) is both positive and significant.
The results indicate that as state environmental spending increases, growth in state per
capita income increases. This finding supports the contention that states with more
stringent environmental policies experience greater economic growth. It should be noted
that the magnitude and statistical significance of the state environmental spending
coefficient is greater in Model (2) than in Model (1).
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Similarities in the two models are that the coefficients of the variables for
financial assistance programs (b = 0.487, t = 2.44), change in national GDP (b = 0.832, t
= 21.21), state debt (b = -0.068, t = -3.27) and manufacturing employment (b = 0.110, t =
2.91) all retain their direction and significance in Model (2). The coefficient for the
political culture variable (b = 0.003, t = 1.73) is again positive and statistically
significant. Differences in Model (2) include the lack of significance of variables that are
found to have an effect upon state per capita income growth in the first model. National
unemployment, federal aid, high school attainment, and urbanization all lose significance
in Model (2). The coefficients of two structural/institutional variables reach significance
in the second model, though. Tax structure (b = 0.023, t = 1.97) has a positive effect on
state per capita income growth. This finding indicates that states with more regressive
tax policies have higher growth in per capita income. Legislative professionalism (b =
-0.195, t = -3.64) achieves significance at the .01 level and, as in earlier models, has a
coefficient in the opposite direction as expected. This suggests that states with more
professional legislatures exhibit lower levels of growth in state per capita income.
Though, once again, as this variable is cross-sectional in nature, caution is used in the
interpretation of this result.
Models for State Unemployment Rates
The relationship between state unemployment rates and the independent variables
is explored in Table 6.9. Model (1) does not show a significant relationship between
state environmental spending and state unemployment. There is no evidence in this
model that environmental spending has an effect on state unemployment. National
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Table 6.9. FGLS estimate for State Environmental Spending and State Unemployment
(1)
(2)
----------------------------------------------b
t
b
t
Intercept

7.826

Environmental Policy Variable
Environmental Spending

10.334

6.45***

-0.700 [1] -0.52

-0.005

-2.36**

0.007
-0.095

0.55
-1.49

0.006
-0.123
0.223

0.37
-3.36***
4.90***

National Economic Variables
Change in Per Capita GDP
National Unemployment

-1.548
0.781

-1.15
27.57***

-1.820
0.800

-0.94
17.50***

State Fiscal Variables
State Debt
Federal Aid [1]

3.238
0.131

2.87***
0.91

3.748
-0.330

2.69***
-0.71

Structural/Institutional Variables
Tax Structure
Gubernatorial Power
Legislative Professionalism

0.001
0.263
1.943

1.19
1.47
3.53***

0.005
-0.066
3.125

2.83***
-0.25
3.75***

-0.678
-0.004
-18.496
-0.205
-23.827
-0.233
-0.018
0.016

-5.31***
-0.25
-7.19***
-1.65*
-3.97***
-0.90
-2.53**
1.41

-0.094
0.047
-30.598
-0.129
-15.536
-0.648
-0.026
0.013

-4.17***
1.31
-7.10***
-0.69
-1.77**
-1.40
-2.25**
0.68

Business Policy Variables
Financial Assistance
Tax Incentives
Pollution Control Incentive

State Demographic Variables
Educational Attainment
High School Degree
College Degree
Manufacturing Employment
Political Culture (Moralistic)
Farms
South
Urbanization
Black
N
Psuedo R2
Wald chi-square
Prob chi-square
***prob < .01
** prob < .05
* prob < .10

6.96***

900
0.4978
1484.78
0.0000

[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation
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400
0.3515
600.71
0.0000

unemployment (b = 0.781, t = 27.57) rates have a highly significant relationship to state
unemployment; state unemployment rates increase (decrease) as national unemployment
rates increase (decrease). The coefficient for state debt (b = 3.238, t = 2.87) also exhibits
a strong positive relationship with state unemployment rates. This indicates that
increases in state debt result in increases in state unemployment rates; conversely, lower
rates of state debt are associated with lower state unemployment rates. The coefficient
for legislative professionalism (b = 1.943, t = 3.53) is highly significant, but in the
unexpected direction. This suggests that states with more professional legislatures have
higher unemployment rates; though the cross-sectional nature of this variable may have
an impact on this result.
State demographic variables also have a noticeable effect upon state
unemployment rates. At least three demographic variables have coefficients that are both
in the expected direction and statistically significant; high school educational attainment
(b = -0.678, t = -5.31), manufacturing employment (b = -18.496, t = -7.19), and farms per
capita (b = -23.828, t = -3.97). These results suggest that states with larger proportions of
their citizens attaining high school degrees have lower unemployment rates. States with
greater numbers of citizens employed in the manufacturing sector have lower
unemployment rates. Further, states with greater numbers of farms per capita also exhibit
lower unemployment rates. The coefficient for the urbanization variable (b = -0.018, t =
-2.53) is both negative and significant at conventional levels. This suggests that higher
levels of urbanization are associated with lower levels of unemployment. The final
variable with a significant coefficient is for political culture, (b = -23.827, t = -1.65),
though, the level of significance is marginal at the .05 level in a one-tailed test. Thus
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there is some support for the finding that states with moralistic political cultures have
lower unemployment rates.
I also estimate a revised version of this model to include pollution control
incentive as an independent variable. The results are presented in Table 6.9 Model (2).
The coefficient for state environmental spending (b = -0.005, t = -2.36) does exhibit a
significant effect on state unemployment in this model. The relationship reaches the
standard .05 level of significance and the coefficient is negative. This coefficient
indicates that as states spend more on environmental and natural resources programs,
unemployment rates will decrease. Thus, the model provides support to those who
contend that more stringent environmental regulation stimulates economic growth.
Other results of note in Model (2) include the highly significant relationship of
two of the business policy variables. The coefficient for tax incentive policies variable
(b= -0.123, t = -3.36) displays a negative relationship to state unemployment. As
expected, the more tax incentives that states offer to businesses, the lower the state
unemployment rate. However, the coefficient for pollution control policies variable (b =
0.223, t = 4.90) has a positive effect on state unemployment. States that offer more
incentives to business to engage in pollution control display higher levels of
unemployment.
There are other differences evident in Model (2). The coefficient for the tax
structure variable (b = 0.005, t = 2.83) becomes highly significant in the second model.
The results indicate that states with more regressive tax structures have higher levels of
unemployment. The coefficient for the farm variable (b = -15.536, t = -1.77) is
approximately one-third smaller in magnitude and the level of statistical significance for
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farms per capita is weaker. The political culture variable appears to have no effect on
state unemployment in Model (2).
Summary
The results of the models using state environmental spending as a measure of
environmental policy stringency provide mixed results. The strength of the relationship
between spending and economic growth is enhanced in the models which take into
account pollution control incentive policies. However, the models estimated that include
this variable (Model (2) in Tables 6.7, 6.8, 6.9) capture a shorter time period than the
models that exclude this variable. Thus, these models may not be capturing all of the
variability in the measures needed to fully understand their relationship with state
economic growth. When the models are estimated using the longer time period (Model
(1) in Tables 6.7, 6.8, 6.9), state environmental spending exhibits only a weak
relationship to growth in total state personal income and growth in state per capita
income. The relationship is significant at the more relaxed .10 level in these models. No
statistically significant relationship is detected between state environmental spending and
state unemployment (Table 6.9 Model (1)). Thus, the models do not provide conclusive
evidence of the relationship between state environmental spending and state economic
growth. When meaningful significance is detected in this relationship, it comes as a
result of using fewer observations. Consequently, these models may be missing
important elements in the analysis.
State Environmental Conditions Models
States that enact more stringent environmental regulations are pursuing policy
goals indicative of the desire for healthier environmental conditions. These states enact
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regulations to control in a more effective manner the pollution levels within their
jurisdictions. A result of these more stringent regulations should be an improvement in
environmental conditions.
It is important to consider the possibility that state environmental conditions have
an effect on state economic performance. Stringent environmental policies may help to
lure some individuals and industries to a given state, but I suspect that it is a pristine
environment that has a greater capacity of drawing individuals and industries. In order to
estimate the effect of environmental conditions on state economic performance, I use the
data reported annually in the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) as a measure of
environmental policy. TRI data on industrial chemical air emissions and water releases
are often used as a measure of state environmental conditions. These measures provide
an indication of the environmental hazard present in each state. TRI data are collected
for the years of 1988 to 2003.
Models for Change in Total State Personal Income
Table 6.10 presents the results of the model estimated for environmental
conditions and total state personal income growth. The model provides no evidence that
state environmental conditions effect total state personal income growth. Neither the
variable for chemical air emissions nor the variable for water emissions produces a
statistically significant coefficient. These results hold constant in both Model (1) and (2).
The inclusion of pollution control incentive policies does not change the relationship
between environmental conditions and growth in total state personal income. Thus, no
conclusions can be drawn about the relationship between environmental conditions and
state economic growth from the results of this model estimation. It appears that this
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Table 6.10. FGLS estimate for State Environmental Conditions and Change in Total State
Personal Income
(1)
(2)
----------------------------------------------b
t
b
t
Intercept

0.061

3.79***

Environmental Policy Variable
Air Emissions [1]
Water Emissions [1]

-0.005
-0.052

-1.27
-0.55

-0.006
0.006

-1.44
0.70

0.172
-0.001

0.75
-2.64***

0.279
-0.001
-0.826

1.02
-2.12**
-1.59

National Economic Variables
Change in Per Capita GDP
National Unemployment

0.784
-0.003

18.63***
-3.85***

.829
.006

20.69***
5.40***

State Fiscal Variables
State Debt
Federal Aid [2]

-0.022
-0.011

-1.26
-4.81***

-0.017
-0.012

-1.01
-1.91

Structural/Institutional Variables
Tax Structure [2]
Gubernatorial Power
Legislative Professionalism

0.017
-0.004
-0.012

1.36
-1.83*
-1.97**

0.026
-0.002
-0.018

1.45
-0.63
-2.48**

-0.020
0.025
0.018
0.004
-0.137
0.006
-0.002
-0.040

-0.10
0.10
0.53
2.40**
-1.64
1.95*
-0.47
3.79

-0.248
-0.386
0.082
0.006
-0.472
0.006
-0.009
-0.024

-0.70
-1.00
1.53
2.42**
-3.61***
1.59
-1.64
-0.15

Business Policy Variables
Financial Assistance [2]
Tax Incentives
Pollution Control Incentive [2]

State Demographic Variables
Educational Attainment
High School Degree [2]
College Degree [2]
Manufacturing Employment
Political Culture (Moralistic)
Farms
South
Urbanization [2]
Black [2]
N
Psuedo R2
Wald chi-square
Prob chi-square
***prob < .01
** prob < .05
* prob < .10

0.029

798
0.3265
604.94
0.0000

[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 100,000,000 to facilitate interpretation
[2] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation
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1.33

300
0.3356
670.42
0.0000

dimension of state economic growth is unaffected by state environmental conditions.
State business policies, national economic conditions and state fiscal variables
display statistically significant effects on state economic growth in Table 6.10. Tax
incentives offered to businesses (b = -0.001, t = -2.645) do have a highly significant
relationship to growth in total state personal income. Contrary to expectations, states that
offer more tax incentives to businesses experience a decline in total state personal income
growth. The effect is evident in both models. National economic conditions are found to
have strong effects upon growth in total state personal income. Model (1) indicates that
as national per capita GDP growth (b = 0.784, t = 18.63) increases, state growth in total
personal income increases. National unemployment (b = -0.003, t = -3.85) has a negative
effect upon the dependent variable. When national unemployment rates increase, growth
in total state personal income decreases. The strong effects of the national economic
variables are constant in both Model (1) and Model (2). The coefficient for the federal
aid receipts variable (b = -0.011, t = -4.81) also exerts a highly significant negative effect
upon growth in total state personal income in the first model estimated. States that
receive more federal aid per capita experience lower growth. However, this effect is not
evident in Model (2).
Defying expectations, the state institutional variables are negatively related to
growth in total state personal income. In both models, states that have more professional
legislatures experience lower growth in total state personal income. Gubernatorial power
(b = -0.004, t = -1.83) exerts a weak effect on the dependent variable in the first model,
but this effect is not evident in the Model (2). Though, once again it should be noted that
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these variables are cross-sectional measures and this may have an impact on these
counterintuitive results.
State demographic variables display some differences in the two models estimated
in Table 6.10. The effect of political culture is significant at conventional levels and the
relationship is positive in both models. States with a more moralistic political culture
have greater growth in total state personal income. In Model (1), the coefficient for the
southern regional variable (b = 0.006, t = 1.95) is significant at the .10 level. Thus, there
is limited support for the view that southern states have higher levels of growth in total
state personal income, though this finding is not reproduced in the second model. While
not significant in Model (1), the coefficient for the variable for farms per capita is highly
significant in Model (2). The second model indicates that states with more farms per
capita (b = -0.472, t = -3.61) have lower growth in total state personal income.
Models for Change in State Per Capita Income
The results for the model estimation of economic conditions and growth in state
per capita income are presented in Table 6.11. The findings are very similar to those of
the total state personal income model. No statistically significant relationship is found
between state environmental conditions and state per capita income growth. This result is
consistent in both models. Thus, there is not support for the contention that state
environmental conditions have any effect upon state per capita income growth.
State business policy variables and national economic variables display
significant relationships with change in state per capita income in both model estimations
in Table 6.11. Financial assistance policies exert highly significant positive effects upon
state per capita income growth. States that offer more financial assistance to business
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and industry experience higher growth in state per capita income. Tax incentive policies
display a negative relationship with per capita income growth. States that offer more tax
incentives to business and industry have lower growth in state per capita income.
Though, the significance of this particular relationship is weak in Model (1), reaching
significance at the .10 level. Moreover, the coefficient for change in national per capita
GDP is highly significant and positive in both models. These results indicate that as
national per capita GDP increases, growth in state per capita increases. National
unemployment exerts a highly significant negative effect in Model (1). This suggests that
increases in the national unemployment rate result in decreases in state per capita income
growth. The relationship is not significant in Model (2), however.
Other variables produce notable effects as well. In Model (1), the coefficient for
the variable for federal aid (b = -0.004, t = -2.62) has a highly significant negative effect
upon growth in state per capita income. States with greater amounts of federal aid have
lower levels of growth in per capita income. The high school educational attainment
variable produces unexpected results in both models. The results indicate that the more
citizens in a state with high school degrees, the lower state per capita income growth.
Manufacturing employment (b = 0.052, t = 1.99) reaches the .05 significance level in
Model (1), suggesting that states with more employees in the manufacturing sector
experience greater growth in per capita income. This result is not duplicated in Model
(2). Political culture displays weak significance in Model (1) and strong significance in
Model (2). Both sets of findings indicate that states with a moralistic political culture
have higher growth in per capita income. Model (1) presents an unexpected positive
significant relationship between farms per capita (b = 0.1485631, t = 2.37) and growth in
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Table 6.11. FGLS estimate for State Environmental Conditions and Change in State Per
Capita Income
(1)
(2)
----------------------------------------------b
t
b
t
Intercept

0.058

4.77***

0.045

2.90***

Environmental Policy Variable
Air Emissions [1]
Water Emissions [1]

0.100
0.060

0.33
-0.80

-0.008
-0.051

-0.29
-0.90

0.510
3.01***
-0.580 [2] -1.68*

0.722
-0.001
-0.416

3.56***
-2.29**
-1.20

National Economic Variables
Change in Per Capita GDP
National Unemployment

0.759
-0.004

20.45***
-8.09***

0.820
0.001

23.58***
1.34

State Fiscal Variables
State Debt
Federal Aid [2]

0.007
-0.004

0.62
-2.62***

0.017
0.0007

1.26
0.15

Structural/Institutional Variables
Tax Structure [2]
Gubernatorial Power [2]
Legislative Professionalism

0.003
-0.130
-0.005

0.34
-0.09
-1.03

0.017
0.699
-0.011

1.39
0.37
-1.60

-0.396
0.016
0.052
0.002
0.149
0.001
0.0009
-0.014

-2.48**
0.08
1.99**
1.93*
2.37**
0.57
0.26
-0.16

-0.694
-0.302
0.060
0.004
0.072
-0.001
0.005
0.223

-2.80***
-1.04
1.56
2.41**
0.71
-0.36
-0.30
1.78*

Business Policy Variables
Financial Assistance [2]
Tax Incentives
Pollution Control Incentive [2]

State Demographic Variables
Educational Attainment
High School Degree [2]
College Degree [2]
Manufacturing Employment
Political Culture (Moralistic)
Farms
South
Urbanization [2]
Black [2]
N
Pseudo R2
Wald chi-square
Prob chi-square
***prob < .01
** prob < .05
* prob < .10

798
0.3510
859.45
0.0000

[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 100,000,000 to facilitate interpretation
[2] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation
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300
0.3745
819.30
0.0000

per capita income. States with more farms per capita have higher per capita income
growth. This relationship is not present in Model (2). Finally, Model (2) offers weak
evidence that the greater proportion of a state’s population that is black (b = 0.223, t=
1.78), the greater the growth in state per capita income. Though, this result is significant
at the relaxed .10 level, is not evident in Model (1), and has a coefficient in the different
direction in Model (1).
Models of State Unemployment Rates
The final model using environmental conditions as a measure of environmental
policy is estimated in Table 6.12. State unemployment rate is the dependent variable in
this model. As one can see, this model estimates suggest the only significant relationship
between environmental conditions and economic growth. In both models of Table 6.12
the air emissions variable is positive and highly significant (.01 level), indicating that
there is a positive relationship between air emissions and state unemployment. These
results suggest that states with higher industrial air emissions experience higher levels of
unemployment; conversely, unemployment is lowest in those state-year cases with lower
levels of air emissions. This lends support to the contention that more stringent state
environmental policy—which, presumably, leads to higher levels of environmental
quality—results in stronger economic performance in terms of state unemployment.
State business policies produce different results in the two models. No significant
relationship between business policies and state unemployment is evident in the first
model. On the other hand, there is a strong negative relationship between tax incentives
and state unemployment, coupled with a highly positive relationship with the pollution
control incentives variable in Model (2). Thus, states that offer more business tax
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Table 6.12. FGLS estimate for State Environmental Conditions and State Unemployment
(1)
(2)
----------------------------------------------b
t
b
t
Intercept

6.005

6.41***

8.506

5.94***

Environmental Policy Variable
Air Emissions [1]
Water Emissions [1]

0.007
0.044

3.30***
0.95

0.007
0.016

3.41***
0.23

0.421
-0.009

0.04
-0.34

-0.010
-0.080
0.162

-0.68
-2.12**
3.89***

National Economic Variables
Change in Per Capita GDP
National Unemployment

-1.494
0.735

-1.11
25.38***

-3.621
0.773

-1.90*
13.80***

State Fiscal Variables
State Debt
Federal Aid [2]

4.668
0.004

4.28***
2.52**

3.174
0.038

2.89***
0.09

Structural/Institutional Variables
Tax Structure
Gubernatorial Power
Legislative Professionalism

0.021 [2]
0.071
1.241

0.02
0.49
2.66***

0.003
-0.498
1.100

1.83*
-2.16**
2.90***

-0.045
-0.035
-17.303
-0.262
-21.282
-0.397
-0.810
0.014

-3.63***
-2.19**
-8.06***
-2.62***
-3.55***
-1.68*
-2.16**
1.53

-0.063
-0.004
-27.728
-0.172
0.515
-0.766
-0.120
0.008

-2.80***
-0.11
-7.10***
-1.01
0.05
-1.98**
-0.18
0.56

Business Policy Variables
Financial Assistance [2]
Tax Incentives
Pollution Control Incentive

State Demographic Variables
Educational Attainment
High School Degree
College Degree
Manufacturing Employment
Political Culture (Moralistic)
Farms
South
Urbanization [2]
Black
N
Pseudo R2
Wald chi-square
Prob chi-square
***prob < .01
** prob < .05
* prob < .10

798
0.5286
1173.94
0.0000

[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000,000 to facilitate interpretation
[2] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation
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300
0.3582
410.15
0.0000

incentives (b = -0.080, t = -2.12) experience a decline in unemployment rates, while
states that offer more pollution control incentives (b = 0.162, t = 3.89) to businesses
experience an increase in unemployment rates.
National and state fiscal conditions also influence state unemployment rates. In
both models I find that national unemployment rates have a highly significant positive
effect upon state unemployment rates. These results indicate that when national
unemployment rates increase, state unemployment rates also increase. This finding is
consistent with all other models estimated in this chapter. Moreover, state debt produces
a highly significant positive effect in both models. States that have higher levels of state
debt as a proportion of total personal income have higher unemployment rates. The
coefficient for federal aid (b = 0.004, t = 2.52) is significant at the .05 level in Model (1).
This model indicates that the more federal aid a state receives the greater the state
unemployment rate. This significant result is not duplicated in Model (2).
State structural/institutional variables produce mixed results. Legislative
professionalism has a consistent, highly significant and positive effect in both models.
This finding suggests that the more professional the state legislature, the higher the state
unemployment rate. The gubernatorial power variable produces particularly confusing
results. Although not statistically significant in Model (1), the coefficient for the variable
is in the positive direction. However, in Model (2) the coefficient for gubernatorial
power (b = -0.498, t = -2.16) is in the expected direction and achieves significance at
conventional levels. This indicates that states that have governors with greater
institutional powers have lower state unemployment rates. Though, the results for both
of these institutional variables must be interpreted with caution since they are cross-
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sectional measures. State tax structure (b = 0.003, t = 1.83) achieves a lower level of
significance in Model (2) providing some support that states with more regressive tax
structures have state lower unemployment.
The state demographic variables also produce mixed results across both models.
The coefficients for state high school educational attainment, manufacturing
employment, and location in the south are all negative and statistically significant in both
models. The results suggest that the higher the high school educational attainment level
of a state the lower the unemployment rate. States with higher numbers of workers
employed in the manufacturing sector have lower unemployment rates. Southern states
exhibit significantly lower unemployment rates in both models. None of the other
demographic variables display a significant effect in Model (2). In Model (1) the
coefficients for college educational attainment, political culture, farms per capita, and
urbanization are statistically significant. As expected, states that have citizens with
higher levels of college attainment (b = -0.035, t = -2.19) have lower levels of
unemployment. States with a moralistic political culture (b = -0.262, t = -2.62) are more
likely to have lower unemployment. As expected, states with more farms per capita (b =
-21.28182, t = -3.55) exhibit lower unemployment rates. The findings of Model (1) also
suggest that higher level of urbanization in a state (b = -0.810, t = -2.16) leads to lower
unemployment levels.
Summary
The results of the model estimations using state environmental conditions as a
measure of state environmental policy do not provide strong evidence that environmental
policy has any effect upon economic growth. State environmental conditions have a
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statistically significant relationship with only one of the dependent variables. Table 6.12
shows that state industrial air emissions exhibit a positive relationship with state
unemployment rates. However, the second environmental policy measure in this model
(water emissions) does not have a statistically significant effect on state unemployment.
Even within this model there is not strong evidence of a relationship between state
environmental conditions and state economic growth. Thus, the model estimated using
environmental conditions as a measure of state environmental policy does not provide
evidence that state economic growth is affected by state environmental policy.
Levinson Index and State Environmental Spending Models
The preceding estimations provide conflicting results regarding the effect that
environmental regulatory policies have on state economic performance. The impact of
these policies is dependent upon which measurement tool is used to represent
environmental policy. Estimations utilizing the Levinson Index as a measure of
environmental policy provide support for the contention that strict environmental policies
have a negative impact on state economic performance. Conversely, estimations that
utilize environmental spending as a measure of environmental policy provide support for
the contention that strict environmental regulations have a positive impact on state
economic performance.
Limitations in the availability of data for both measures make estimations over the
entire period of enhanced environmental regulation impossible. However, there is a
small range of years for which data for both the Levinson Index and state environmental
spending are available. Models are estimated for each of the state economic performance
dependent variables for these years. These models “tease out” the effects that each of the
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environmental policies measures have on state economic performance. By including both
measures of environmental policy, the estimation provides a more complete
understanding of the effect these variables have on the state economic variables.
Data are available for both The Levinson Index and the state environmental
spending measures for the time period from 1986 to 1994. The model estimations for
each of the dependent variables are presented in Tables 6.13, 6.14, and 6.15. For the sake
of brevity, I focus the discussion in this section on the two main independent variables of
interest—the Levinson Index and state environmental spending. The remaining control
variables are discussed in detail in the preceding sections and are not reviewed again in
this stage of the analysis3.
In Table 6.13 I present the results of estimation of the effects of the Levinson
Index and state environmental spending on change in total personal income. The
coefficient for environmental spending (b = 0.184, t = 2.91) is positive and highly
significant. The result indicates that states that spend more on environmental and natural
resource programs have higher growth in total state personal income. This is consistent
with the earlier model that did not include the Levinson Index (Table 6.7). In contrast,
the coefficient for the Levinson Index is not statistically significant in this model. This
result is different from the earlier model that did not include state environmental
spending (Table 6.4). In the original model without state spending, the Levinson Index
exhibited a negative relationship to change in total state personal income. While this
negative relationship is still evident, the lack of statistical significance in Table 6.13
means that I cannot conclude that the Levinson Index has a negative effect on change in
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Table 6.13. FGLS estimate for Levinson Index & State Environmental Spending and
Change in Total State Personal Income, Years 1986 - 1994
b

t

Intercept

0.010

6.71***

Environmental Policy Variable
Levinson Index
Environmental Spending [1]

-0.002
0.184

-0.65
2.91***

Business Policy Variables
Financial Assistance [1]
Tax Incentives [1]

0.264
-0.848

0.97
-1.47

National Economic Variables
Change in Per Capita GDP
National Unemployment

0.835
0.002

18.04***
2.38**

State Fiscal Variables
State Debt
Federal Aid [1]

-0.85
-0.011

-2.60***
-1.52

Structural/Institutional Variables
Tax Structure [1]
Gubernatorial Power
Legislative Professionalism

0.007
-0.005
-0.226

0.40
-2.00***
-2.75***

0.718
-0.862
0.084
0.004
-0.484
0.009
-0.002
0.046

2.11***
-1.80*
1.79***
1.57
-3.60***
1.76*
-0.30
0.25

State Demographic Variables
Educational Attainment
High School Degree [1]
College Degree [1]
Manufacturing Employment
Political Culture (Moralistic)
Farms
South
Urbanization [2]
Black
N
Pseudo R2
Wald chi-square
Prob chi-square
***prob < .01
** prob < .05
* prob < .10

384
0.2867
458.74
0.0000

[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation
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total state personal income. The results of this estimation provide support for those who
contend that strict environmental policies stimulate state economic growth
A similar finding is evident in Table 6.14. Once again the coefficient for the
environmental spending variable (b = 0.120, t = 2.55) is positive and highly significant.
Thus, it appears that states that spend more on environmental and natural resource
programs experience higher growth in state per capita income. This result is consistent
with the results of Table 6.8, which present the estimation of the effect of environmental
spending on change in per capita income, excluding the Levinson Index. The coefficient
for the Levinson Index in Table 6.14 has similar results to the earlier model estimating
the effect of the Levinson Index on state per capita income growth, excluding the state
spending variable (Table 6.5). Neither model produces a statistically significant
relationship between the Levinson Index and change in state per capita income. Thus, the
Levinson Index does not have an affect upon change in state per capita income. These
results also lend support to the proponents of stricter state environmental regulations who
argue that environmental stringency will enhance economic performance.
The estimation for the effects of the Levinson Index and state environmental
spending on state unemployment rates is presented in Table 6.15. Immediately evident is
the strong, positive relationship between the Levinson Index (b = 0.443, t = 3.02) and
state unemployment rates. States that have higher scores on the Levinson Index—states
that impose higher pollution abatement costs on industries—have higher unemployment
rates. This finding, including the magnitude of the effect, is similar to that of the original
Levinson Index-state unemployment estimation in Table 6.6 that did not include the
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Table 6.14. FGLS estimate for Levinson Index & State Environmental Spending and
Change in State Per Capita Income, Years 1986 - 1994
b

t

Intercept

0.018

1.14

Environmental Policy Variable
Levinson Index [1]
Environmental Spending [1]

0.624
0.120

0.26
2.55***

Business Policy Variables
Financial Assistance [1]
Tax Incentives [1]

0.568
-0.734

3.09***
-2.00***

National Economic Variables
Change in Per Capita GDP
National Unemployment [1]

0.788
0.422

21.68***
0.60

State Fiscal Variables
State Debt
Federal Aid [1]

-0.022
-0.006

-1.02
-1.11

Structural/Institutional Variables
Tax Structure [1]
Gubernatorial Power [1]
Legislative Professionalism

0.019
0.377
-0.018

1.84*
0.22
-3.61***

-0.280
-0.507
0.133
0.003
0.592
0.001
0.0001
0.150

-1.26
-1.69
4.84***
1.77**
0.01
0.36
0.03
1.33

State Demographic Variables
Educational Attainment
High School Degree [1]
College Degree [1]
Manufacturing Employment
Political Culture (Moralistic)
Farms [1]
South
Urbanization [1]
Black [1]
N
Pseudo R2
Wald chi-square
Prob chi-square
***prob < .01
** prob < .05
* prob < .10

384
0.3281
721.06
0.0000

[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation
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variable for state environmental spending. On the other hand the environmental spending
variable produces somewhat mixed results in the different models. The coefficient for
the environmental spending variable (b = -0.060, t = -1.75) in Table 6.15 has a negative
relationship to state unemployment rates. Since I expected a positive relationship
between these variables, a two-tailed test is applied and the significance of the
relationship is at the more relaxed .10 level. Thus, limited support for an effect of state
environmental spending on state unemployment rates is found. Once again, a model
produces somewhat mixed results. The strong positive relationship between the Levinson
Index and state unemployment rates supports the contention that more stringent
environmental policies are a detriment to state economic performance. However, the
negative relationship between state environmental spending and state unemployment
lends support to those who hold the position that more stringent state environmental
policies stimulate state economic performance. Though, since the state spending variable
is significant at the more relaxed .10 level, the evidence supporting this relationship is
weaker than that of the Levinson Index.
Overall, the models that include the Levinson Index and state environmental
spending in the calculus appear to indicate that the two variables have differing effects on
different aspects of state economic performance. The state environmental spending
variable consistently exerts a positive effect on the state income growth variables. In all
the estimations I consider in this analysis, greater state spending on state environmental
and natural resource programs is associated with greater growth in total state personal
income and state per capita income. The Levinson Index has a similar consistently
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Table 6.15. FGLS estimate for Levinson Index & State Environmental Spending and
Unemployment, Years 1986 - 1994
b

t

Intercept

8.266

5.56***

Environmental Policy Variable
Levinson Index
Environmental Spending

0.443
-0.006

3.02***
-1.75*

Business Policy Variables
Financial Assistance
Tax Incentives

0.010
-0.057

0.63
-1.52

National Economic Variables
Change in Per Capita GDP
National Unemployment

-3.523
0.744

-1.55
15.95***

State Fiscal Variables
State Debt
Federal Aid [1]

8.981
0.280

3.87***
0.58

Structural/Institutional Variables
Tax Structure
Gubernatorial Power
Legislative Professionalism

0.003
-0.109
2.456

2.11***
-0.52
3.53***

-0.079
-0.024
-18.22
-0.027
-17.861
-0.337
-0.002
8.266

-3.64***
-0.72
-6.19***
-0.18
-2.24***
-0.91
-1.98***
5.56***

State Demographic Variables
Educational Attainment
High School Degree
College Degree
Manufacturing Employment
Political Culture (Moralistic)
Farms
South
Urbanization
Black
N
Pseudo R2
Wald chi-square
Prob chi-square
***prob < .01
** prob < .05
* prob < .10

384
0.4042
581.86
0.0000

[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation
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significant effect upon state unemployment rates. In all of the models estimated, the
Levinson Index exerts a strong positive effect on state unemployment. States that score
higher on the Levinson Index have higher unemployment rates. Thus, higher pollution
abatement costs for business and industry is associated with higher levels of state
unemployment. While state environmental spending sometimes exerts an effect on state
unemployment and while the Levinson Index sometimes exerts an effect on the state
income growth variables, these results are not consistent in all the models estimated.
Thus, the evidence seems to support both sides of the environment vs. economy
debate, depending upon which economic indicator is used. When examining the effects
of environmental policy on change in state income measures, I find that greater state
spending on environmental and natural resource programs is associated with greater
growth in total state personal income and greater growth in state per capita income.
However, when I focus on the effect that environmental policy has on state
unemployment rates, I find that states that impose greater pollution abatement costs on
business and industry have higher levels of unemployment. Though, I am cautious in
making such generalizations since the time period that allows me to study the effects of
both variables at the same points in time is somewhat limited. Data are only available for
these estimations for eight years.
Conclusion
The results of the models examining the relationship between state environmental
policy and state economic growth provide mixed results. My inferences about the effects
of state environmental policy depend upon the measurement tool used to represent this
independent variable. First, many previous studies have used the Green Index as a
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measure of state environmental conditions and Green Policies as a measure of state
environmental policy, so I begin by estimating my models of state economic performance
with these two variables as independent variables. When the Green Index and Green
Policies are used to measure environmental policy, the evidence supports the contention
that more stringent state environmental regulations enhance state economic growth. This
would seem to fit with the contention of many observers that state economies benefit
from policies that result in a pristine environment. Unfortunately, the Green Index and
Green Policies scale are cross-sectional variables that do not show change in policy over
the time period examined. Hence the appropriate interpretation of the coefficients for
these variables is the effect of the Green Index and Green Policies on the average level of
economic performance over the time frame being studied, controlling for the effects of
other independent variables. Ultimately, one must view the findings from the models
using the Green Index and Green Policies with great caution.
In order to account for this variability in state environmental policy over time, a
longitudinal measure of this concept is used. When the Levinson Index is used to
measure environmental policy, the exact opposite relationship occurs than when the
Green Index is utilized. The Levinson Index models support the contention that more
stringent state environmental regulations have a negative impact upon state economic
growth. This is especially evident when the dependent variable under consideration is
state unemployment rates. However, when state environmental spending and state
environmental conditions are used as measures of environmental policy, there is
somewhat weak evidence that stringent environmental policy has a positive effect upon
state economic growth.
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The results of the models using environmental spending and environmental
conditions variables are often at odds with the findings of the Levinson Index models.
These estimations provide support for the assertion that more stringent state
environmental regulations enhance state economic growth. Though, such support is more
strongly evident in the models which utilize environmental spending, rather than
environmental conditions, as a measure of environmental policy. Further, such support is
more strongly evident when examining the state income dependent variables. Evidence
points to a consistent positive relationship between state environmental spending and
state income growth. However, no such consistent link is found to exist with state
environmental spending and state unemployment levels.
Clearly, the model estimations provide inconsistent results, and this begs the
question of why. On the one hand, it is possible that these various indicators represent
different components of environmental stringency and quality. If so, it would not be
surprising that models estimated separately for each indicator would yield different
results. For instance, the Levinson Index represents regulatory costs imposed on the state
economy. Of course regulation requires some spending to administer and monitor, but
not all environmental spending goes for administering, monitoring, and enforcing
compliance with environmental regulations. I have assumed that regulatory costs and
environmental spending both represent the stringency of environmental policy in a given
state, but it is possible that these two variables represent different components of
environmental stringency.
On the other hand, it is possible that other factors than just the measurement tools
themselves are causing these conflicting results. Because of the limitations in data
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availability, the models using the Levinson Index and the environmental spending and
conditions variables represent different time periods. The Levinson Index estimates are
for the years 1977 to 1994, while the state environmental spending models provide an
analysis of time period from 1986 to 2003. The state conditions models are estimated
using data from 1988 to 2003. It is possible that the effects of environmental regulations
upon economic growth changed over the course of these years.
The initial impact of environmental regulations may have had heavy costs
associated with them. These costs could have had a very real impact upon businesses,
and thus, overall economic growth when first enacted. As business and industry adjusted
to these regulations and these regulations became a part of the routine costs to business,
the effect of the regulations may have dwindled. This could explain why the Levinson
Index models produce a strong negative effect of environmental policy on state economic
performance. The Levinson Index covers the period that produced the first “shocks” of
the environmental regulations upon businesses. The environmental spending and
environment conditions models start in 1986. By this point business and industry may
have adjusted to the costs of these regulations. It may be that environmental regulations
are now a routine operating cost and as such no longer have as strong of an economic
impact upon businesses.
Thus, the mixed results produced in these different model estimations may not be
in conflict. The Levinson Index models may accurately reflect a negative impact of
environmental regulation upon economic growth during the years estimated in those
models. The weaker positive impact of environmental regulation upon economic growth
in the environmental spending and environmental conditions estimations may reflect the
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changing role of regulation upon the economy. When states begin putting more financial
resources into environmental programs, the states themselves may stimulate positive
economic change. Though, I am cautious about reading too much into these findings.
The mixed findings produced in these models may be as a result of the changing dynamic
of environmental regulations. However, it is also possible that, as mentioned earlier, the
different measurement tools are responsible for the differences in results. They may not
all be “equal” in their measurement of environmental policy.
Another finding of note in this analysis includes the consistently strong effect that
national economic conditions have upon state economic growth. In all of the models
estimated, at least one – and generally both – of the national economic conditions
variables exhibited a statistically strong effect upon state economic growth. The national
economy does matter to the states. When national economic trends are positive state
economic growth is evident. Increases in national per capita GDP correspond to
increases in state growth in total personal income and state growth in per capita income.
Increases in state unemployment will follow increases in national unemployment. My
estimations indicate that national economic conditions exert great influence upon
economic growth in the states. Though, this finding is debated in the literature. Different
researchers note the effect of national economic conditions on state economies is variable
over time (Brace, 1991; Hendrick and Garand, 1991, Brace, 1993; Crain, 2003).
However, in my analysis, the evidence regarding the influence of environmental
policy upon state economic growth is not as consistent. No clear pattern is discernable.
When a cross-sectional measure is used for environmental policy, evidence supports the
positive impact that state environmental regulation has upon state economic growth.
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When longitudinal measures are used, this finding is not consistent. Longitudinal
measures produce mixed results in the time periods examined. The Levinson Index
provides support for the argument that environmental regulation has a negative impact
upon state economic growth. During the time period covered by the Levinson Index, the
initial shock of increased regulation may have had a detrimental effect to state
economies. Models estimated for the more recent years of 1986 to 2003, indicate that
state environmental spending and state environmental conditions have a weak positive
impact upon state economic growth. Thus, the effects of environmental policy upon state
economic growth appear to change over time.

174

Endnotes
1. The xtgls command in Stata does not produce an R2 for the FGLS regression.
Thus I estimate a pseudo R2 as the square of the correlation coefficient for the
predicted and observed values.
2. The Levinson Index models are estimated with the pollution control incentives
excluded. As the results are quite similar to the models in which they are
included, the models with the variables excluded are not reported here. The
results for these models are presented in Appendix B.
3. Separate models are also estimated with the inclusion of the pollution control
index variable. These models are presented in Appendix C.
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CHAPTER 7:
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation I examine the relationship between state environmental policy
and state economic growth. I determine that measurement tools are critical to
understanding this relationship and that there is deficit in the available data that makes it
difficult to arrive at firm conclusions. When using the Levinson Index—a measure of the
costs to businesses of complying with pollution abatement measures in the states—as the
measure of environmental policy, there appears to be a negative relationship between
environmental regulatory stringency and state economic performance. States with more
stringent environmental policies experience lower total state personal income growth and
higher unemployment rates. However when using state per capita environmental
spending as the measure of environmental policy, there appears to be a positive
relationship between environmental policy and state economic performance. States that
spend more on environmental programs exhibit higher rates of total state personal income
and per capita income growth and lower unemployment rates. The tool used to measure
environmental policy stringency is crucial to the results attained.
The Levinson Index is the variable that most directly approximates the concept I
seek to measure. The focus of my research is on the effect that state environmental
policies have on state economies. More specifically I have tried to ascertain whether
environmental regulatory stringency causes states to lose (or never attain) businesses that
contribute to overall state economic health. The Levinson Index measures the costs to
businesses of complying with pollution abatement efforts in each state over time. Thus,
the Levinson Index captures the costs of regulations to businesses. If more stringent
environmental regulations place a higher compliance cost on businesses and if these

176

higher costs of compliance do play a part in site location or expansion decisions of
businesses, the Levinson Index should account for this effect.
Models that I estimate using the Levinson Index as the measure of environmental
policy indicate that states that impose greater pollution abatement costs upon business
and industry experience lower rates of total personal income growth and higher
unemployment rates. Models based on the Levinson Index provide strong support for the
contention that states that adopt strict environmental policies will suffer a detrimental
economic consequence. More stringent environmental policies that impose greater costs
on business and industry are associated with lower economic growth and higher
unemployment in the states that impose these regulatory burdens. This result comes from
estimations that use the policy measurement tool that is the more direct measure of how
environmental policies effect business costs—the Levinson Index. Thus, I find evidence
of a negative economic effect of environmental stringency.
My analysis does not stop with the Levinson Index, though, and this is where the
results become a bit muddled. The Levinson Index is only available for the years 1977 to
1994. In order to study the effects of state environmental policy on state economic
performance over a longer period of time, it is necessary for me to use another measure
for environmental policy. I use two different alternate measures of environmental policy:
state per capita spending on environmental and natural resource programs and state
environmental conditions. I do not find much evidence that state environmental
conditions have an effect on state economic growth. However, the state spending
measurement tool produces results contradictory to those of the models using the
Levinson Index.
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In the model estimations in which I use state per capita environmental spending as
a measure of environmental policy, I find that state environmental spending has a positive
relationship to state economic growth. States that allocate more of their resources toward
environmental programs are associated with higher levels of total state personal income
growth and higher per capita income growth. Further, I find that states that have higher
levels of environmental spending experience lower unemployment rates. However, I am
cautious about reading too much into these results. While I am confident that the
Levinson Index captures the costs associated with environmental regulatory stringency, I
am not as confident that state environmental spending is a good proxy for the same
concept.
States that spend more on environmental and natural resource programs may be
states that have more money to spend, i.e. states that have strong economies. The
estimations using state spending as the measure of environmental policy may have a
problem of endogeneity. It is possible that the results I find in these models may not truly
reflect that greater state environmental spending leads to better state economic
performance. Instead, the accurate relationship may be that states with stronger
economies spend more on environmental programs. Thus, the direction of the
relationship is in question.
In order to better understand the mixed results from the Levinson Index and state
spending models, I estimate models with both of these variables included as measures of
state environmental policy. These models do not necessarily lend clarity to my analysis.
The models indicate that state environmental spending has a very strong positive effect
upon the income dependent variables. Greater state environmental spending is associated
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with greater growth in total state personal income and greater growth in per capita
income. However, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, I am cautious of these
results since the spending and income growth variables may be endogenous. These final
sets of models do not indicate that state environmental spending has a strong impact on
state unemployment rates. While a negative relationship is found, it is at the weaker .10
level of significance. The Levinson Index, though, exhibits a very strong effect on state
unemployment rates in these models. The higher a state scores on the Levinson Index—
the greater the pollution abatement costs to industry in a state—the higher the state
unemployment rates. However, the Levinson Index does not exhibit a relationship with
the state income growth variables. This final set of models seems to indicate that state
environmental spending and the Levinson Index effect different aspects of state economic
performance.
There are two possible explanations for the conflicting results achieved in the
models estimated. First, the three measures I use for environmental policy may simply be
measuring different things. The Levinson Index, state environmental spending, and state
environmental conditions may not be interchangeable policy variables. By definition
these variables are not the same – they measure different aspects of states’ environmental
efforts. Thus, the differing results achieved in the models may simply be a reflection of
this variety in the measurement tools. The models produce differing results because the
policy variables measure different concepts.
Secondly, the results may be in conflict because the variables cover different time
periods. The Levinson Index is only available from 1977 to 1994. The state
environmental spending data is available from 1986 to 2003. The state environmental

179

conditions data has been collected annually since 1988. The conflicting results in the
models may be as a result of changes in the regulatory environment in the time period
from 1977 to 2003. The time period covered by the Levinson Index is the period in
which the first serious efforts of the federal government to regulate the environment
occurred. The initial cost to business of compliance with “new” federal and state laws
was probably very severe. Since data for the Levinson Index begins in 1977, the height
of this regulatory period, this variable may include start-up costs that had a major impact
on the costs of business operations. The Levinson Index data is not available after 1994.
By this point in time, businesses may have started to adjust to these costs and
environmental compliance costs were just another operating expense. Thus, the negative
economic impact that the Levinson Index exhibits may be a result of the “growing pains”
of a new regulatory push.
By the same token, data availability for the environmental spending and
conditions variables begin in the late 1980s. These variables are from a time period when
the regulatory “growing pains” may have subsided. The somewhat positive economic
effect that is evident in these models may be due to the acceptance by business and
industry of these environmental regulations after having time to adjust. Thus, the models
may present somewhat conflicting results because the business reaction to environmental
regulations has changed over time.
While the models do display some contradictory findings, I am more confident in
the results of the Levinson Index models. This variable is the best measure for
understanding the cost of environmental regulatory compliance to business and industry.
My study is focused on how state environmental stringency affects state economic
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growth. The typical argument revolves around the notion that environmental regulations
increase operating costs to business and these businesses will leave an area (choose to
operate elsewhere) if operating expenses are too high. When businesses leave, states will
suffer a negative economic impact. The Levinson Index provides a measure that captures
the cost of compliance to businesses. Thus, this variable measures the concept closest to
the theory driving my research.
There is a key drawback associated with the Levinson Index, though. As
mentioned, the Levinson Index is only available from 1977 to 1994. This limitation of
the data calls into question the generalizability of the results. The estimations indicate
that from 1977 to 1994 states that have higher pollution abatement costs imposed on
business and industry experience a negative impact on state economic performance.
However, since the Levinson Index is not available after 1994, it cannot be said with
certainty that this effect holds true today. Simply because such a negative effect was
evident from 1977 to 1994, it cannot be assumed that this effect reaches past 1994. Even
with this limitation, though, the Levinson Index models do provide a better understanding
of the relationship between state environmental policy stringency and economic growth
during the time period examined.
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, limitations of data availability have
created difficulties in my ability to reach firm conclusions regarding the impact of state
environmental regulations on state economic performance. While researchers have
developed specific environmental policy measures, these are all cross-sectional in nature.
In order to study state environmental policy in each state over time, accounting for
variability in the states, it is necessary to find another measure of environmental policy.
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Available longitudinal measures capture some aspect of state environmental policy
without actually specifically measuring state environmental policy.
One weakness of using these longitudinal measures is that none of them are
available for the entire time period I examine. Thus, I cannot be sure that when I
estimate the models with these different measures of policy that I am consistently
measuring the same concept in these models. As mentioned with regards to the Levinson
Index, this calls into question the generalizability of my results. Further, the state
environmental spending variable may not be adequately capturing the concept I hope to
measure – the level of commitment to environmental efforts by the states. This variable
may need to be reformulated as a proportion of total state personal income in order to
truly be able to account for whether some states spend more on environmental programs
simply because they have stronger economies, and thus, have more money to spend on
such programs. An effort must be made to resolve the possible endogenous relationship
between the state environmental spending and state income growth variables.
Future research should also try to resolve some of the curious results of the
control variables. In particular, the state institutional variables and the state educational
variables often produce confounding results in the modes I estimate. The cross-sectional
nature of the institutional variables may be responsible for results that are often at odds
with expectations. Since these measures do not vary over time, they may not be able to
accurately capture the change in state economic performance that could occur as a result
of legislative professionalism and gubernatorial power. In addition, the state educational
attainment results are not consistent throughout the models estimated. The results
frequently defy the conventional wisdom that a better educated citizenry can aid in a
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state’s economic performance. As detailed in chapter 5, the educational attainment data
suffers from three major flaws. First, the data is not consistently available for the years
1977 to 1988. Second, when reported in these years, the data is sometimes reported
regionally, sometimes reported by state. Finally, the question wording changed in 1989
from a question asking about years of school completed to actual degree attained. These
inconsistencies in the raw data may account for the incongruous results often found in the
models estimated. Thus, future research needs to account for problems with the control
variables, as well as the environmental policies variables.
Taking into account all of the measurement issues mentioned above, my research
indicates that when businesses spend more on pollution control efforts, state economies
do experience a negative impact on economic growth. Total state personal income is
lower and unemployment is higher in states that impose greater pollution abatement
compliance costs on business and industry. This effect is especially strong on state
unemployment rates. While this effect may be waning as business and industries come to
consider pollution abatement as a normal operating expense, I am cautious about drawing
such a conclusion until a better environmental policy measurement tool is available.
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APPENDIX A:
DESCRIPTION OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES TAKEN FROM
SITE SELECTION HANDBOOK: FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR INDUSTRY, TAX
INCENTIVES FOR INDUSTRY, AND POLLUTION CONTROL INCENTIVES FOR
INDUSTRY
State Industrial Aid (Financial Assistance for Industry)
1. State Sponsored Industrial Development Authority
2. Privately Sponsored Development Credit Corporation
3. State Authority or Agency Revenue Bond Financing
4. State Authority of Agency General Obligation Bond Financing
5. City and/or County Revenue Bond Financing
6. City and/or County General Obligation Bond Financing
7. State Loans for Building Construction
8. State Loans for Equipment, Machinery
9. City and/or County Loans for Building Construction
10. City and/or County Loans for Equipment, Machinery
11. State Loan Guarantees for Building Construction
12. State Loan Guarantees for Equipment, Machinery
13. City and/or County Loan Guarantees for Building Construction
14. City and/or County Loan Guarantees for Equipment, Machinery
15. State Financing Aid for Existing Plant Expansion
16. State Matching Funds for City and/or County Industrial Financing Programs
17. State Incentive for Establishing Industrial Plants in Areas of High Unemployment
18. City and/or County Incentive for Establishing Industrial Plants in Areas of High
Unemployment
Tax Incentives for Industry
1. Corporate Income Tax Exemption
2. Personal Income Tax Exemption
3. Excise Tax Exemption
4. Tax Exemption or Moratorium on Land, Capital Improvements
5. Tax Exemption or Moratorium on Equipment, Machinery
6. Inventory Tax Exemption on Goods in Transit (Freeport)
7. Tax Exemption on Manufacturers Inventory
8. Sales/Use Tax Exemption on New Equipment
9. Tax Exemption on Raw Materials Used in Manufacturing
10. Tax Incentive for Creation of Jobs
11. Tax Incentive for Industrial Investment
12. Tax Credits for Use of Specified State Products
13. Tax Stabilization Agreements for Specified Industries
14. Tax Exemption to Encourage Research and Development
15. Accelerated Depreciation of Industrial Equipment
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Pollution Control Incentives for Industry
1. Corporate Income Tax Exemption
2. Personal Income Tax Exemption
3. Excise Tax Exemption
4. Tax Exemption or Moratorium on Land, Capital Improvements
5. Tax Exemption or Moratorium on Equipment, Machinery
6. Inventory Tax Exemption on Goods in Transit (Freeport)
7. Tax Exemption on Manufacturers Inventory
8. Sales/Use Tax Exemption on New Equipment
9. Tax Exemption on Raw Materials Used in Manufacturing
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APPENDIX B:
LEVINSON INDEX
ADDITIONAL MODELS
Table B.1. FGLS estimate for Levinson Index and Change in Total State Personal Income
b

t

Intercept

0.088

5.28***

Environmental Policy Variable
The Levinson Index

-0.005

-2.08***

Business Policy Variables
Financial Assistance [1]
Tax Incentives [1]

-0.013
-0.577

-0.05
-1.32

National Economic Variables
Change in Per Capita GDP
National Unemployment

0.570
-0.002

21.98***
-3.05***

State Fiscal Variables
State Debt
Federal Aid [1]

-0.052
0.011

-1.93**
1.52

Structural/Institutional Variables
Tax Structure [1]
Gubernatorial Power
Legislative Professionalism

-0.009
-0.008
-0.030

-0.71
-3.27***
-3.78***

-0.222
-0.611
-0.018
0.003
-0.420
0.008
0.260
-0.246

-0.85
-1.39
-0.47
1.65*
-4.04***
2.02**
2.47**
-1.63

State Demographic Variables
Educational Attainment
High School Degree [1]
College Degree [1]
Manufacturing Employment
Political Culture (Moralistic)
Farms
South
Urbanization [1]
Black [1]
N
816
Pseudo R2
0.3255
Wald chi-square
727.94
Prob chi-square
0.0000
***prob < .01
** prob < .05
* prob < .10

[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation
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Table B.2. FGLS estimate for Levinson Index and Change in State Per Capita Income
b

t

Intercept

0.047

Environmental Policy Variable
The Levinson Index

-0.002

-1.31

Business Policy Variables
Financial Assistance [1]
Tax Incentives [1]

0.287
0.065

1.65*
0.21

National Economic Variables
Change in Per Capita GDP
National Unemployment

0.594
-0.001

26.42***
-3.29***

State Fiscal Variables
State Debt
Federal Aid [1]

-0.024
0.002

-1.24
0.28

Structural/Institutional Variables
Tax Structure [1]
Gubernatorial Power
Legislative Professionalism

-0.004
-0.001
-0.011

-0.39
-0.65
-2.21**

-0.149
-0.688
0.032
0.001
-0.097
0.005
-0.010
-0.129

-0.78
-2.19**
1.20
0.93
-1.27
1.86*
-0.15
-1.28

State Demographic Variables
Educational Attainment
High School Degree [1]
College Degree [1]
Manufacturing Employment
Political Culture (Moralistic)
Farms
South
Urbanization [1]
Black [1]
N
816
Pseudo R2
0.3390
Wald chi-square
940.77
Prob chi-square
0.0000
***prob < .01
** prob < .05
* prob < .10

3.90***

[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation
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Table B.3. FGLS estimate for Levinson Index and State Unemployment
b

t

Intercept

2.84

1.88*

Environmental Policy Variable
The Levinson Index

0.559

4.37***

Business Policy Variables
Financial Assistance [1]
Tax Incentives

0.786
0.010

0.05
0.05

National Economic Variables
Change in Per Capita GDP
National Unemployment

-0.428
0.929

-.039
31.87***

State Fiscal Variables
State Debt
Federal Aid

7.892
-0.001

3.99***
-3.10***

Structural/Institutional Variables
Tax Structure [1]
Gubernatorial Power
Legislative Professionalism

-0.233
-0.423
2.213

-0.18
-1.51
2.67***

0.004
0.001
-13.144
-0.127
-27.382
-1.014
-0.023
0.050

0.22
0.03
-3.94***
-0.81
-3.59***
-2.21***
-2.24***
2.70***

State Demographic Variables
Educational Attainment
High School Degree
College Degree
Manufacturing Employment
Political Culture (Moralistic)
Farms
South
Urbanization
Black
N
816
Pseudo R2
0.4409
Wald chi-square
1489.94
Prob chi-square
0.0000
***prob < .01
** prob < .05
* prob < .10

[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation

198

APPENDIX C:
LEVINSON INDEX/ENVIRONMENTAL SPENDING
ADDITIONAL MODELS
Table C.1. FGLS estimate for Levinson Index & State Environmental Spending and
Change in Total State Personal Income, Years 1986 – 1994, Including Pollution Control
b

t

Intercept

-0.011

-0.42

Environmental Policy Variable
Levinson Index [1]
Environmental Spending [1]

-0.393
0.194

-0.12
2.79***

Business Policy Variables
Financial Assistance [1]
Tax Incentives [1]
Pollution Control [1]

0.315
-0.447
-0.937

1.12
-0.73
-1.78*

National Economic Variables
Change in Per Capita GDP
National Unemployment

0.838
0.002

16.84***
2.05**

State Fiscal Variables
State Debt
Federal Aid [1]

-0.068
-0.011

-1.94***
-1.25

Structural/Institutional Variables
Tax Structure [1]
Gubernatorial Power
Legislative Professionalism

0.001
-0.004
-0.019

0.06
-1.53
-2.21***

State Demographic Variables
Educational Attainment
High School Degree [1]
0.707
1.95**
College Degree [1]
-0.913
-1.82*
Manufacturing Employment
0.126
2.32***
Political Culture (Moralistic)
0.001
0.47
Farms
-0.606
-4.20***
South
0.011
2.21***
Urbanization
-0.002
-0.19
Black [1]
-0.132
-0.71
N
336
0.2675
R2
Wald chi-square
431.72
Prob chi-square
0.0000
***prob < .01
** prob < .05
* prob < .10
[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation
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Table C.2. FGLS estimate for Levinson Index & State Environmental Spending and
Change in State Per Capita Income, Years 1986 - 1994, Including Pollution Control
b

t

Intercept

0.015

0.84

Environmental Policy Variable
Levinson Index
Environmental Spending [1]

0.001
0.163

0.43
3.13***

Business Policy Variables
Financial Assistance [1]
Tax Incentives [1]
Pollution Control [1]

0.548
-0.642
0.247

2.84***
-1.69*
0.71

National Economic Variables
Change in Per Capita GDP
National Unemployment [1]

0.808
0.047

21.34***
0.07

State Fiscal Variables
State Debt
Federal Aid [1]

-0.029
-0.005

-1.26
-0.80

Structural/Institutional Variables
Tax Structure [1]
Gubernatorial Power [1]
Legislative Professionalism

0.031
-0.073
-0.020

3.05***
0.04
-4.38***

-0.230
-0.540
0.133
0.002
-0.34
0.464
0.002
0.169

-0.98
-1.76*
4.84***
1.15
-0.33
0.16
0.46
1.49

State Demographic Variables
Educational Attainment
High School Degree [1]
College Degree [1]
Manufacturing Employment
Political Culture (Moralistic)
Farms
South
Urbanization [1]
Black
N
R2
Wald chi-square
Prob chi-square
***prob < .01
** prob < .05
* prob < .10

336
0.3368
832.27
0.0000

[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation
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Table C.3. FGLS estimate for Levinson Index & State Environmental Spending and
Unemployment, Years 1986 - 1994 Including Pollution Control
b

t

Intercept

7.850

4.83***

Environmental Policy Variable
Levinson Index
Environmental Spending

0.433
-0.006

3.02***
-1.81*

Business Policy Variables
Financial Assistance
Tax Incentives
Pollution Control

0.009
-0.135
0.176

0.56
-3.54***
3.92***

National Economic Variables
Change in Per Capita GDP
National Unemployment

-3.188
0.747

-1.43
15.77***

State Fiscal Variables
State Debt
Federal Aid [1]

7.413
-0.056

3.12***
-0.09

Structural/Institutional Variables
Tax Structure
Gubernatorial Power
Legislative Professionalism

0.004
-0.669
2.60

2.43***
-0.28
3.14***

-0.076
-0.001
-24.872
-0.067
-11.473
-0.444
-0.002
0.011

-3.23***
-0.01
-7.10***
-0.40
-1.39
-1.06
-1.89**
0.61***

State Demographic Variables
Educational Attainment
High School Degree
College Degree
Manufacturing Employment
Political Culture (Moralistic)
Farms
South
Urbanization
Black
N
R2
Wald chi-square
Prob chi-square
***prob < .01
** prob < .05
* prob < .10

336
0.3786
576.26
0.0000

[1] Coefficient has been multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate interpretation
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